Is Headline Studio by CoSchedule safe?
Headline Studio by CoSchedule accepts postMessage commands from any ngrok.io tunnel, allowing manipulation of CMS title fields and stored credentials.
The extension injects content scripts on all pages to provide a headline analysis sidebar. Its postMessage handlers in hub.bundle.js and spoke.bundle.js accept messages from any origin matching 'ngrok.io' or '.ngrok.io', rather than restricting to CoSchedule's own domains. Through the SAVE_AUTH_STATE message type, any ngrok tunnel can overwrite the CoSchedule userId and authToken stored in chrome.storage.local; through UPDATE_STATE, it can rewrite headline text fields on CMS editing pages.
Part of this rating comes from analysis signals we haven't published as detailed findings yet.
Who publishes itCoschedule, LLC - 1 other listing from the same operator, none carrying a finding
Coschedule, LLC - 1 other listing from the same operator, none carrying a finding
What this publisher told the store about itself, and the other listings that told it the same thing.
Same store account
1 other listing published from this account, 2k+ users between them, none of them carrying a finding.
AI-generated. Findings may contain errors. Those marked Verified have been manually reviewed.
Publishers can request a review.
What it can do
Permissions this extension asks for, as declared in version 3.1.7. Asking for a permission is not a finding on its own - it is what the extension can do if it chooses to.
Read and change your data on every site you visit
http://*/*
Read and change your data on every secure site you visit
https://*/*
Store data in your browser
storage