Is 1688 Purchase Assistant safe?

Question

Accepted Answer

Our review of 1688 Purchase Assistant surfaced the following. This extension packages three Shein partner-level API tokens — X-Gw-Auth, Anti-In, and armortoken — verbatim in its background service worker bundle. When you use the cross-platform image search feature, these credentials are injected into outgoing requests to Shein's recommendation API via chrome.declarativeNetRequest, allowing the extension to authenticate to Shein's backend as a Shein mobile client. Analysis confirmed the tokens are present in the downloadable extension package; a test request made with the extracted tokens received Shein gateway authentication headers and session cookies in response, confirming the tokens reach Shein's API infrastructure. Version 1.1.4 of this extension adds an AI browsing-agent feature (internally named PagePilot) that can click elements, type into fields, scroll, and read the full structure of a page on the user's behalf, plus run caller-supplied JavaScript on that page. These automation commands travel over an internal browser-extension message that names which open browser tab to act on. The background handler that carries out the command forwards it to that tab without checking who sent the message or whether the agent is actually supposed to be running against that tab. A live test confirmed this: an automation command issued directly to the relay, bypassing the agent's own side-panel interface entirely, successfully scrolled an unrelated, already-open browser tab. The same test also tried the JavaScript-execution action against two ordinary websites; both attempts were blocked by the extension's own Content-Security-Policy, so no code-execution risk was confirmed for that specific action. The confirmed issue is the unauthorized cross-tab automation control, not code execution.

Is 1688 Purchase Assistant Plugin safe?

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