Is Similarweb - Website Traffic, AI Traffic & SEO Checker safe?

High risk

Similarweb is high risk. At startup Similarweb fetches a settings file from an S3 bucket with no signature or format check. It drives feature switches and rules that rewrite addresses before they reach Similarweb. Sessions only returned analytics switches.…

Similarwebv6.12.26Extension ID hoklmmgfnpapgjgcpechhaamimifchmpChrome Web Store
79Risk
AI-assisted analysis.

Similarweb findings

Downloads settings from an Amazon S3 bucket at startup, not similarweb.com

HighunwantedCWE-829Dynamic sandbox

At startup Similarweb fetches a settings file from an S3 bucket with no signature or format check.

What actually happens

You did this

You start Chrome, or install the extension, with Similarweb enabled.

No page visit, click, or interaction with the extension is needed.

The extension did this

The extension downloads a settings file from an Amazon S3 bucket and saves it into your synced Chrome storage.

The file it receives decides which analytics systems run and, through a second code path, how the URLs of pages you visit are rewritten before being sent to Similarweb.

Captured request

GEThttps://sw-extension.s3.amazonaws.com/config.json?v=1788051448413

HTTP 200. Response body captured verbatim: { "mixpanel": { "enabled": true, "config": { "persistence": "localStorage" } }, "matomo": { "enabled": true } }

What's stored on your device

The S3 file is kept as received. It's written to synced storage, not local, so it travels to every Chrome profile you're signed into.

Location
chrome.storage.sync, key 'config'
Contents
{  "matomo": {    "enabled": true  },  "mixpanel": {    "config": {      "persistence": "localStorage"    },    "enabled": true  }}

The code that does this

Startup fetch and persistence, from the extension's shipping background bundle.

Readable version

The config endpoint constant

background/background.js (deobfuscated)
const ENDPOINTS = {  CONFIG:      "https://sw-extension.s3.amazonaws.com/config.json",  DATA:        "https://data.similarweb.com/api/v1/data",  GLOBAL_RANK: "https://rank.similarweb.com/api/v1/global",  IDENTITY:    "https://data.similarweb.com/api/v1/identity"};const STORAGE_KEYS = {  CONFIG: "config",  // ...};

The fetch-and-store routine

background/background.js (deobfuscated)
async function fetchRemoteConfig() {  try {    const response = await fetch(`${ENDPOINTS.CONFIG}?v=${Date.now()}`);    const config   = await response.json();    await storageSet(STORAGE_KEYS.CONFIG, config);   // chrome.storage.sync.set({ config })  } catch (err) {    logError(err);  }}

Called from the top-level startup routine

background/background.js (deobfuscated)
(async function startup() {  try {    initA();    initB();    installIdentityHeaderListener();    await fetchRemoteConfig();  } catch (err) {    logError(err);  }})();

The code that does this

How the stored configuration is consumed: settings loader and URL-rewriting rule builder.

Readable version

Settings applied from a response header on the data endpoint

background/background.js (deobfuscated)
fetch(this.dataEndpoint, { method, headers, body }).then(response => {  const sessionHeader = response.headers.get("x-session-id");  if (sessionHeader) {    try {      const settings = JSON.parse(atob(sessionHeader));      runHook.setSettings(settings);   // replaces the live settings object    } catch (e) {}  }  // ...});

The rule builder that consumes config.data

background/background.js (deobfuscated)
createGetClasses(pii) {  if (typeof pii === "undefined") return;  // config.data is either a base64-encoded JSON string or a plain object  const rules = typeof pii.data === "string"    ? JSON.parse(atob(pii.data || "e30="))    : pii.data;  // "urlparams" entries are "keyRegex=valueRegex[=type]" triples  const urlparams_m = {};  Object.keys(rules.urlparams || {}).forEach(name => {    const parts = rules.urlparams[name].split("=");    if (parts.length === 2 || parts.length === 3) {      urlparams_m[name] = { kr: parts[0], vr: parts[1], t: parts[2] };    }  });  rules.urlparams_m = urlparams_m;  const handlers = [];  try {    if (typeof rules.sitewhitelist === "string")      handlers.push(new SiteWhitelistHandler(true, rules.sitewhitelist));    if (typeof rules.blacklist === "object" && Object.keys(rules.blacklist).length)      handlers.push(new BlacklistHandler(true, rules.blacklist));    if (typeof rules.paramwhitelist === "string"        && typeof rules.urlparams_m === "object"        && typeof rules.paths === "object"        && Object.keys(rules.paths).length)      handlers.push(new ParamWhitelistHandler(false, rules.paramwhitelist, rules.urlparams_m, rules.paths));  } catch (e) {}  this.holdings_list = handlers;   // applied to URLs before they are sent}

Hosts hardcoded in the background bundle's endpoint table.

    • sw-extension.s3.amazonaws.com

    S3 bucket serving config.json, fetched every worker start and applied with no integrity checks. Not similarweb.com; the bucket's own access control governs what the extension gets.

    • data.similarweb.com

    Similarweb's data/identity API. Its x-session-id header decodes to base64 JSON fed into the same settings loader, a second server-controlled config channel.

    • rank.similarweb.com

    Similarweb's global rank API, queried for site metrics after URLs have been processed by the configured rewriting rules.

What we observed, and what we did not

The startup fetch and the storage write are confirmed: two independent dynamic-analysis sessions each captured the background service worker performing GET https://sw-extension.s3.amazonaws.com/config.json, and the post-session storage snapshot held the exact response body under chrome.storage.sync['config'].

The configuration served at the time of testing contained only Mixpanel and Matomo feature toggles. The urlparams, sitewhitelist, blacklist, paramwhitelist and paths fields that the rule builder is written to consume were not present in that response, so we did not observe URL-rewriting rules being delivered. Those code paths are present in the shipping bundle and are reached from the same stored config object; what they do on a given day depends on the document the bucket returns at that moment.

The vendor's server can make Similarweb read text on any site

HighunwantedCWE-359Static analysis

Code analysis shows a remote-config engine runs on all sites, including AI chat sites, and can read page text and input fields as the server directs.

What actually happens

You did this

The vendor's config server sends extraction rules.

The extension did this

The extension reads page text and input fields that the rules select on any site.

This includes AI chat sites if a rule targets them.

What the engine can read

  • Visible page text
    element.innerText

    Text of any element the rule selects.

  • Input values
    input.value

    What is typed in fields the rule selects.

  • Attributes and markup
    getAttribute / innerHTML

    Attributes and HTML of selected elements.

  • XPath queries
    document.evaluate(...)

    Rules can address any node in the page.

The code that does this

Config endpoint and consent text

Readable version

Readable form

const cfg = await fetch('https://rank.similarweb.com/content/config', {method:'POST', body: JSON.stringify({sid})});// 56 encoded {"e":"<cipher>"} rule objects, decoded in the extension

Destination

    • rank.similarweb.com

    Serves the extraction rules; also the vendor's data collection host.

Observation

Static analysis finding. This behaviour was identified by reading the shipped extension code and has not yet been reproduced in a live run. The trigger conditions and the exact data sent are read from the code, not from an observed capture.

Sends every page you visit and its referrer to Similarweb

HighunwantedCWE-359Static analysis

Code analysis shows the extension posts each page address and its referrer to rank.similarweb.com on every page navigation.

What actually happens

You did this

You load any web page.

The extension did this

The extension sends the page address and referrer to rank.similarweb.com.

The report is a form-encoded POST to /api/v1/global.

Fields in each report

  • Current page
    https://example.com/account/orders

    The address of the page you are viewing.

  • Previous page
    https://example.com/search?q=shoes

    The page you came from.

  • Referrer header
    https://www.google.com/

    The Referer value sent with the request (illustrative).

  • Canonical address
    https://example.com/account/orders

    The canonical link read from the page.

  • Tab id
    1482

    Which browser tab produced the visit.

The code that does this

Endpoint and body construction

Readable version

Readable form

const ENDPOINT = 'https://rank.similarweb.com' + '/api/v1/global';body = 'e=' + encodeURIComponent(data) + '&decode=0';

Destination

    • rank.similarweb.com

    Receives URL, referrer and tab data for each navigation.

Observation

Static analysis finding. This behaviour was identified by reading the shipped extension code and has not yet been reproduced in a live run. The trigger conditions and the exact data sent are read from the code, not from an observed capture.

+3 more findings not shown

If you have Similarweb installed

  1. Open chrome://extensions and turn on Developer mode to show IDs. Find the one with ID hoklmmgfnpapgjgcpechhaamimifchmp and choose Remove.
  2. Block the servers only it was seen contacting: ca.knock-ai.com, d2c7xlmseob604.cloudfront.net, gtm.similarweb.com, analytics.getlimy.ai, bzr.openai.com, bzrcdn.openai.com, js.knock-ai.com.
  3. Scan your browser to check the rest of your extensions.

Similarweb version history

  1. 6.12.17

    Mar 4, 2026

  2. +4 more

  3. 6.12.22

    Aug 3, 2026

  4. 6.12.24

    Sep 30, 2026

  5. 6.12.26

    Oct 19, 2026

Where Similarweb sends data

  • pagead2.googlesyndication.com/ccm/collect22 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · 7 other extensions

  • www.google.com/ccm/collect22 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · 108 other extensions

  • www.google.com/rmkt/collect/…18 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · 108 other extensions

  • mpps.similarweb.com/track15 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · 1 other extension

  • rank.similarweb.com/content/config12 calls

    From its background script · 1 other extension

  • sw-extension.s3.amazonaws.com/config.json10 calls

    From its background script · 1 other extension

  • ca.knock-ai.com/client/an/…9 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · only this extension

  • api.mixpanel.com/track8 calls

    From its background script · 22 other extensions

  • d2c7xlmseob604.cloudfront.net/configuration/…8 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · only this extension

  • gtm.similarweb.com/g/collect8 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · only this extension

  • www.google.com/async/hpba5 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · 108 other extensions

  • analytics.getlimy.ai/e4 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · only this extension

  • api-js.mixpanel.com/track4 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · 17 other extensions

  • bzr.openai.com/v1/sdk/…4 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · only this extension

  • bzrcdn.openai.com/pixel-config/v1/…4 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · only this extension

  • consentcdn.cookiebot.com/consentconfig/…4 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · 1 other extension

  • js.knock-ai.com/prod/v/…4 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · only this extension

  • m.media-amazon.com/images/I/…4 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · 33 other extensions

  • www.facebook.com/ajax/bz4 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · 28 other extensions

  • www.google-analytics.com/j/collect4 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · 238 other extensions

  • chatgpt.com/backend-api/sentinel/…3 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · 28 other extensions

  • ogads-pa.clients6.google.com/$rpc/…3 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · 27 other extensions

  • play.google.com/log3 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · 38 other extensions

  • www.amazon.com/dram/…3 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · 55 other extensions

  • www.amazon.com/portal-migration/hz/…3 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · 55 other extensions

Named inside its requests but not contacted (servers it tested or reported on): 49625052041-kgt0hghf445lmcmhijv46b715m2mpbct.apps.googleusercontent.com, ep.tt, sst.us, www.similarweb.com.

Chrome Web Store listing

Versions
6.12.26 latest of 8 seen since March 4, 2026
Store rating
4.7 from 3,805 ratings
Last updated
May 14, 2026
Size
1.22 MiB
Privacy policy
www.similarweb.com

Our write-ups

Updated November 20, 2026