Is 二维码小能手 safe?

Medium risk

二维码小能手 is medium risk. Code analysis shows the extension fetches an encrypted rule set from its server and installs it as redirect rules for page loads. A test session received an empty set, so no redirects were observed.…

llrenfubv0.0.6Extension ID inkoacoebhbbfcidbbjognchggilmefmChrome Web Store
56Risk
AI-assisted analysis.

二维码小能手 findings

Server-supplied rules can redirect page loads or rewrite affiliate parameters

HighunwantedCWE-829Static analysis

Code analysis shows the extension fetches an encrypted rule set from its server and installs it as redirect rules for page loads.

What actually happens

You did this

You open a web page that matches a server-supplied pattern.

The extension did this

The extension redirects the load or rewrites its query parameters, such as affiliate IDs.

The code that does this

Rule installation from the server config

Readable version

Config fetch endpoint

serviceworker.js
const i=await fetch(`${n}/sr105/qrinfo`,{method:"POST",headers:{"Content-Type":"application/json"},body:h(JSON.stringify({bf:t,version:c(),fg:r}))}),s=await i.json();if(1===s.success){

Fields in each server-supplied rule

  • Match pattern
    ^https://www\.example-shop\.com/.*

    Regex deciding which page loads the rule applies to.

  • Redirect URL
    https://tracker.example.net/go?u=1 (illustrative)

    Fixed address the page load is sent to, if set.

  • Query parameters
    aff_id=12345 (illustrative)

    Parameters added or replaced on the URL, such as affiliate IDs.

  • Enabled flag
    1

    Switches a rule on or off from the server.

Server involved

    • api.qrstrategy.com

    Receives a POST and returns the encrypted rule configuration.

Observation

During dynamic analysis the server returned a configuration that decrypted to an empty rule set, so no redirects were observed. The mechanism is present but was not seen active.

Observation

Static analysis finding. This behaviour was identified by reading the shipped extension code and has not yet been reproduced in a live run. The trigger conditions and the exact data sent are read from the code, not from an observed capture.

Extension sends a device fingerprint to api.qrstrategy.com at startup

MediumunwantedCWE-359Dynamic sandbox

On every startup it sends an encrypted device fingerprint and the extension version to api.qrstrategy.com.

What actually happens

You did this

You install this QR-code scanner/generator extension and browse normally.

No fingerprinting or data collection is mentioned in the extension's Chrome Web Store description.

The extension did this

On every service worker startup, the extension encrypts your browser fingerprint and extension version and sends them to api.qrstrategy.com.

api.qrstrategy.com is unrelated to any QR-code functionality and is contacted over plain HTTP.

Fields sent in the startup request

  • Browser fingerprint ID
    30fc5c92a3dca2ce3180a3684df381fb

    A unique identifier from your browser and device. It persists across sessions and identifies your browser even after cookies are cleared.

  • Extension version
    0.0.6

    Tells the server exactly which build of the extension you're running.

  • Build flag
    1

    A fixed internal marker the extension always sends; likely used server-side to distinguish release channels.

Why you can't catch this in DevTools

The request body leaves your browser as an unreadable block of ciphertext, but the AES key used to produce it is hardcoded inside the extension's own shipped code (see the code block below), so anyone who reads the extension's source can decrypt it just as easily as the destination server can.

Decoded value
{  "bf": 1,  "version": "0.0.6",  "fg": "30fc5c92a3dca2ce3180a3684df381fb"}

The code that does this

The startup request path in serviceworker.js

Readable version
// state: cached fingerprint + server-provided configconst state = { fingerprint: "", jsonData: {} };const sendFingerprintAndFetchConfig = (haveFingerprint) => {  if (!haveFingerprint) {    log("waiting", "fingerprint");    return;  }  log("starting", "init");  (async (fingerprint) => {    try {      const config = await (async (fingerprint) => {        log("outbound payload", { bf: BUILD_FLAG, version: getExtensionVersion(), fg: fingerprint });        const response = await fetch(`${C2_HOST}/sr105/qrinfo`, {          method: "POST",          headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },          body: encryptAesCbc(JSON.stringify({            bf: BUILD_FLAG,            version: getExtensionVersion(),            fg: fingerprint,          })),        });        const json = await response.json();        if (json.success === 1) {          const decrypted = decryptAesCbc(json.data);          return !!decrypted && JSON.parse(decrypted);        }        return false;      })(fingerprint);      log("received config", config);      state.jsonData = config;      new RedirectRuleManager(state.jsonData, state.fingerprint, BUILD_FLAG).init();    } catch {      log("request failed", "config fetch failed");    }  })(state.fingerprint);};// Content script posts { event: "setFingerprint", body: { id: <fingerprint> } }// when no fingerprint is stored yet; background persists it and immediately// fires the request above.chrome.runtime.onMessage.addListener((message, sender, sendResponse) => {  if (message.event === "getFingerprint") {    sendResponse(state.fingerprint ? { fingerprint: state.fingerprint } : false);  }  if (message.event === "setFingerprint") {    const fingerprintId = message?.body?.id;    log("received fingerprint", fingerprintId);    if (fingerprintId) {      chrome.storage.sync.set({ brext: fingerprintId });      state.fingerprint = fingerprintId;      sendFingerprintAndFetchConfig(true);    }  }});// On service-worker startup, reuse a fingerprint already persisted from a// previous session.chrome.storage.sync.get(["brext"], (stored) => {  if (stored.brext) {    log("cached fingerprint", stored.brext);    state.fingerprint = stored.brext;    sendFingerprintAndFetchConfig(true);  } else {    sendFingerprintAndFetchConfig(false);  }});

Where the fingerprint and version are sent

    • api.qrstrategy.com

    Receives the encrypted fingerprint ID and version at startup, returning an encrypted config payload. Not disclosed in the listing, which describes only QR scanning.

Browser Fingerprint Built On Every Page, Synced Across Devices

MediumunwantedCWE-359Dynamic sandbox

This QR-code extension loads FingerprintJS on every website you visit and derives a stable ID from your device and browser, then saves it to synced storage that follows you to every device on your Google account.

What actually happens

You did this

You browse to any website with the extension installed.

The extension's content script is injected on every page, matching *://*/*, whether or not you ever open the QR tool.

The extension did this

The content script computes a browser fingerprint using a bundled copy of the FingerprintJS library, without notifying you.

Nothing on the page indicates this is happening; there is no prompt, badge, or setting to opt out.

Signals combined into your fingerprint

  • Screen and display
    1920x1080, 24-bit color

    Your screen resolution and color depth are combined with other traits into a value that rarely changes between visits.

  • Installed plugins
    PDF Viewer, Native Client

    The list of browser plugins and MIME types you have is uncommon enough to help single you out.

  • Hardware profile
    deviceMemory: 8, hardwareConcurrency: 12

    Your device's memory size and CPU core count add further detail that narrows down which machine you're on.

  • Resulting fingerprint ID
    30fc5c92a3dca2ce3180a3684df381fb

    All of the above are hashed into one ID that stays the same across sessions, even after you clear cookies.

What's stored on your device

This is synced storage, not local-only. Chrome copies the ID to every device signed into the same Google account.

Location
chrome.storage.sync, key 'brext'
Contents
{  "brext": "30fc5c92a3dca2ce3180a3684df381fb"}

The code that does this

Fingerprint request/store glue code in contentscript.js

Readable version
// ie = the FingerprintJS agent, already loading in the backgroundconst fingerprintManager = new class {  constructor() {    this.fingerprint = "";  }  init() {    chrome.runtime.sendMessage({ event: "getFingerprint", body: {} }, (response) => {      if (response) {        // Service worker already has a fingerprint cached; reuse it.        const { fingerprint } = response;        this.fingerprint = fingerprint;      } else {        // No fingerprint yet: run FingerprintJS and compute one.        (async () => {          const agent = await fingerprintJsAgent;          const result = await agent.get();          const { visitorId } = await result;          return visitorId;        })().then((visitorId) => {          if (debugLoggingEnabled) {            console.log("%ccreated fingerprint", "color: #4e6ef2", visitorId);          }          chrome.runtime.sendMessage({ event: "setFingerprint", body: { id: visitorId } });        });      }    });  }};// Invoked at the bottom of the bundle on every page load:// fingerprintManager.init();

What 二维码小能手 can do

Permissions this extension asks for, as declared in version 0.0.6. Asking for a permission is not a finding on its own - it is what the extension can do if it chooses to.

  • Read and change your data on every site you visit

    *://*/*

  • Block and redirect the requests your browser makes

    declarativeNetRequest

  • See which of your requests its blocking rules matched

    declarativeNetRequestFeedback

  • Store data in your browser

    storage

  • See the address and title of every tab you have open

    tabs

Where 二维码小能手 sends data

  • api.qrstrategy.com/sr105/qrinfo4 calls

    From its background script · only this extension

Chrome Web Store listing

Versions
0.0.6 seen since March 4, 2026
Store rating
5.0 from 1 ratings
Last updated
September 5, 2022
Size
98.35 KiB
Updated November 20, 2026