Is Next Level Networking Community safe?

Medium risk

Next Level Networking Community sends the URL of every non-LinkedIn page you load to mymosttrusted.net.

When any tab finishes loading a page outside LinkedIn, the background worker posts that page's full URL to the vendor's detect-link endpoint, along with your profile id. This happens on all websites, regardless of the extension's LinkedIn-focused purpose or its hide toggle.

My Most Trusted Networkv1.0.0.8Chrome Web Store
49Risk
Who publishes it

My Most Trusted Network - 16 other listings from the same operator, 2 of them carrying a finding

What this publisher told the store about itself, and the other listings that told it the same thing.

Publisher
My Most Trusted Network

Same store account

16 other listings published from this account, 2k+ users between them. 2 of them carry a finding.

The Bx xtension544LowSelling on the Spot Marketplace Global Nexus391LowCIBN Connect331LowCircle of Trust230LowLeadHERship Global204LowGHL Connect124Low10 more listings in the relationship graph, on paid plans →

AI-generated. Findings may contain errors. Those marked Verified have been manually reviewed.

Publishers can request a review.

Findings

Sends every non-LinkedIn page URL you visit to mymosttrusted.net with your ID

Code analysis shows the extension posts the address of each non-LinkedIn page you finish loading to mymosttrusted.net, with your profile ID in a request header.

Severity
High unwanted
Type
Unexpected
CWE
CWE-359
Source
Static analysis
What actually happens
You did this

You finish loading any page that is not on linkedin.com.

The extension did this

The extension posts that page's full URL to mymosttrusted.net, tagged with your profile ID.

The code that does this

The navigation listener that sends the URL

Readable version

Same branch, readable

deobfuscated/background.js
if ("complete" == a.status && (n || chrome.tabs.sendMessage(e, {    script: "MMTWLNLNCContentLoader",    method: "initiate",    args: ["callback"]  }, null, (e => {})), t?.url && -1 == t?.url?.search(/linkedin.com/gm))) {  var { url: c } = t;  self.callBackEnd("-v5/detect-link", "POST", { url: c }, (e => {}), !0)}
Fields in the detect-link request
  • Page URL
    https://example.com/account/orders?id=1042 (illustrative)

    The full address of the page you just loaded, including path and query.

  • Profile ID header
    trustee: <profile id from chrome.storage.sync>

    The vendor profile ID from extension storage, sent as the trustee header.

  • profile_id body field
    profile_id: <profile id>

    The same profile ID is added to the JSON body.

  • Version and app name
    v: 1.0.0.8

    Extension version and name from the manifest.

  • Partnership ID
    partnership_id (when set)

    Added when an active partnership is stored.

Where the URLs are sent
    • mymosttrusted.net

    Vendor backend; receives each URL at /api-v5/detect-link.

Observation

Static analysis finding. This behaviour was identified by reading the shipped extension code and has not yet been reproduced in a live run. The trigger conditions and the exact data sent are read from the code, not from an observed capture.

Where it sends data

Destinations our analysis observed Next Level Networking Community contacting. Sending data somewhere is not a finding on its own - an extension that syncs your settings has to talk to its own server - but it is where your data can go, and who else it goes to.

  • mymosttrusted.netwidely used

    Next Level Networking Community sends data to mymosttrusted.net. A widely used service: 39 other extensions we have analysed send data here.

Updated 15 October 2026dfneikkodkngkobmdloohfcjpbkenbma