Is AVG SafePrice safe?
AVG SafePrice is high risk. AVG SafePrice puts a script in every web page that records the addresses you move to, even ones you did not type. Testing saw it report Amazon moves to AVG's background code. Onward sending is switched off but can be changed.
Who publishes itGen Digital - 17 other listings from the same operator, 2 of them carrying a finding
Gen Digital - 17 other listings from the same operator, 2 of them carrying a finding
Same store account
1 other listing published from this account, 500k+ users between them, none of them carrying a finding.
Same operator - 16 listings
Published under a different store account, but sharing the registered address, contact or declared legal entity this one gave the store.
AVG SafePrice findings
Watches every page address you navigate to, to detect affiliate redirects
AVG SafePrice puts a script in every web page that records the addresses you move to, even ones you did not type.
Testing saw it report Amazon moves to AVG's background code.
Onward sending is switched off but can be changed.
What actually happens
You load or navigate to any page over HTTP or HTTPS.
Fires on chrome.webNavigation.onCommitted for the top frame of any http:// or https:// tab – there is no check for a shopping/merchant domain before this fires.
The extension injects a script into the page's own JavaScript context that watches every way you can navigate away from it.
chrome.scripting.executeScript loads redirectionChainSiteScript.js with world:'MAIN', giving it the same JS context the page itself runs in, rather than the isolated content-script sandbox most extensions use.
The code that does this
Unconditional injection on every navigation, and the navigation-API patches it installs
Injector registered on every committed HTTP/HTTPS navigation
background.js:55815const REDIRECTION_CHAIN_SCRIPT = "redirectionChainSiteScript.js";class RedirectionChainSiteScriptInjector { constructor(logger) { this.logger = logger; this.started = false; } start() { if (this.started) return; this.started = true; // Registered on chrome.webNavigation.onCommitted -- fires for every // committed navigation in every tab, not just shopping sites. webNavigationOnCommitted.addListener((navDetails) => { if (navDetails.tabId < 0 || navDetails.frameId !== 0) return; const url = navDetails.url; if (url && (url.startsWith("http://") || url.startsWith("https://"))) { // No allowlist check against a merchant domain list here -- // any committed http/https top-frame navigation qualifies. chrome.scripting .executeScript({ siteScriptPath: [REDIRECTION_CHAIN_SCRIPT], tabId: navDetails.tabId, frameIds: [0], world: "MAIN", // runs in the page's own JS context, not the isolated content-script world }) .catch((err) => { this.logger.debug(`Failed to inject ${REDIRECTION_CHAIN_SCRIPT} into tab ${navDetails.tabId}:`, err); }); } }); }}Location/history/window.open patches installed in the page's own JS context
redirectionChainSiteScript.jsconst HOOK_FLAG = "__centlyRdSiteHookInstalled__";const win = window;if (win[HOOK_FLAG]) return; // only patch once per pagefunction reportHop(payload) { const message = { source: "cently-rd-site", payload }; try { window.postMessage(message, "*"); } catch (e) { try { window.postMessage(JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(message)), "*"); } catch (e2) {} }}function captureStack() { const { stack } = new Error(); if (stack) return stack.split("\n").slice(2, 8).join("\n");}function resolveUrl(value) { if (value == null) return; try { return new URL(value.toString(), location.href).href; } catch (e) { return value.toString(); }}win[HOOK_FLAG] = true;const locationProto = Location.prototype;// Patch location.assign / .replace / .reloadfunction patchLocationMethod(methodName, label) { const original = locationProto[methodName]; if (typeof original !== "function") return; const patched = function (...args) { const targetUrl = methodName === "reload" ? location.href : (resolveUrl(args[0]) ?? location.href); reportHop({ kind: "js_location_change", url: location.href, targetUrl, method: label, stack: captureStack() }); return original.apply(this, args); }; Object.defineProperty(locationProto, methodName, { value: patched, writable: true, configurable: true });}patchLocationMethod("assign", "assign");patchLocationMethod("replace", "replace");patchLocationMethod("reload", "reload");// Patch location.href / pathname / hash / search / host / hostname / port / protocol settersconst locationProps = ["href", "pathname", "hash", "search", "host", "hostname", "port", "protocol"];for (const prop of locationProps) { const descriptor = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(locationProto, prop); if (!descriptor || typeof descriptor.set !== "function") continue; const originalGet = descriptor.get; const originalSet = descriptor.set; Object.defineProperty(locationProto, prop, { configurable: true, enumerable: descriptor.enumerable, get: originalGet, set(value) { const targetUrl = prop === "href" ? (resolveUrl(value) ?? value) : (() => { try { const u = new URL(location.href); u[prop] = value; return u.href; } catch (e) { return value; } })(); reportHop({ kind: "js_location_change", url: location.href, targetUrl, method: prop, stack: captureStack() }); return originalSet.call(this, value); }, });}// Patch window.location assignment itselftry { const proto = Object.getPrototypeOf(window); const descriptor = (proto && Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(proto, "location")) || Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(window, "location"); if (descriptor && typeof descriptor.set === "function") { const originalSet = descriptor.set; Object.defineProperty(window, "location", { configurable: true, enumerable: descriptor.enumerable ?? true, get: descriptor.get, set(value) { reportHop({ kind: "js_location_change", url: location.href, targetUrl: resolveUrl(value) ?? value, method: "window_location_setter", stack: captureStack() }); return originalSet.call(window, value); }, }); }} catch (e) {}// Patch window.open, history.pushState, history.replaceStateconst originalOpen = window.open;function patchHistoryMethod(methodName) { const original = history[methodName]; history[methodName] = function (state, title, url) { reportHop({ kind: "history_state_change", url: location.href, method: methodName, targetUrl: resolveUrl(url ?? undefined), stack: captureStack() }); return original.call(this, state, title, url); };}if (typeof originalOpen === "function") { window.open = function (url, target, features) { reportHop({ kind: "js_window_open", url: location.href, targetUrl: resolveUrl(url), target, features, stack: captureStack() }); return originalOpen.call(window, url, target, features); };}patchHistoryMethod("pushState");patchHistoryMethod("replaceState");Fields reported on every intercepted navigation
- Page you were onhttps://www.amazon.com/s?k=usb+cable
The full URL of the page you were viewing right before the navigation happened.
- Page you're going tohttps://www.amazon.com/dp/B08JPMTV2S (illustrative -- exact captured product URL not quoted in the DA evidence record)
The full URL you're navigating to, resolved to an absolute URL even if the page only passed a relative path.
- How the navigation happenedhistory_state_change (history.replaceState)
Which browser API triggered the report – a location property set, history.pushState/replaceState, or window.open.
Where the assembled navigation data is headed, and what currently blocks it
- eb.nextgenshopping.com
Serves the live remote config, including the 'sendAnalytics' flag controlling onward transmission. Returned false in every test session, June-August 2026.
- c.nextgenshopping.com
Snowplow collector that would receive the assembled redirect-chain event if sendAnalytics is enabled remotely. No such event was observed; the flag was off in all tests.
What we did and didn't observe
We confirmed the injection and the API patching fire on ordinary navigation, and we confirmed the patched hooks capture real before/after URLs during a live browsing session. We did not observe the final step – the assembled chain being sent to AVG's analytics collector – because AVG's own server-side configuration currently returns sendAnalytics=false. That flag lives entirely on AVG's servers and can be changed at any time without a client-side update, so its current 'off' state is not a guarantee about how the extension behaves for all users or at all times.
If you have AVG SafePrice installed
- Open
chrome://extensionsand turn on Developer mode to show IDs. Find the one with IDmbckjcfnjmoiinpgddefodcighgikkgnand choose Remove. - Block the servers only it was seen contacting:
stcenqaweu.blob.core.windows.net. - Scan your browser to check the rest of your extensions.
What AVG SafePrice can do
Permissions this extension asks for, as declared in version 25.9.0.943. Asking for a permission is not a finding on its own - it is what the extension can do if it chooses to.
Read and change your data on every site you visit
<all_urls>
Store data in your browser
storage
Schedule its own background tasks
alarms
Watch every request your browser makes
webRequest
Run its own code inside the pages you visit
scripting
See every page you navigate to, as you navigate to it
webNavigation
See the address and title of every tab you have open
tabs
AVG SafePrice version history
24.18.2.825
Mar 4, 2026
+4 more
25.6.0.901
Aug 28, 2026
25.7.0.906
Sep 12, 2026
25.8.0.929
Oct 14, 2026
Where AVG SafePrice sends data
- eb.nextgenshopping.com/api/Extension/…40 calls
From its background script · 4 other extensions
- eb.nextgenshopping.com/api/extension/…24 calls
From its background script · 4 other extensions
- c.nextgenshopping.com/…9 calls
From its background script · 3 other extensions
- v2.auc.avira.com/api/query8 calls
From its background script · 2 other extensions
- eb.nextgenshopping.com/flags6 calls
From its background script · 4 other extensions
- stcencenprodwus.blob.core.windows.net/web/locale_codes.json6 calls
From its background script · 4 other extensions
- stcencenprodwus.blob.core.windows.net/web/…6 calls
From its background script · 4 other extensions
- stwleprodwus.blob.core.windows.net/web/init_data.json6 calls
From its background script · 4 other extensions
- stwleprodwus.blob.core.windows.net/web/translations/…6 calls
From its background script · 4 other extensions
- v2.auc.avira.com/api/auth6 calls
From its background script · 2 other extensions
- v2.auc.avira.com/api/categories6 calls
From its background script · 2 other extensions
- v2.auc.avira.com/api/update6 calls
From its background script · 2 other extensions
- stwleprodwus.blob.core.windows.net/web/configuration/…5 calls
From its background script · 4 other extensions
- stcencenprodwus.blob.core.windows.net/web/aar/…4 calls
From its background script · 4 other extensions
- stcenqaweu.blob.core.windows.net/web/acl_exclusion_list.json2 calls
From its background script · only this extension
- stcenqaweu.blob.core.windows.net/web/…2 calls
From its background script · only this extension
Chrome Web Store listing
- Versions
- 25.8.0.929 latest of 8 seen since March 4, 2026
- Store rating
- 4.4 from 1,782 ratings
- Last updated
- August 27, 2026
- Size
- 2.68 MiB
- Privacy policy
- www.avg.com
