Is Rakuten: Get Cash Back For Shopping safe?

High risk

Rakuten is high risk.

Code analysis indicates Rakuten captures the full HTML of your order confirmation pages and sends it to third-party servers.

When an order confirmation page loads, the extension reads the complete innerHTML of the page and POSTs it to capture.ecbsn.com and capture.fillr-tech.com. Requests include a hardcoded developer key. Order confirmation pages typically contain itemized purchase details, shipping addresses, and personal identifiers. This behavior has not been directly verified through dynamic analysis.

Rakuten Ebatesv26.22.1Extension ID chhjbpecpncaggjpdakmflnfcopglcmiChrome Web Store
78Risk
Who publishes it

Ebates Performance Marketing Inc., d/b/a Rakuten Rewards - no other listings under this identity, 6 shared hostnames

Publisher
Rakuten Ebates
Declared legal entity
Ebates Performance Marketing Inc., d/b/a Rakuten Rewards
Registered address
800 Concar Drive, 5th Floor, San Mateo, CA 94402, US

Shared hosts - 6 hostnames

Hostnames hardcoded in this extension that few other listings call. That can mean one operator behind both, and it can equally mean a small shared vendor, so it is context rather than a conclusion. Hosts that many listings call are left out: they are services, not connections.

api.fillr.com
Also called by 2 other listings, including Rakuten: Get Cash Back For Shopping
button.rrcbsn.com
Also called by 2 other listings, including Rakuten: Get Cash Back For Shopping
search.ecbsn.com
Also called by 2 other listings, including Rakuten: Get Cash Back For Shopping
static.ebates.com
Also called by 2 other listings, including Rakuten: Get Cash Back For Shopping
static.rakuten.com
Also called by 2 other listings
verishop.com
Also called by 2 other listings
AI-assisted analysis.

Rakuten findings

Rakuten uploads checkout and order pages to ocp.fillr.com on listed stores

HighunwantedCWE-200Static analysis

Code analysis shows that on stores in a remote allow-list, the extension uploads the full checkout page and order confirmation page HTML to ocp.fillr.com.

What actually happens

You did this

You reach checkout and then the order confirmation page on a store on the remote allow-list.

The allow-list and a feature flag are delivered by remote settings.

The extension did this

The extension sends the HTML of both pages to ocp.fillr.com in one request.

The request carries your tracking ticket and Rakuten auth token as headers.

The code that does this

Checkout page HTML is captured and queued for upload

Readable version

Background upload with auth headers

js/bg.js
await this.postData({  url: this.deps.domUploadUrl,  headers: {    trackingTicket: s,    ebtoken: t,    "x-dev-key": this.deps.domUploadDevKey  },  data: o,  errorContext: { label: "CheckoutAndOCPDOMUpload", ttn: s, store_id: i, store_name: n }})

Destination constant

js/bg.js
FILLR_DOM_UPLOAD_URL: "https://ocp.fillr.com/api/v1.0/dom-capture"

What the upload contains

  • Checkout page HTML
    <html>...<form id="checkout">...</form></html> (illustrative)

    The page where you enter delivery and payment details, minus input value attributes.

  • Confirmation page HTML
    <html>...Order #123456 confirmed...</html> (illustrative)

    The order confirmation page, which may show items, totals and your name.

  • Page URLs
    https://www.bombas.com/checkout (illustrative)

    The address of each captured page.

  • Tracking ticket
    ttn-7f3a91c2 (illustrative)

    Links the upload to your shopping trip.

  • Rakuten auth token
    ebtoken: <redacted>

    Your account token, sent as the ebtoken header.

Where the pages are sent

    • ocp.fillr.com

    New destination for combined checkout and confirmation page HTML.

    • capture.ecbsn.com

    Existing destination for confirmation-page-only capture, still present in the code.

Observation

Static analysis finding. This behaviour was identified by reading the shipped extension code and has not yet been reproduced in a live run. The trigger conditions and the exact data sent are read from the code, not from an observed capture.

Rakuten Uploads Full Order Page HTML to Two Third-Party Servers

HighunwantedCWE-359Dynamic sandbox

During an active shopping trip, a purchase makes the extension read the order confirmation HTML (name, address, items, total) and upload it to capture.ecbsn.com and capture.fillr-tech.com via a hardcoded shared API key.

What actually happens

You did this

You complete a purchase on any merchant site where you activated a Rakuten shopping trip.

The trigger requires an active shopping trip tracking number (TTN), meaning Rakuten was already involved in tracking your browsing session at that merchant.

The extension did this

Rakuten reads the entire HTML of your order confirmation page and uploads it to two third-party servers.

Your order details, including name, shipping address, items, and total, are packaged as gzip-compressed JSON and sent to both Rakuten's analytics backend and a Fillr data capture service using a hardcoded developer key.

Data included in the order confirmation page upload

  • Full order page HTML
    <!DOCTYPE html><html><head>...</head><body>...Order #A1B2C3D4 confirmed. Shipping to Jane Smith, 42 Maple St, Portland OR 97201...</body></html>

    The full HTML of your checkout confirmation page: name, delivery address, items, quantities, prices, order number.

  • Order confirmation URL
    https://www.amazon.com/gp/buy/thankyou/handlers/display.html?ie=UTF8&checkoutSessionId=abc123

    The full URL of the order confirmation page, sent as content_source in the upload payload.

  • Rakuten Member ID
    rr_7482910

    Your Rakuten account identifier, included in the ecbsn.com upload payload as rr_member_id.

  • Store Name and ID
    Amazon / store_id: 1234

    The merchant name and internal Rakuten store identifier, included in both upload payloads.

The code that does this

merchant.js: page classifier triggers innerHTML capture

Readable version

Trigger in content/merchant.js (annotated)

js/content/merchant.js
// Check feature flag (OCPDOM_CAPTURE_EABLED — note: typo in source)const captureEnabled = featureFlags.isEnabled(FLAGS.OCPDOM_CAPTURE_EABLED);// Fire only when: page is an order confirmation, capture not yet done,// and an active Rakuten shopping trip tracking number existsif (pageType === 'OrderConfirm' && captureEnabled &&    !this.OCPDOMCaptured && this.merchant.session.shoppingTrip.ttn) {  // Capture the ENTIRE page HTML  const html = document.documentElement.innerHTML;  if (html) {    // Fire event to background service worker    sendEvent('OCPDOMCapture', {      content: html,          // full page HTML      merchant: this.merchant,      detail: pageType    });    this.OCPDOMCaptured = true;  // prevent duplicate sends  }}

bg.js: dual POST handler (annotated)

js/bg.js
// Upload #1: POST to Rakuten analytics backend (ecbsn.com)handleCaptureOrderPage({ url, tabId, data }) {  const { storeName, storeId, session } = data.merchant;  this.postData(this.deps.captureOrderUrl, {}, {    tenant_id: this.deps.tenantId,    source_name: 'toolbar',    store_name: storeName,    store_id: storeId,    shopping_trip_id: session.shoppingTrip.ttn,    rr_member_id: this.deps.getMemberId(),  // Rakuten account ID    content_source: url,                    // order confirmation URL    content_type: 'order confirmation',    content_format: 'html',    content: data.content                   // full page HTML  });}// Upload #2: POST to Fillr third-party capture (fillr-tech.com)handleOCPDOMCapture({ url, tabId, data }) {  const ebToken = this.deps.getEBToken();  if (this.deps.fillrOCPDOMUploadUrl && ebToken) {    const headers = {      'x-dev-key': this.deps.domUploadDevKey,  // hardcoded: f401eb0b18d9ca5c20ad6e16574b0e27      ebtoken: ebToken    };    this.postData(this.deps.fillrOCPDOMUploadUrl, headers, {      tracking_ticket: session.shoppingTrip.ttn,      content: data.content  // same full page HTML    });  }}// Both uploads use gzip compressionasync postData(url, extraHeaders = {}, payload) {  const compressed = await gzip(JSON.stringify(payload));  return await fetch(url, {    method: 'POST',    headers: {      'Content-Type': 'application/json',      'Content-Encoding': 'gzip',      ...extraHeaders    },    body: compressed  });}

Both servers receive a copy of your order confirmation HTML

    • capture.ecbsn.com

    Rakuten's order capture analytics backend (Rakuten/Ebates). Receives full page HTML plus member ID, shopping trip ID, store details, and order URL.

    • capture.fillr-tech.com

    Fillr's third-party data capture service. Receives a copy of the order page HTML via a hardcoded developer key. Fillr is an autofill/data company; appears to be a data partnership.

Reproduce it yourself

Reads the Rakuten extension source files and confirms all three components of the order capture mechanism are present: the innerHTML trigger in merchant.js, the dual-POST handler in bg.js, and the hardcoded Fillr dev key.

Requires
  • Node.js 18+
rakuten-ocp-capture-verify.js · js
'use strict';const fs = require('fs');const path = require('path');const EXT_DIR = process.argv[2] || './extracted';const bgContent = fs.readFileSync(path.join(EXT_DIR, 'js/bg.js'), 'utf8');const merchantContent = fs.readFileSync(path.join(EXT_DIR, 'js/content/merchant.js'), 'utf8');const extract = (content, pattern) => {  const m = content.match(pattern);  return m ? m[1] : '(NOT FOUND)';};const CAPTURE_ORDER              = extract(bgContent, /CAPTURE_ORDER:"([^"]+)"/);const FILLR_OCP_DOM_UPLOAD_DEVKEY = extract(bgContent, /FILLR_OCP_DOM_UPLOAD_DEVKEY:"([^"]+)"/);const FILLR_OCP_DOM_UPLOAD_URL    = extract(bgContent, /FILLR_OCP_DOM_UPLOAD_URL:"([^"]+)"/);const hasHandleCaptureOrderPage  = bgContent.includes('handleCaptureOrderPage');const hasHandleOCPDOMCapture     = bgContent.includes('handleOCPDOMCapture');const hasGzip                    = bgContent.includes('Content-Encoding') && bgContent.includes('gzip');const hasDevKeyHeader            = bgContent.includes('x-dev-key');const hasInnerHTMLCapture        = merchantContent.includes('document.documentElement.innerHTML');const hasOrderConfirmTrigger     = merchantContent.includes('OrderConfirm');const EXPECTED_DEV_KEY = 'f401eb0b18d9ca5c20ad6e16574b0e27';const keyMatch = FILLR_OCP_DOM_UPLOAD_DEVKEY === EXPECTED_DEV_KEY;console.log('=== Rakuten Claim 1122: Order Confirmation Page HTML Capture ===\n');console.log('Hardcoded endpoints extracted from js/bg.js:');console.log('  CAPTURE_ORDER:               ' + CAPTURE_ORDER);console.log('  FILLR_OCP_DOM_UPLOAD_URL:    ' + FILLR_OCP_DOM_UPLOAD_URL);console.log('  FILLR_OCP_DOM_UPLOAD_DEVKEY: ' + FILLR_OCP_DOM_UPLOAD_DEVKEY);console.log('  Dev key matches expected:    ' + keyMatch);console.log();console.log('Handler presence in js/bg.js:');console.log('  handleCaptureOrderPage: ' + hasHandleCaptureOrderPage);console.log('  handleOCPDOMCapture:    ' + hasHandleOCPDOMCapture);console.log('  gzip encoding:          ' + hasGzip);console.log('  x-dev-key header:       ' + hasDevKeyHeader);console.log();console.log('Trigger in js/content/merchant.js:');console.log('  innerHTML capture:       ' + hasInnerHTMLCapture);console.log('  OrderConfirm classifier: ' + hasOrderConfirmTrigger);console.log();if (keyMatch && hasHandleCaptureOrderPage && hasHandleOCPDOMCapture && hasInnerHTMLCapture) {  console.log('RESULT: CONFIRMED — all claim components present.');  console.log('  1. merchant.js reads innerHTML on OrderConfirm pages with active TTN.');  console.log('  2. bg.js POSTs HTML to ' + CAPTURE_ORDER);  console.log('  3. bg.js POSTs same HTML to ' + FILLR_OCP_DOM_UPLOAD_URL);  console.log('     using hardcoded dev key: ' + FILLR_OCP_DOM_UPLOAD_DEVKEY);  console.log('  4. Both uploads are gzip-compressed JSON.');} else {  console.log('RESULT: INCONCLUSIVE — one or more components not found.');}
How to run it
  1. 1node rakuten-ocp-capture-verify.js /path/to/chhjbpecpncaggjpdakmflnfcopglcmi/extracted

Merchant site visits sent to two Rakuten analytics endpoints on every navigation

MediumunwantedCWE-359Dynamic sandbox

Navigating to any site on Rakuten's tracked merchant list sends your hostname and a session ID to Segment (events.engager.ecbsn.com) and messaging (api.rakuten.com).

What actually happens

You did this

You navigate to a website on Rakuten's merchant tracking list, such as amazon.com, walmart.com, or ebay.com.

The extension did this

The extension sends your hostname to two Rakuten-controlled batch endpoints: a Segment analytics endpoint and a messaging endpoint.

This fires once per domain per 30-minute window. No shopping trip or click-through is required.

What the Segment endpoint (events.engager.ecbsn.com/v1/batch) receives on each navigation

  • Merchant hostname
    amazon.com

    The domain of the merchant site you are visiting, for example amazon.com.

  • Toolbar ID
    465221942

    A numeric identifier assigned to your Rakuten extension install, used to link events back to your account.

  • Anonymous ID
    a3f71b2c-84de-4e9c-bc12-3f9a11e70d55

    A persistent session identifier that Rakuten uses to correlate browsing events across navigations.

  • User agent
    Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36

    Your browser name and version string, used for device fingerprinting.

  • Extension version
    5.1.0

    The version of the Rakuten extension installed.

Data received by Rakuten's messaging endpoint (messages/batch)

  • Page URL
    amazon.com/

    The full URL of the merchant page you visited.

  • Page host
    amazon.com

    The hostname of the page you are on.

  • Installation ID
    b2e44a91-3f87-4c01-a812-9e3c5d70b124

    A persistent identifier tied to your extension installation.

  • User agent
    Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36

    Your browser name and version string.

Captured request

POSThttps://events.engager.ecbsn.com/v1/batch

200 OK (empty body). Three identical POST requests captured during dynamic analysis: one each for amazon.com, walmart.com, ebay.com.

Headers
Content-Type
application/json
Authorization
Basic UlJrenJjdEV3dG1ndDhQZ1lXa0Y2U3pONjJvYUFpSUQ6
Body
{  "batch": [    {      "type": "track",      "event": "Visit NP Page",      "properties": {        "host": "amazon.com"      },      "context": {        "browser_agent": "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36",        "app_version": "5.1.0",        "browser": "chrome",        "toolbarid": 465221942      },      "anonymousId": "a3f71b2c-84de-4e9c-bc12-3f9a11e70d55",      "writeKey": "RRkzrctEwtmgt8PgYWkF6SzN62oaAiID",      "sentAt": "2026-04-18T13:29:47.212Z"    }  ],  "sentAt": "2026-04-18T13:29:47.213Z"}

The code that does this

The code that fires both tracking calls on every matched merchant navigation:

Readable version

Domain check and dual-track call

// Fires on every handleDocumentComplete (navigation) event.async function trackNonPartnerPage(url) {  const domain = parseDomain(url)?.domain;  if (!domain) return;  if (!settings.get('trackNP')) return;  // feature flag must be enabled  if (!self.EBATES) return;  // Lazy-load tracked domain list from remote config  if (!domainSet) domainSet = await DomainList.getDomains();  if (!domainSet.has(domain)) return;  // Dedup: skip if already sent within the last 30 minutes  if (!lastVisitMap) lastVisitMap = await storage.get('np-domains-last-visit') || new Map();  lastVisitMap.forEach((ts, d) => {    if (ts + 1_800_000 < Date.now()) lastVisitMap.delete(d);  // expire old entries  });  if (!lastVisitMap.has(domain)) {    // Send to Segment analytics    EBATES.segment.track('Visit NP Page', { host: domain });    // Send to Rakuten holistic messaging    const fullUrl = `https://${domain}`;    EBATES.holistic.track(Events.WebsiteVisited, {      data: { website_visit_id: generateUUID() },      url: fullUrl    });  }  lastVisitMap.set(domain, Date.now());  await storage.set('np-domains-last-visit', lastVisitMap);}

Segment batch POST with hardcoded write key

// The Segment analytics client, configured with a hardcoded write key.const segmentClient = new SegmentAnalytics({  key: config.get('SEGMENT_KEY'),    // 'RRkzrctEwtmgt8PgYWkF6SzN62oaAiID'  host: config.get('SEGMENT_HOST'),  // 'https://events.engager.ecbsn.com'});// The POST that transmits queued events:fetch(`${this.host}/v1/batch`, {  method: 'POST',  headers: {    Authorization: `Basic ${btoa(this.writeKey + ':')}`,    'Content-Type': 'application/json',  },  body: JSON.stringify(batch),});

Where your browsing data ends up

    • events.engager.ecbsn.com

    Rakuten's self-hosted Segment analytics endpoint. Receives 'Visit NP Page' events including merchant hostname, toolbar ID, and anonymous ID. ecbsn.com is a Rakuten-owned domain.

    • api.rakuten.com

    Rakuten's core API. Receives 'Website Visited' holistic events including page.url, page.host, and installation ID via the /message/v2/regions/USA/messages/batch path.

+3 more findings not shown

If you have Rakuten installed

  1. Open chrome://extensions and turn on Developer mode to show IDs. Find the one with ID chhjbpecpncaggjpdakmflnfcopglcmi and choose Remove.
  2. Block the servers only it was seen contacting: search.ecbsn.com, cas.rrcbsn.com.
  3. Scan your browser to check the rest of your extensions.

What Rakuten can do

Permissions this extension asks for, as declared in version 26.21.0. Asking for a permission is not a finding on its own - it is what the extension can do if it chooses to. The current listed version is 26.22.1, which we have not unpacked yet.

  • Read and change your data on every site you visit

    <all_urls>

  • See the address and title of every tab you have open

    tabs

  • See every page you navigate to, as you navigate to it

    webNavigation

  • Watch every request your browser makes

    webRequest

  • Store data in your browser

    storage

  • Read and change cookies, including the ones that keep you signed in

    cookies

  • Schedule its own background tasks

    alarms

  • Run its own code inside the pages you visit

    scripting

Rakuten version history

  1. 26.3.0

    Mar 4, 2026

  2. +21 more

  3. 26.21.0

    Nov 2, 2026

  4. 26.22.0

    Nov 12, 2026

  5. 26.22.1

    Nov 17, 2026

Where Rakuten sends data

  • api.engager.ecbsn.com/datagrid/rest/…136 calls

    From its background script · 1 other extension

  • www.rakuten.com/toolbar/config/…64 calls

    From its background script · 2 other extensions

  • api.engager.ecbsn.com/feedapi/v3/…32 calls

    From its background script · 1 other extension

  • static.rakuten.com/toolbar/config/…32 calls

    From its background script · 2 other extensions

  • api.engager.ecbsn.com/feedapi/v1/…30 calls

    From its background script · 1 other extension

  • api.rakuten.com/offer/v1/…24 calls

    From its background script · 1 other extension

  • api.rakuten.com/message/v2/…16 calls

    From its background script · 1 other extension

  • events.engager.ecbsn.com/v1/batch16 calls

    From its background script · 2 other extensions

  • ffconf.ecbsn.com/featureflags16 calls

    From its background script · 1 other extension

  • api.rakuten.com/experiment/v4/…14 calls

    From its background script · 1 other extension

  • browser-intake-datadoghq.com/api/v2/…14 calls

    From its background script · 3 other extensions

  • static.rakuten.com/static/fonts/…12 calls

    From its own pages · 2 other extensions

  • www.rakuten.com/api/v3/…6 calls

    From its background script · 2 other extensions

  • search.ecbsn.com/search/price-magic/…4 calls

    From its background script · only this extension

  • www.rakuten.com/api/ads3 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · 2 other extensions

  • www.rakuten.com/geogating/sorry3 calls

    From its background script · 2 other extensions

  • www.rakuten.com/reclaim/set-cookie3 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · 2 other extensions

  • cas.rrcbsn.com/cart_abandonment/v1/…2 calls

    From its background script · only this extension

  • capture.ecbsn.com

    Found in its code · 5 other extensions

  • capture.fillr-tech.com

    Found in its code · 1 other extension

Chrome Web Store listing

Versions
26.22.1 latest of 25 seen since March 4, 2026
Store rating
4.7 from 43,581 ratings
Last updated
November 17, 2026
Size
1.57 MiB
Privacy policy
www.rakuten.com
Updated November 20, 2026