Is EE-Entry Filler safe?
EE-Entry Filler loads a script from rch-en.netlify.app into rch.mohfw.gov.in pages and removes their security headers.
On the Indian RCH health portal, the extension fills entry forms from Excel data. It also adds a script from a third-party Netlify host that runs in the page, and a built-in rule strips the portal's X-Frame-Options and Content-Security-Policy headers. The remote script's logic is not included in the package, so what it does with page content or form input cannot be seen.
AI-generated. Findings may contain errors. Those marked Verified have been manually reviewed.
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Findings
RCH helper pulls remote script from rch-en.netlify.app into health record pages
Code analysis shows the extension requests a script from rch-en.netlify.app and places it in rch.mohfw.gov.in pages.
That script's logic is not shipped in the package.
- Severity
- High unwanted
- Type
- Unexpected
- CWE
- CWE-829
- Source
- Static analysis
You open a record-entry page such as MotherANC.aspx on rch.mohfw.gov.in.
The extension adds a script element pointing at rch-en.netlify.app to the page.
The remote file is not included in the extension package.
Loader branch and the helper that creates the script element
Branch selecting the remote URL
contentScript16.js// appSK111 decodes to 'firefox', so this is true on Chromeif ("chrome" !== decode(getMessage("appSK111"))) { /* Firefox path */ }else await injectScript(decode(getMessage("appSU055")) + "scripts/contentScripts16.js", "body", 200);// appSU055 decodes to https://rch-en.netlify.app/Helper that appends the element
contentScript16.jsconst s = document.createElement("script");s.setAttribute("script-link", url);document.body.appendChild(s);- Remote hosthttps://rch-en.netlify.app/scripts/contentScripts16.js
Code comes from a Netlify site, not from the extension package.
- Integrity checknone
No hash or signature limits what the remote file can contain.
- Page CSPcontent-security-policy: remove (rch.mohfw.gov.in)
A network rule removes CSP and frame headers on the RCH site.
- Pages affectedrch.mohfw.gov.in/RCH/UI/MotherANC.aspx
Pages hold maternal and child health records and form inputs.
Static analysis finding. This behaviour was identified by reading the shipped extension code and has not yet been reproduced in a live run. The trigger conditions and the exact data sent are read from the code, not from an observed capture.
Where it sends data
Destinations our analysis observed EE-Entry Filler contacting. Sending data somewhere is not a finding on its own - an extension that syncs your settings has to talk to its own server - but it is where your data can go, and who else it goes to.
- rch-en.netlify.app
EE-Entry Filler sends data to rch-en.netlify.app. No other extension we have analysed sends data here.