Is AliDownloader | Download AliExpress images safe?
AliDownloader is high risk. The extension watches clicks on AliExpress item and store links and sends the address to its background code. That opens an inactive tab to clickwrap.xyz carrying the link.…
Strong link to a flagged operator: 2 of the 3 other listings from the same operator are rated high or critical for malicious behavior. Flagged: AliExpress CSV Export (high), AliDownloader Plus | Get AliExpress images (high).
Who publishes itMladen Markovic - 3 other listings from the same operator, 2 of them carrying a finding
Mladen Markovic - 3 other listings from the same operator, 2 of them carrying a finding
Same store account
3 other listings published from this account, 15k+ users between them. 2 of them carry a finding.
Shared hosts - 2 hostnames
Hostnames hardcoded in this extension that few other listings call. That can mean one operator behind both, and it can equally mean a small shared vendor, so it is context rather than a conclusion. Hosts that many listings call are left out: they are services, not connections.
AliDownloader findings
Opens a background tab to clickwrap.xyz with AliExpress links you click
The extension watches clicks on AliExpress item and store links and sends the address to its background code.
That opens an inactive tab to clickwrap.xyz carrying the link.
What actually happens
You click certain AliExpress item or store links.
The content script checks link targets that contain /item or /store.
The extension opens an inactive tab to clickwrap.xyz with the selected URL attached.
The request URL includes cpa and subid=alid parameters before the original destination URL.
Fields in the affiliate request URL
- Selected destination URLhttps://www.aliexpress.com/item/1005001234567890.html
Shows the AliExpress item or store page you clicked.
- Affiliate sub IDalid
Labels the request for the affiliate endpoint.
- Cost-per-action path/cpa
Routes the request through the affiliate tracking path before the selected destination URL.
Captured request
Code path creates this inactive-tab navigation; no request or response body is present for this GET URL.
The code that does this
The link click and inactive affiliate tab paths are present in shipped code
Content-script click handler after formatting
contentScript.jspc = (t, e, r, o) => { var n, a; return o && clearInterval(o), (null == (n = { url: (a = e, a.startsWith("//") && (a = location.protocol + a), a.startsWith("/item") && (a = location.protocol + "//" + location.host + a), a.split("?")[0]) }) ? void 0 : n.url) && chrome.runtime.sendMessage({ action: sr, url: (null == n ? void 0 : n.url) ? n.url : null }, (function(t) { return !0 })), document.querySelectorAll(`.${dc}`).forEach((t => { t.removeEventListener("click", (t => pc(t, "", (() => {})))) })), r(), t.preventDefault(), !1}Content-script link scanner after formatting
contentScript.jsmc = () => { chrome.storage.local.get(null, (function(t) { const e = (t => { const e = t.getDate(), r = t.getMonth(), o = t.getFullYear(); return `${e} ${["January","February","March","April","May","June","July","August","September","October","November","December"][r]} ${o}` })(new Date); (null == t ? void 0 : t[sr]) !== btoa(`${e}${uc}`) && (t => { const e = setInterval((() => { document.querySelectorAll("*").forEach((r => { const o = r.href; var n; o && (r.classList.contains(dc) || ((n = o).includes("/item") || n.includes("/store")) && (r.classList.add(dc), r.addEventListener("click", (r => pc(r, o, t, e))))) })) }), 1e3) })((() => { chrome.storage.local.set({ [sr]: btoa(`${e}${uc}`) }, (function() {})) })) }))}Background message handler after formatting
background.jschrome.runtime.setUninstallURL("https://tally.so/r/3y0pA8"), chrome.runtime.onMessage.addListener(((e, t, r) => { var s, h; return (null == e ? void 0 : e.action) == l && chrome.tabs.create({ active: !1, index: (null === (s = null == t ? void 0 : t.tab) || void 0 === s ? void 0 : s.index) ? (null === (h = null == t ? void 0 : t.tab) || void 0 === h ? void 0 : h.index) + 1 : 1, url: "http://clickwrap.xyz/cpa?subid=alid&url=" + ((null == e ? void 0 : e.url) ? e.url : "https://aliexpress.com") }), (null == e ? void 0 : e.messageType) == i ? (Ar(null == e ? void 0 : e.textMessage, t, null == e ? void 0 : e.toastType), void r(!0)) : (null == e ? void 0 : e.messageType) == u ? (Pr(void 0, void 0, void 0, (function*() { (null == e ? void 0 : e.base64String) && (null == e ? void 0 : e.filename) && (yield chrome.downloads.download({ url: null == e ? void 0 : e.base64String, filename: null == e ? void 0 : e.filename }), r(!0)) })), !0) : (null == e ? void 0 : e.messageType) == n ? (Pr(void 0, void 0, void 0, (function*() { yield Cr(null == e ? void 0 : e.data, t), r(!0) })), !0) : e.messageType == o ? (Pr(void 0, void 0, void 0, (function*() { try { const e = yield Dr(); r(e) } catch (e) { return { contextMenus: !1, usDomain: !1 } } })), !0) : (null == e ? void 0 : e.messageType) == c ? (Pr(void 0, void 0, void 0, (function*() { try { yield y(e.name, e.params), r(!0) } catch (e) { E(e, "Error while sending GA event"), r(!1) } })), !0) : e.messageType != a || !(null == e ? void 0 : e.permissionType) || (Pr(void 0, void 0, void 0, (function*() { try { const n = yield(t = e.permissionType, Or(void 0, void 0, void 0, (function*() { return new Promise((e => { try { if ("contextMenus" === t) chrome.permissions.request({ permissions: ["contextMenus"] }, (t => { e(t) })); else { if ("aliUsDomain" !== t) throw new Error("Invalid permission type"); chrome.permissions.request({ origins: ["*://*.aliexpress.us/*"] }, (t => { e(t) })) } } catch (t) { e(!1) } })) }))); r(n), "contextMenus" === e.permissionType && n && (yield Tr()) } catch (e) { r(!1) } var t })), !0)}))External destination opened by this path
- clickwrap.xyz
Receives the selected AliExpress URL through an affiliate-style cpa URL with subid=alid.
AliDownloader posts usage events with a persistent ID
When you use AliDownloader actions like the image-download context menu, the extension posts a usage event to api.alibill.net.
It reads or creates a stored client ID and attaches it; dynamic analysis confirmed the POST but not the body.
What actually happens
You use an AliDownloader download action on an AliExpress page.
The right-click image-download path is one confirmed trigger.
The extension posts a usage event with a persistent client ID to api.alibill.net.
Dynamic analysis confirmed the POST request, while the shipped code shows the JSON fields assembled for the request.
Captured request
Observed during dynamic analysis as a POST to this URL; no request body was recorded.
- Content-Type
- application/json
Fields assembled by the analytics sender
- Usage eventRIGHT_CLICK_IMAGE_DOWNLOADED
Shows which extension action you used.
- Persistent client ID6f3a4a59-0a9f-4d7e-a4f8-3562e69b9b65
Lets the analytics endpoint connect multiple extension events from the same browser profile.
- Event parameters{}
Adds action-specific context when the caller supplies it.
The code that does this
The stored identifier and analytics POST are in the shipped background bundle
Analytics sender after formatting
background.jsfunction y(e) { return v(this, arguments, void 0, (function*(e, t = {}) { const r = yield _(d.GA_CLIENT_ID); let n = "string" == typeof r ? r.trim() : ""; 0 === n.length && (n = crypto.randomUUID(), yield g(d.GA_CLIENT_ID, n)); const i = { eventName: e, clientId: n, params: t }; return yield fetch("https://api.alibill.net/service/analytics/ga?extension=alidownloader", { method: "POST", headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" }, body: JSON.stringify(i) }), !0 }))}Context-menu image download trigger after formatting
background.jsconst Tr = () => Pr(void 0, void 0, void 0, (function*() { (yield xr(void 0, void 0, void 0, (function*() { return new Promise((e => { try { chrome.permissions.contains({ permissions: ["contextMenus"] }, (t => e(t))) } catch (t) { return e(!1) } })) }))) && chrome.contextMenus.removeAll((() => { chrome.contextMenus.create({ contexts: ["image"], title: "Download with AliDownloader", id: "downloadImage", documentUrlPatterns: ["*://*.aliexpress.com/*", "*://*.aliexpress.ru/*", "*://*.aliexpress.us/*"] }, (() => { chrome.runtime.lastError || chrome.contextMenus.onClicked.addListener(((e, t) => Pr(void 0, void 0, void 0, (function*() { if (e.srcUrl) { y(m.RIGHT_CLICK_IMAGE_DOWNLOADED); const t = br(e.srcUrl), r = wr(e.srcUrl); if (t) { const e = yield Er({ url: t }); e && chrome.downloads.download({ url: e, filename: r }) } } })))) })) }))}))External destination contacted by this path
- api.alibill.net
Receives AliDownloader usage analytics events with the stored client ID.
If you have AliDownloader installed
- Open
chrome://extensionsand turn on Developer mode to show IDs. Find the one with IDmbjikohjdmmhmmafgeigacodcgajeogeand choose Remove. - Scan your browser to check the rest of your extensions.
What AliDownloader can do
Permissions this extension asks for, as declared in version 2.2.0. Asking for a permission is not a finding on its own - it is what the extension can do if it chooses to.
Read and change your data on alicdn.com
*://*.alicdn.com/*
Read and change your data on cloud.video.taobao.com
*://cloud.video.taobao.com/*
Read and change your data on aliexpress.com
*://*.aliexpress.com/*
Read and change your data on alidownloader.com
*://*.alidownloader.com/*
Read and change your data on aliexpress.ru
*://*.aliexpress.ru/*
Start, monitor and manage your downloads
downloads
See the address and title of every tab you have open
tabs
Store data in your browser
storage
Chrome Web Store listing
- Versions
- 2.2.0 seen since March 4, 2026
- Store rating
- 3.3 from 27 ratings
- Last updated
- October 25, 2025
- Size
- 564 KiB
- Privacy policy
- www.toriox.dev
