Is AVG SafePrice safe?

High risk

AVG SafePrice is high risk. AVG SafePrice puts a script in every web page that records the addresses you move to, even ones you did not type. Testing saw it report Amazon moves to AVG's background code. Onward sending is switched off but can be changed.

AVG Technologiesv25.9.0.943Extension ID mbckjcfnjmoiinpgddefodcighgikkgnChrome Web Store
74Risk
Who publishes it

Gen Digital - 17 other listings from the same operator, 2 of them carrying a finding

Publisher
AVG Technologies
Declared legal entity
Gen Digital
Registered address
60 E Rio Salado Pkwy, Tempe, AZ 85281-9124, US
Registered contact
Gen Digital Inc

Same store account

1 other listing published from this account, 500k+ users between them, none of them carrying a finding.

AI-assisted analysis.

AVG SafePrice findings

Watches every page address you navigate to, to detect affiliate redirects

HighunwantedCWE-359Dynamic sandbox

AVG SafePrice puts a script in every web page that records the addresses you move to, even ones you did not type.

What actually happens

You did this

You load or navigate to any page over HTTP or HTTPS.

Fires on chrome.webNavigation.onCommitted for the top frame of any http:// or https:// tab – there is no check for a shopping/merchant domain before this fires.

The extension did this

The extension injects a script into the page's own JavaScript context that watches every way you can navigate away from it.

chrome.scripting.executeScript loads redirectionChainSiteScript.js with world:'MAIN', giving it the same JS context the page itself runs in, rather than the isolated content-script sandbox most extensions use.

The code that does this

Unconditional injection on every navigation, and the navigation-API patches it installs

Readable version

Injector registered on every committed HTTP/HTTPS navigation

background.js:55815
const REDIRECTION_CHAIN_SCRIPT = "redirectionChainSiteScript.js";class RedirectionChainSiteScriptInjector {  constructor(logger) {    this.logger = logger;    this.started = false;  }  start() {    if (this.started) return;    this.started = true;    // Registered on chrome.webNavigation.onCommitted -- fires for every    // committed navigation in every tab, not just shopping sites.    webNavigationOnCommitted.addListener((navDetails) => {      if (navDetails.tabId < 0 || navDetails.frameId !== 0) return;      const url = navDetails.url;      if (url && (url.startsWith("http://") || url.startsWith("https://"))) {        // No allowlist check against a merchant domain list here --        // any committed http/https top-frame navigation qualifies.        chrome.scripting          .executeScript({            siteScriptPath: [REDIRECTION_CHAIN_SCRIPT],            tabId: navDetails.tabId,            frameIds: [0],            world: "MAIN", // runs in the page's own JS context, not the isolated content-script world          })          .catch((err) => {            this.logger.debug(`Failed to inject ${REDIRECTION_CHAIN_SCRIPT} into tab ${navDetails.tabId}:`, err);          });      }    });  }}

Location/history/window.open patches installed in the page's own JS context

redirectionChainSiteScript.js
const HOOK_FLAG = "__centlyRdSiteHookInstalled__";const win = window;if (win[HOOK_FLAG]) return; // only patch once per pagefunction reportHop(payload) {  const message = { source: "cently-rd-site", payload };  try {    window.postMessage(message, "*");  } catch (e) {    try {      window.postMessage(JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(message)), "*");    } catch (e2) {}  }}function captureStack() {  const { stack } = new Error();  if (stack) return stack.split("\n").slice(2, 8).join("\n");}function resolveUrl(value) {  if (value == null) return;  try {    return new URL(value.toString(), location.href).href;  } catch (e) {    return value.toString();  }}win[HOOK_FLAG] = true;const locationProto = Location.prototype;// Patch location.assign / .replace / .reloadfunction patchLocationMethod(methodName, label) {  const original = locationProto[methodName];  if (typeof original !== "function") return;  const patched = function (...args) {    const targetUrl = methodName === "reload" ? location.href : (resolveUrl(args[0]) ?? location.href);    reportHop({ kind: "js_location_change", url: location.href, targetUrl, method: label, stack: captureStack() });    return original.apply(this, args);  };  Object.defineProperty(locationProto, methodName, { value: patched, writable: true, configurable: true });}patchLocationMethod("assign", "assign");patchLocationMethod("replace", "replace");patchLocationMethod("reload", "reload");// Patch location.href / pathname / hash / search / host / hostname / port / protocol settersconst locationProps = ["href", "pathname", "hash", "search", "host", "hostname", "port", "protocol"];for (const prop of locationProps) {  const descriptor = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(locationProto, prop);  if (!descriptor || typeof descriptor.set !== "function") continue;  const originalGet = descriptor.get;  const originalSet = descriptor.set;  Object.defineProperty(locationProto, prop, {    configurable: true,    enumerable: descriptor.enumerable,    get: originalGet,    set(value) {      const targetUrl = prop === "href" ? (resolveUrl(value) ?? value) : (() => {        try {          const u = new URL(location.href);          u[prop] = value;          return u.href;        } catch (e) {          return value;        }      })();      reportHop({ kind: "js_location_change", url: location.href, targetUrl, method: prop, stack: captureStack() });      return originalSet.call(this, value);    },  });}// Patch window.location assignment itselftry {  const proto = Object.getPrototypeOf(window);  const descriptor = (proto && Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(proto, "location")) || Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(window, "location");  if (descriptor && typeof descriptor.set === "function") {    const originalSet = descriptor.set;    Object.defineProperty(window, "location", {      configurable: true,      enumerable: descriptor.enumerable ?? true,      get: descriptor.get,      set(value) {        reportHop({ kind: "js_location_change", url: location.href, targetUrl: resolveUrl(value) ?? value, method: "window_location_setter", stack: captureStack() });        return originalSet.call(window, value);      },    });  }} catch (e) {}// Patch window.open, history.pushState, history.replaceStateconst originalOpen = window.open;function patchHistoryMethod(methodName) {  const original = history[methodName];  history[methodName] = function (state, title, url) {    reportHop({ kind: "history_state_change", url: location.href, method: methodName, targetUrl: resolveUrl(url ?? undefined), stack: captureStack() });    return original.call(this, state, title, url);  };}if (typeof originalOpen === "function") {  window.open = function (url, target, features) {    reportHop({ kind: "js_window_open", url: location.href, targetUrl: resolveUrl(url), target, features, stack: captureStack() });    return originalOpen.call(window, url, target, features);  };}patchHistoryMethod("pushState");patchHistoryMethod("replaceState");

Fields reported on every intercepted navigation

  • Page you were on
    https://www.amazon.com/s?k=usb+cable

    The full URL of the page you were viewing right before the navigation happened.

  • Page you're going to
    https://www.amazon.com/dp/B08JPMTV2S (illustrative -- exact captured product URL not quoted in the DA evidence record)

    The full URL you're navigating to, resolved to an absolute URL even if the page only passed a relative path.

  • How the navigation happened
    history_state_change (history.replaceState)

    Which browser API triggered the report – a location property set, history.pushState/replaceState, or window.open.

Where the assembled navigation data is headed, and what currently blocks it

    • eb.nextgenshopping.com

    Serves the live remote config, including the 'sendAnalytics' flag controlling onward transmission. Returned false in every test session, June-August 2026.

    • c.nextgenshopping.com

    Snowplow collector that would receive the assembled redirect-chain event if sendAnalytics is enabled remotely. No such event was observed; the flag was off in all tests.

What we did and didn't observe

We confirmed the injection and the API patching fire on ordinary navigation, and we confirmed the patched hooks capture real before/after URLs during a live browsing session. We did not observe the final step – the assembled chain being sent to AVG's analytics collector – because AVG's own server-side configuration currently returns sendAnalytics=false. That flag lives entirely on AVG's servers and can be changed at any time without a client-side update, so its current 'off' state is not a guarantee about how the extension behaves for all users or at all times.

If you have AVG SafePrice installed

  1. Open chrome://extensions and turn on Developer mode to show IDs. Find the one with ID mbckjcfnjmoiinpgddefodcighgikkgn and choose Remove.
  2. Block the servers only it was seen contacting: stcenqaweu.blob.core.windows.net.
  3. Scan your browser to check the rest of your extensions.

What AVG SafePrice can do

Permissions this extension asks for, as declared in version 25.9.0.943. Asking for a permission is not a finding on its own - it is what the extension can do if it chooses to.

  • Read and change your data on every site you visit

    <all_urls>

  • Store data in your browser

    storage

  • Schedule its own background tasks

    alarms

  • Watch every request your browser makes

    webRequest

  • Run its own code inside the pages you visit

    scripting

  • See every page you navigate to, as you navigate to it

    webNavigation

  • See the address and title of every tab you have open

    tabs

AVG SafePrice version history

  1. 24.18.2.825

    Mar 4, 2026

  2. +4 more

  3. 25.6.0.901

    Aug 28, 2026

  4. 25.7.0.906

    Sep 12, 2026

  5. 25.8.0.929

    Oct 14, 2026

Where AVG SafePrice sends data

  • eb.nextgenshopping.com/api/Extension/…40 calls

    From its background script · 4 other extensions

  • eb.nextgenshopping.com/api/extension/…24 calls

    From its background script · 4 other extensions

  • c.nextgenshopping.com/…9 calls

    From its background script · 3 other extensions

  • v2.auc.avira.com/api/query8 calls

    From its background script · 2 other extensions

  • eb.nextgenshopping.com/flags6 calls

    From its background script · 4 other extensions

  • stcencenprodwus.blob.core.windows.net/web/locale_codes.json6 calls

    From its background script · 4 other extensions

  • stcencenprodwus.blob.core.windows.net/web/…6 calls

    From its background script · 4 other extensions

  • stwleprodwus.blob.core.windows.net/web/init_data.json6 calls

    From its background script · 4 other extensions

  • stwleprodwus.blob.core.windows.net/web/translations/…6 calls

    From its background script · 4 other extensions

  • v2.auc.avira.com/api/auth6 calls

    From its background script · 2 other extensions

  • v2.auc.avira.com/api/categories6 calls

    From its background script · 2 other extensions

  • v2.auc.avira.com/api/update6 calls

    From its background script · 2 other extensions

  • stwleprodwus.blob.core.windows.net/web/configuration/…5 calls

    From its background script · 4 other extensions

  • stcencenprodwus.blob.core.windows.net/web/aar/…4 calls

    From its background script · 4 other extensions

  • stcenqaweu.blob.core.windows.net/web/acl_exclusion_list.json2 calls

    From its background script · only this extension

  • stcenqaweu.blob.core.windows.net/web/…2 calls

    From its background script · only this extension

Chrome Web Store listing

Versions
25.8.0.929 latest of 8 seen since March 4, 2026
Store rating
4.4 from 1,782 ratings
Last updated
August 27, 2026
Size
2.68 MiB
Privacy policy
www.avg.com
Updated November 20, 2026