Is Ad Blocker: Stands AdBlocker safe?

High risk

Stands AdBlocker is high risk.

Stands AdBlocker transmits every page URL and referrer to standsapp.org on each navigation, linked to a persistent user ID.

On every browser navigation, the extension batches the visited URL, previous URL, country code, and app version and POSTs them to thepromise-event.standsapp.org/convert. The country is resolved by sending the user's IP to prod.standsapp.org/geolookup at startup and stored alongside a server-assigned persistent user ID. CSS ad-blocking rules are fetched from static.standsapp.org and applied directly to page content; the fetch requests include the anonymous user ID and app version.

Standsv2.1.75Extension ID lgblnfidahcdcjddiepkckcfdhpknnjhChrome Web Store
75Risk
Who publishes it

Stands - 1 other listing from the same operator, none carrying a finding

Publisher
Stands
Declared legal entity
Stands
Registered address
Yosef Karo 7, Suit 22, Tel Aviv 6701407, Israel
Registered contact
Roy Rosenfeld

Same store account

1 other listing published from this account, 6 users between them, none of them carrying a finding.

Shared hosts - 1 hostname

Hostnames hardcoded in this extension that few other listings call. That can mean one operator behind both, and it can equally mean a small shared vendor, so it is context rather than a conclusion. Hosts that many listings call are left out: they are services, not connections.

developer.semrush.com
Also called by 2 other listings, including Semrush Navigator
AI-assisted analysis.

Stands AdBlocker findings

Browsing History Sent to Remote Server on Every Page Visit

HighunwantedCWE-200Dynamic sandbox

Dynamic analysis captured POSTs to thepromise-event.standsapp.org/convert with the URL of every page visited, referrer, a persistent anonymous ID, country, OS, version.

What actually happens

You did this

You navigate to any HTTP or HTTPS page.

The extension did this

The extension records the URL you visited, where you came from, and your transition type, then queues the row for transmission to standsapp.org.

No interaction required. Every completed navigation is captured, including searches, background tabs, and pages you close immediately.

Captured request

POSThttps://thepromise-event.standsapp.org/convert

HTTP 200 OK, 2 such POST requests observed in our test session. All 5 navigation targets (google.com, amazon.com, facebook.com, wikipedia.org, reddit.com) appeared in the payloads.

Headers
Content-Type
application/json
Cache-Control
no-cache
Body
{  "rows": [    {      "nid": "a141fe0b-3c2d-4f18-9e7a-0021deadbeef",      "pid": "",      "sid": "",      "cc": "GBR",      "ts": 1745001234567,      "rfu": "https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F",      "tu": "https%3A%2F%2Fen.wikipedia.org%2Fwiki%2FMain_Page",      "trt": "link",      "trq": "",      "os": "Windows",      "ver": "2.1.62",      "blk": 10    }  ]}

What the extension sends for each page you visit

  • Page you visited
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Main_Page

    The exact URL of the page you just loaded, URL-encoded.

  • Page you came from
    https://www.google.com/

    The URL of the previous page on that tab, or the URL of the tab that opened this one.

  • Your anonymous ID
    a141fe0b-3c2d-4f18-9e7a-0021deadbeef

    A UUID generated on first install and stored permanently. Links all your navigation records together across time.

  • Your country
    GBR

    Three-letter country code obtained by querying your IP address at startup.

  • How you got there
    link

    Whether you clicked a link, typed the URL, or were redirected, reveals your browsing patterns.

  • Your operating system
    Windows

    OS name, sent with every batch.

  • Extension version
    2.1.62

    Which version of Stands AdBlocker you have installed.

  • Timestamp
    1745001234567

    When the page finished loading, in milliseconds.

The code that does this

The navigation listener and payload assembly from the extension's source:

Readable version

Tab navigation hook — runs on every tab URL change

// Fires whenever a tab navigates to a new URL.// Captures the current URL and the previous URL on that tab,// then queues a navigation record for transmission.async function onTabUpdated(tabId, { url }) {  if (!url) return;  const previousPage = await pageData.get(tabId);  if (previousPage?.pageUrl === url) {    // Same URL — just refresh counters, don't re-report    await pageData.refreshBulk([tabId]);    return;  }  const [newPageData, tabState] = await Promise.all([    pageData.create(url),    tabContainer.get()  ]);  // previousUrl = the page you were just on, or the tab that opened this one  newPageData.previousUrl =    previousPage?.pageUrl ||    tabState.tabOpenInitiators[tabId]?.url ||    '';  // 100 ms delay so transition metadata is available  setTimeout(async () => {    if (newPageData.isValidSite) {      await navigationReporter.queue([{        loadTime: Date.now(),        previousUrl: newPageData.previousUrl,        pageUrl:     newPageData.pageUrl,        transitionType:       tabState.transitions[tabId]?.[url]?.trt,  // 'link' | 'typed' | ...        transitionQualifiers: tabState.transitions[tabId]?.[url]?.trq,      }]);    }  }, 100);}

POST assembler — builds the JSON batch and sends it

// Collects up to 10 queued navigation rows, then POSTs them together.async function sendNavigationBatch(navigationRows) {  const [anonymousId, operatingSystem, countryCode] = await Promise.all([    loadAnonymousId(),      // persistent UUID from chrome.storage    getOperatingSystem(),    userData.getCountryCode()  // obtained at startup from prod.standsapp.org/geolookup  ]);  const payload = navigationRows.map(row => ({    nid: anonymousId,          // your persistent identifier    pid: '',    sid: '',    cc:  countryCode,          // e.g. 'GBR'    ts:  row.loadTime,         // Unix ms timestamp    rfu: encodeURIComponent(row.previousUrl),  // where you came from    tu:  encodeURIComponent(row.pageUrl),      // where you went    trt: row.transitionType  || '',            // 'link' | 'typed' | 'reload'    trq: row.transitionQualifiers?.join(',') || '',    os:  operatingSystem,    ver: getExtensionVersion(),    blk: navigationRows.length  }));  await fetch('https://thepromise-event.standsapp.org/convert', {    method: 'POST',    body: JSON.stringify({ rows: payload })  });}

Where your navigation data is sent

    • thepromise-event.standsapp.org

    Receives every navigation batch. Operated by Stands (the extension publisher). Subdomain name 'thepromise-event' does not appear in the Chrome Web Store listing.

    • prod.standsapp.org

    Primary API host. Used for user creation, geolookup, heartbeat, and error logging.

Function.prototype Globally Patched for Ad-Block Detection Evasion

MediumunwantedCWE-506Dynamic sandbox

The extension globally wraps Function.prototype.toString on sites where its ad-blocking scripts load, hiding proxied functions from detection.

What actually happens

You did this

You visit any website where the extension's proxy-apply.js script is loaded.

The extension did this

The extension replaces Function.prototype.toString with a Proxy, so wrapped functions return the original's source on .toString(), hiding the change from native-function checks.

On YouTube, a second mechanism injects code into the page via script-tag text replacement that additionally wraps Map.prototype.has and modifies the player's user-agent.

The code that does this

proxy-apply.js, Function.prototype.toString global patch:

Readable version

Function.prototype.toString anti-detection patch — annotated

// One-time setup: save the real toString, then replace it globally.// The replacement walks a WeakMap to find the original function// behind any chain of Proxy wrappers.proxyApply.nativeToString = Function.prototype.toString;const antiDetectionToString = new Proxy(Function.prototype.toString, {  apply(target, thisArg) {    // Follow the proxy chain back to the original function    let original = thisArg;    while (true) {      const unwrapped = proxyApply.proxies.get(original);      if (unwrapped === undefined) break;      original = unwrapped;    }    // Return what the native function would report    return proxyApply.nativeToString.call(original);  }});// Register the replacement itself in the WeakMap so it also looks nativeproxyApply.proxies.set(antiDetectionToString, proxyApply.nativeToString);// Install globally — affects all JS on the pageFunction.prototype.toString = antiDetectionToString;

The code that does this

youtube/isolated.js, Map.prototype.has wrap and ytcfg user-agent injection (YouTube-only):

Readable version

Map.prototype.has intercept on YouTube — annotated

// Wrap Map.prototype.has globally on YouTube to intercept the ad-blocker// detection signal. YouTube's player code uses Map.has('onSnackbarMessage')// as a sentinel during ad-blocking detection; wrapping it lets the extension// observe and respond to that check without the page knowing.window.Map.prototype.has = new Proxy(window.Map.prototype.has, {  apply(originalHas, mapInstance, [key]) {    if (key === 'onSnackbarMessage' && !adBlockerDetectionHandled) {      const player = document.getElementById('movie_player');      if (player) {        const stats     = player.getStatsForNerds?.();        const buffering = player.getPlayerStateObject?.()?.isBuffering;        const trackingUrl = player.getPlayerResponse?.()?.playbackTracking                              ?.videostatsPlaybackUrl?.baseUrl;        // If buffered to 0x0 resolution while supposedly buffering → detection event        if (buffering && stats?.buffer_health_seconds === '0.00 s' &&            stats?.resolution === '0x0' && retryTokens.length > 0) {          if (trackingUrl?.includes('reloadxhr')) retryTokens.shift();          adBlockerDetectionHandled = true;        }      }    }    return Reflect.apply(originalHas, mapInstance, [key]);  }});

ytcfg user-agent modification — annotated

// Modify the YouTube player's user-agent string to append one of several// device-context tokens. The player sends this string to YouTube's ad-decision// API via INNERTUBE requests; the extension rotates tokens to bypass// ad-block detection in the ad-serving pipeline.function setUserAgentToken(token) {  const baseUA = ytcfg.data_.INNERTUBE_CONTEXT.client.userAgent;  ytcfg.data_.INNERTUBE_CONTEXT.client.userAgent = token    ? baseUA.replace(/(Mozilla\/5\.0 \([^)]+)/, `$1; ${token}`)    : baseUA;  // restore original when token is null}// Tokens tried in order: 'channel', then 'adunit', 'lactmilli', 'instream', 'eafg'const retryTokens = ['channel'];setUserAgentToken(retryTokens[0]);

Why global prototype modification is noteworthy

Replacing Function.prototype.toString affects every script running on the page, including the website's own code and other extensions. The patch is benign in intent — it prevents ad-blocker detection scripts from identifying wrapped functions — but it establishes a pattern where the extension modifies shared JavaScript primitives outside its own scope. The YouTube-specific patches (Map.prototype.has, ytcfg, Promise.prototype.then) are injected via script-tag text replacement in the isolated world, which means they run in the page's MAIN context without a world: 'MAIN' declaration on the script registration.

Extension Interactions and URLs Reported to Vendor Server

MediumunwantedCWE-200Dynamic sandbox

The extension sends records of blocking toggles, allowlist changes, and filtered sites to prod.standsapp.org/api/v2/events.

What actually happens

You did this

You enable or disable the extension on a specific website, add or remove a site from your allowlist, or open an extension-internal page.

The extension did this

The extension queues an event with the affected URL and a numeric event type, then POSTs it with your persistent user identifiers once 10 events accumulate.

When the 'management' permission is granted, the POST also includes the IDs of every other extension installed in your browser.

Captured request

POSThttps://prod.standsapp.org/api/v2/events

HTTP 200 OK, observed during dynamic analysis. Request body containing privateUserId and anonymousUserId was captured. (Body structure above is illustrative, reconstructed from source; field names and types confirmed by code.)

Headers
Content-Type
application/json
Body
{  "privateUserId": "b1c9f3a2-d45e-4812-a678-1234567890ab",  "anonymousUserId": "a141fe0b-3c2d-4f18-9e7a-0021deadbeef",  "installedExtensions": [],  "appVersion": "2.1.64",  "extensionId": "lgblnfidahcdcjddiepkckcfdhpknnjh",  "events": [    {      "eventType": 6,      "state": "disabled",      "url": "https://www.example.com/account/",      "eventTime": "2025-04-29T10:15:00.000Z"    }  ]}

Fields included in each event POST to prod.standsapp.org

  • Server-assigned user ID
    b1c9f3a2-d45e-4812-a678-1234567890ab

    A persistent ID the vendor's server assigns on first install and stores locally. Present in every POST to link all your event logs together.

  • Anonymous device ID
    a141fe0b-3c2d-4f18-9e7a-0021deadbeef

    A UUID generated on your device at install and stored permanently. Identifies your device independently of the server-assigned ID.

  • Affected site URL
    https://www.example.com/account/

    The URL of the site where the action occurred. Present in state-change, allowlist, filtering, and extension-page-open events.

  • Other installed extension IDs
    cjpalhdlnbpafiamejdnhcphjbkeiagm, uBlock0@raymondhill.net

    Chrome extension IDs of every other extension in your browser, included when the optional 'management' permission is granted.

  • Extension version
    2.1.64

    Which version of Stands AdBlocker sent this log entry.

The code that does this

ServerLogger.sendToServer, payload assembly and delivery:

Readable version

Event upload — readable form showing identifier collection

// Collects persistent user identifiers, optionally the list of installed// extensions, then POSTs up to 10 queued events to the vendor logging endpoint.async function sendEventsToServer(events) {  const user          = await getUserData();  const anonymousId   = await loadAnonymousId();  const hasManagement = await hasPermission('management');  let otherExtensions = [];  if (hasManagement) {    otherExtensions = await chrome.management.getAll();  }  const payload = {    privateUserId:       user?.privateUserId,       // server-assigned persistent ID    anonymousUserId:     anonymousId,               // locally-generated UUID    installedExtensions: otherExtensions.map(e => e.id),    appVersion:          getExtensionVersion(),    extensionId:         getExtensionId(),    events,                                         // array of up to 10 event objects  };  await fetch('https://prod.standsapp.org/api/v2/events', {    method: 'POST',    body: JSON.stringify(payload),  });}

URL-bearing event constructors

// Event types that carry the affected site URL in plaintext:// eventType 6 — user toggled the blocker on or off for this sitefunction onStateChange(enabled, url) {  return { eventType: 6, state: enabled ? 'enabled' : 'disabled', url };}// eventType 8 — user modified the allowlist for this sitefunction onAllowlistChange(url, type, added) {  return { eventType: 8, type, state: added ? 'added' : 'removed', url };}// eventType 9 — user opened an extension-internal URLfunction onExtensionPageOpen(url) {  return { eventType: 9, url };}// eventType 15 — content filtering ran on this URLfunction onUrlFiltered(type, url) {  return { eventType: 15, type, bUrl: url };}

Where event data is sent

    • prod.standsapp.org

    Primary vendor API, receives event logs at /api/v2/events. Also used for user account creation, geolookup (/geolookup), and heartbeat pings.

If you have Stands AdBlocker installed

  1. Open chrome://extensions and turn on Developer mode to show IDs. Find the one with ID lgblnfidahcdcjddiepkckcfdhpknnjh and choose Remove.
  2. Block the servers only it was seen contacting: static.standsapp.org, rr4---sn-5hne6n6l.googlevideo.com, rr4---sn-8pgbpohxqp5-aigez.googlevideo.com.
  3. Scan your browser to check the rest of your extensions.

Stands AdBlocker version history

  1. 2.1.63

    Mar 4, 2026

  2. +4 more

  3. 2.1.73

    Oct 11, 2026

  4. 2.1.74

    Oct 15, 2026

  5. 2.1.75

    Oct 16, 2026

Where Stands AdBlocker sends data

  • static.standsapp.org/lists/css-increments/…208 calls

    From its background script · also found in its code · only this extension

  • fonts.gstatic.com/s/i/…89 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · 319 other extensions

  • prod.standsapp.org/api/v2/…12 calls

    From its background script · also found in its code · 1 other extension

  • rr4---sn-8pgbpohxqp5-aiges.googlevideo.com/videoplayback12 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · 3 other extensions

  • www.gstatic.com/youtube/img/…12 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · 39 other extensions

  • www.youtube.com/api/stats/…12 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · 41 other extensions

  • prod.standsapp.org/geolookup8 calls

    From its background script · also found in its code · 1 other extension

  • prod.standsapp.org/lists_management/css-increments7 calls

    From its background script · also found in its code · 1 other extension

  • static.standsapp.org/lists/trackers-list7 calls

    From its background script · also found in its code · only this extension

  • prod.standsapp.org/user/heartbeat6 calls

    From its background script · also found in its code · 1 other extension

  • fonts.googleapis.com/css4 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · 378 other extensions

  • thepromise-event.standsapp.org/convert3 calls

    From its background script · also found in its code · 1 other extension

  • googleads.g.doubleclick.net/pagead/id2 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · 18 other extensions

  • rr4---sn-5hne6n6l.googlevideo.com/videoplayback2 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · only this extension

  • www.google.com/js/th/…2 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · 108 other extensions

  • www.gstatic.com/eureka/clank/…2 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · 39 other extensions

  • www.youtube.com/api/jnn/…2 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · 41 other extensions

  • www.youtube.com/api/timedtext2 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · 41 other extensions

  • www.youtube.com/s/desktop/…2 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · 41 other extensions

  • www.youtube.com/youtubei/v1/…2 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · 41 other extensions

  • youtube.com2 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · 5 other extensions

  • rr4---sn-8pgbpohxqp5-aigez.googlevideo.com/videoplayback1 call

    From a script it injects into websites · only this extension

  • www.youtube.com/pagead/viewthroughconversion/…1 call

    From a script it injects into websites · 41 other extensions

  • www.youtube.com/ptracking1 call

    From a script it injects into websites · 41 other extensions

  • www.youtube.com/s/player/…1 call

    From a script it injects into websites · 41 other extensions

Chrome Web Store listing

Versions
2.1.75 latest of 8 seen since March 4, 2026
Store rating
4.8 from 157,083 ratings
Last updated
March 26, 2026
Size
3.15 MiB
Privacy policy
www.standsapp.org
Updated November 20, 2026