Is Banglar Bhumi Auto Captcha safe?
Banglar Bhumi Auto Captcha injects affiliate price-check links on Amazon and Flipkart product pages.
On Amazon India and Flipkart product pages, the extension adds links that search for the current product on the other shopping site. When clicked, those links include product-title keywords and affiliate parameters in the destination URL.
AI-generated. Findings may contain errors. Those marked Verified have been manually reviewed.
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Findings
Affiliate shopping links injected on Amazon and Flipkart
Marketed as a Banglar Bhumi captcha solver, it injects 'Check price' buttons on Amazon.in/Flipkart.com pages, adding the product title and affiliate ID (affid=pskrpogma, tag=bbhumi-21) to the link.
Only Amazon-to-Flipkart fired live.
- Severity
- Low unwanted
- Type
- Unexpected
- CWE
- CWE-506
- Source
- Dynamic sandbox
You open a product page on amazon.in with the extension installed.
The same pattern runs in reverse when you open a product page on flipkart.com.
The amazon.js content script adds two 'Price on Flipkart' buttons next to the Buy Now button and the price.
Clicking either button opens flipkart.com/search with the product title and the affiliate parameter affid=pskrpogma.
Two anchor elements linking to flipkart.com are appended to the Buy Now container and the price display, both carrying the current product's title and the affiliate ID pskrpogma.
- Target
- the Buy Now button and price display on an Amazon.in product page
<div id="buyNow" class="a-button-stack"> <span class="a-button a-button-primary"><input type="submit" value="Buy Now"></span></div><div class="priceToPay"> <span class="a-price-symbol">₹</span><span class="a-price-whole">1,299</span></div><div id="buyNow" class="a-button-stack"> <span class="a-button a-button-primary"><input type="submit" value="Buy Now"></span> <a class="button-7" target="_blank" href="https://www.flipkart.com/search?q=Premium%20PET%20Braided%20USB%20Type-C%20to%20Type-C%20Cable,%20Black%20%7C&affid=pskrpogma">Price on Flipkart</a></div><div class="priceToPay"> <span class="a-price-symbol">₹</span><span class="a-price-whole">1,299</span> <a class="button-8" target="_blank" href="https://www.flipkart.com/search?q=Premium%20PET%20Braided%20USB%20Type-C%20to%20Type-C%20Cable,%20Black%20%7C&affid=pskrpogma">Check price on Flipkart</a></div>amazon.js and flipkart.js, affiliate link injection, both directions
amazon.js — annotated: injects a Flipkart affiliate link on Amazon product pages
amazon.js// Runs on every https://www.amazon.in/* page (content_scripts[1] in manifest.json)window.onload = () => { const price = document.getElementsByClassName("priceToPay")[0]; // Amazon's price block const buyNow = document.getElementById("buyNow"); // Amazon's Buy Now button container const productTitle = document.getElementById("productTitle"); // Amazon's product title element if (productTitle) { // Build a link to Flipkart's search results, seeded with the first 10 words // of the current product's title, plus a fixed affiliate ID (affid=pskrpogma). const flipkartUrl = `https://www.flipkart.com/search?q=${productTitle.innerText ?.split(" ")?.slice(0, 10)?.join(" ")}&affid=pskrpogma`; const a = document.createElement("a"); // Button placed inside the Buy Now box a.setAttribute("href", flipkartUrl); a.setAttribute("target", "_blank"); a.classList.add("button-7"); a.innerText = "Price on Flipkart"; const a2 = document.createElement("a"); // Second, identical link placed next to the price a2.setAttribute("href", flipkartUrl); a2.setAttribute("target", "_blank"); a2.classList.add("button-8"); a2.innerText = "Check price on Flipkart"; buyNow.appendChild(a); price.appendChild(a2); }};flipkart.js — annotated: the reciprocal injection on Flipkart product pages
flipkart.js// Runs on every https://www.flipkart.com/* page (content_scripts[2] in manifest.json)window.onload = () => { const pricingDiv = document.getElementsByClassName("hl05eU")[0]; // Flipkart's price block const productTitle = document.getElementsByClassName("VU-ZEz")[0]; // Flipkart's product title element // Build a link to Amazon's search results, seeded with the first 10 words of the // current product's title, plus this developer's Amazon Associates affiliate tag // (tag=bbhumi-21) and Associates link-tracking parameters (linkCode, linkId, camp, creative). const a = document.createElement("a"); a.setAttribute( "href", `https://www.amazon.in/gp/search?ie=UTF8&tag=bbhumi-21&linkCode=ur2&linkId=702d89317e3a2802e43eeb25390cba88&camp=3638&creative=24630&index=aps&keywords=${productTitle.innerText ?.split(" ")?.slice(0, 10)?.join(" ")}` ); a.setAttribute("target", "_blank"); a.classList.add("button-7", "amazon-bg", "margin"); a.innerText = "Check price on Amazon"; pricingDiv.appendChild(a); // The rest of this file is commented-out dead code for a planned Myntra // affiliate integration (admitad network); it does not execute.};Top-level browser navigation landed on Flipkart; Flipkart's own subsequent search/analytics requests referenced this URL as the page context, confirming the navigation completed.
- www.flipkart.com
Receives the Amazon.in product title as a search query, plus affid=pskrpogma, when the injected 'Price on Flipkart' button is clicked.
- www.amazon.in
Receives the Flipkart.com product title as search keywords, plus tag=bbhumi-21, when the injected 'Check price on Amazon' button is clicked.
The Amazon-to-Flipkart direction was captured live: the injected link matched the extension's source code exactly, and clicking it navigated to Flipkart with the product title and affiliate ID in the URL. The Flipkart-to-Amazon direction did not fire in this session — flipkart.js loaded, but the CSS class it looks for (`VU-ZEz`) was not present on the live Flipkart page at test time, most likely because Flipkart has since changed its page markup. This is evidence of live-site drift, not evidence that the code path is absent; the matching injection logic for that direction is shown in the code_compare block above.
What it can do
Permissions this extension asks for, as declared in version 2.0. Asking for a permission is not a finding on its own - it is what the extension can do if it chooses to.
Read and change your data on banglarbhumi.gov.in
*://*.banglarbhumi.gov.in/*
Read and change your data on www.amazon.in
https://www.amazon.in/*
Read and change your data on www.flipkart.com
https://www.flipkart.com/*
See the address and title of every tab you have open
tabs
Act on the current tab, but only after you click the extension
activeTab
Where it sends data
Destinations our analysis observed Banglar Bhumi Auto Captcha contacting. Sending data somewhere is not a finding on its own - an extension that syncs your settings has to talk to its own server - but it is where your data can go, and who else it goes to.
- www.amazon.in
Banglar Bhumi Auto Captcha sends data to www.amazon.in. One other extension we have analysed sends data here.
- www.flipkart.com
Banglar Bhumi Auto Captcha sends data to www.flipkart.com. One other extension we have analysed sends data here.