Is 淘蛙 · 淘宝天猫图片下载 safe?

Medium risk

Taobao/Tmall image downloader sends the host and full URL of every page you visit to huoxiaqu.com.

The extension downloads images from Taobao and Tmall product pages. Separately, a content script runs on every website and, on each page load, sends the page host and full URL to huoxiaqu.com along with a user ID and session ID. This tracking applies to all sites, not only Taobao or Tmall.

Do Itv1.0.0Chrome Web Store
50Risk
Who publishes it

Do It - 7 other listings from the same operator, 6 of them carrying a finding

What this publisher told the store about itself, and the other listings that told it the same thing.

Publisher
Do It

Same store account

7 other listings published from this account, 973 users between them. 6 of them carry a finding.

全蛙 · 多电商平台商品图下载助手383Medium笔笔·bilibili视频批量下载助手224Medium阿蛙 · 阿里巴巴1688商品图下载助手189Medium京蛙 · 京东图片下载121Low云链 - Tiktok视频下载39MediumTM蛙 · Temu图片下载17Medium1 more listing in the relationship graph, on paid plans →

Shared hosts - 1 hostname

Hostnames hardcoded in this extension that few other listings call. That can mean one operator behind both, and it can equally mean a small shared vendor, so it is context rather than a conclusion. Hosts that many listings call are left out: they are services, not connections.

huoxiaqu.com
Also called by 3 other listings: 界图-图片批量下载, 希蛙 · 希音图片下载 shein image download, 红鸟-X/推特下载助手

AI-generated. Findings may contain errors. Those marked Verified have been manually reviewed.

Publishers can request a review.

Findings

Image downloader reports the URL of every page you open to huoxiaqu.com

Code analysis shows a content script on all sites sends each page's host and full URL to huoxiaqu.com with a user and session ID, although the tool only targets Taobao and Tmall.

Severity
High unwanted
Type
Unexpected
CWE
CWE-359
Source
Static analysis
What actually happens
You did this

You open any web page in the browser.

The extension did this

The extension sends that page's address to huoxiaqu.com.

This happens for every site, not only Taobao or Tmall.

Fields in the visitorRecord request body
  • Full page URL
    https://example.com/account?q=test

    The complete address of the page, including any query string.

  • Site host
    example.com

    Which site you were on.

  • User ID
    u_83a1f9c2

    A stored ID that ties the visit to your install.

  • Session ID
    k3j9x0q2ab

    A random ID that groups visits from one session.

  • Paid-user flag
    false

    Whether the install is marked as a paying user.

The code that does this

Content script and background handler

Readable version

Background forwards the message

js/background.js
case "recordVisitor":  q(e.fromChannel, e.host, e.url), s({    success: !0  });  break;

Background adds IDs and calls the API

js/background.js
function q(e = "popup", r, s) {  chrome.storage.local.get(["userId", "sessionId", "paidUsers"], function(o) {    o.sessionId || (o.sessionId = Math.random().toString(36).substr(2, 10), chrome.storage.local.set({      sessionId: o.sessionId    })), y.recordVisitor({      userId: o.userId,      fromChannel: e,      sessionId: o.sessionId,      host: r,      url: s,      paidUsers: o.paidUsers    }).catch(n => console.log("Error:", n))  })}

API wrapper posts to the vendor

assets/request-DvNSZzIm.js
recordVisitor: async e => {  const t = await Se("/api/visitor/visitorRecord", {    method: "POST",    body: e  });  return t && typeof t == "object" && "error" in t, t}
Where the page addresses are sent
    • huoxiaqu.com

    Vendor server configured in background.js; receives visitorRecord POSTs with plugCode 9nan14ebi12iejy.

Observation

Static analysis finding. This behaviour was identified by reading the shipped extension code and has not yet been reproduced in a live run. The trigger conditions and the exact data sent are read from the code, not from an observed capture.

What it can do

Permissions this extension asks for, as declared in version 1.0.0. Asking for a permission is not a finding on its own - it is what the extension can do if it chooses to.

  • Read and change your data on taobao.com

    *://*.taobao.com/*

  • Read and change your data on tmall.com

    *://*.tmall.com/*

  • Read and change your data on tmall.hk

    *://*.tmall.hk/*

  • Read and change your data on tmall.tw

    *://*.tmall.tw/*

  • Read and change your data on tmall.cn

    *://*.tmall.cn/*

  • Store data in your browser

    storage

  • Start, monitor and manage your downloads

    downloads

  • Watch every request your browser makes

    webRequest

  • Show a panel beside the page

    sidePanel

Where it sends data

Destinations our analysis observed 淘蛙 · 淘宝天猫图片下载 contacting. Sending data somewhere is not a finding on its own - an extension that syncs your settings has to talk to its own server - but it is where your data can go, and who else it goes to.

  • huoxiaqu.com

    淘蛙 · 淘宝天猫图片下载 sends data to huoxiaqu.com. 6 other extensions we have analysed send data here.

Updated 15 October 2026gmjpbedfhllpggaggkhklgipnfcnnikj