Is Evernote Web Clipper safe?
Evernote Web Clipper embeds a hardcoded HMAC secret in its bundle and accepts UI-trigger messages from any web origin.
The extension's content script listens for postMessage events on every page without validating the sender's origin, allowing any website script to open the clipper UI. The extension also hardcodes an HMAC secret key used to sign requests to its analytics endpoint, meaning anyone who inspects the bundle can forge signed analytics events. Both issues affect the extension running in its normal, installed state.
Part of this rating comes from analysis signals we haven't published as detailed findings yet.
Who publishes itEvernote - no other listings under this identity
Evernote - no other listings under this identity
What this publisher told the store about itself, and the other listings that told it the same thing.
AI-generated. Findings may contain errors. Those marked Verified have been manually reviewed.
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What it can do
Permissions this extension asks for, as declared in version 7.42.0. Asking for a permission is not a finding on its own - it is what the extension can do if it chooses to.
Read and change your data on every site you visit
<all_urls>
Act on the current tab, but only after you click the extension
activeTab
See the address and title of every tab you have open
tabs
Read and change cookies, including the ones that keep you signed in
cookies
Add items to the right-click menu
contextMenus
Show you desktop notifications
notifications
Write to your clipboard
clipboardWrite
Read whatever you have copied to your clipboard
clipboardRead
Where it sends data
Destinations our analysis observed Evernote Web Clipper contacting. Sending data somewhere is not a finding on its own - an extension that syncs your settings has to talk to its own server - but it is where your data can go, and who else it goes to.
- cec.svc.evernote.com
Evernote Web Clipper sends data to cec.svc.evernote.com. No other extension we have analyzed sends data here.