Is Shopilo: Automatic Coupon Finder by DontPayFull safe?

High risk

Shopilo is high risk. When you visit a tracked store such as target.com or sephora.com, the extension reports the hostname to DontPayFull's events.dpf.cloud, gated by remote config, plus the extension ID and session ID; if signed in, also your account ID.…

DontPayFull.comv2.2.6Extension ID jfoanacamkbfibjbidbmeobmnndfgpcaChrome Web Store
77Risk
Who publishes it

DontPayFull SRL - 1 other listing from the same operator, none carrying a finding

Publisher
DontPayFull.com
Declared legal entity
DontPayFull SRL
Registered address
Str. Zece Mese nr. 9, Ap. 1, Bucharest 024061, RO
Registered contact
DontPayFull

Same store account

1 other listing published from this account, 2k+ users between them, none of them carrying a finding.

Shared hosts - 3 hostnames

Hostnames hardcoded in this extension that few other listings call. That can mean one operator behind both, and it can equally mean a small shared vendor, so it is context rather than a conclusion. Hosts that many listings call are left out: they are services, not connections.

api.dontpayfull.com
Also called by 3 other listings, including Amazon Shopping Tools
dontpayfull.com
Also called by 3 other listings, including Amazon Shopping Tools
help.dontpayfull.com
Also called by 3 other listings, including Amazon Shopping Tools
AI-assisted analysis.

Shopilo findings

Visited-Site Hostnames Sent to DontPayFull's Analytics Backend

HighunwantedCWE-359Dynamic sandbox

When you visit a tracked store such as target.com or sephora.com, the extension reports the hostname to DontPayFull's events.dpf.cloud, gated by remote config, plus the extension ID and session ID; if signed in, also your account ID.

What actually happens

You did this

You finish loading a page on a store this extension tracks on behalf of DontPayFull, such as target.com or sephora.com.

No click or interaction with the extension itself is required – an ordinary page load is enough.

The extension did this

The background service worker reports that page's hostname to DontPayFull's own analytics backend, events.dpf.cloud.

The same test with a site outside DontPayFull's tracked-store catalog – we used Wikipedia – produced no such request.

Fields inside every page-view event

  • Page hostname
    target.com

    The domain of the page you're on, with any leading 'www.' stripped.

  • Extension ID
    iddgmfjgflgejeafamidllamlmchohjb

    A constant identifier for this extension – the same value for every install, not specific to you.

  • Account ID
    884213 (illustrative -- this session was not signed in, so no real value was captured)

    Added only while you're signed in to your DontPayFull/Shopilo account – ties this and every other tracked page view to your identity.

  • Store/session ID
    4821 (illustrative)

    An internal ID correlating events to the store and browser tab – not a persistent identity.

  • Extension version
    2.1.43

    The exact build number of the extension sending the report.

Captured request

POSThttps://events.dpf.cloud/automatic-coupons/events/

Observed during dynamic analysis immediately after navigating to target.com (also observed with url: "sephora.com" on a separate navigation in the same session – both on DontPayFull's tracked-store list). A control navigation to en.wikipedia.org, which is not on that list, produced no equivalent request in the same session.

Headers
Content-Type
application/json
Body
{  "event": "page_view",  "url": "target.com",  "client_id": "iddgmfjgflgejeafamidllamlmchohjb",  "version": "2.1.43",  "extra": {}}

The code that does this

Gating, event construction, and X-Session obfuscation

Readable version

Background: page-load listener (annotated)

dist/background/bg.global.js
// Fires on every tab update; only proceeds once the page has// finished loading AND the URL passes an internal store-recognition check.chrome.tabs.onUpdated.addListener(async (tabId, { status }, tab) => {  if (tab.url && await isRecognizedSite(tab.url) && status === "complete") {    await reportPageView(tabId, tab.url);  }});

Content script: remote-config gate (annotated)

dist/contentScripts/index.global.js
// Handles the TRACK_PAGE message the background worker just sent.// eventsPageViewTrack is a value pulled from DontPayFull's remote config// (loaded via GLOBAL_CONFIG) -- it can be "supported", "all", or unset.onMessage(Messages.EXTENSION.TRACK_PAGE, () => {  if (isExtensionLoading.value) return;  // "supported": only send if THIS site is on DontPayFull's own store list  if (eventsPageViewTrack.value === "supported" && isStoreSupported.value) {    track(Events.PAGE_VIEW);  }  // "all": send for every site, no store-list check  if (eventsPageViewTrack.value === "all") {    track(Events.PAGE_VIEW);  }  return true;});

Background: event record construction (annotated)

dist/background/bg.global.js
// Turns the active tab's URL into just its hostname, then attaches// the extension's own ID, version, and a session-correlation hash.async function createEventObject(eventName, storeId = "", opts = {}) {  const tabInfo = opts.tabId ? await getTabInfoById(opts.tabId) : null;  let hostname = "";  if (tabInfo && tabInfo.url) {    hostname = new URL(tabInfo.url).hostname.replace("www.", "");   // <-- the page you visited, reduced to its domain  }  const defaults = await getDefaultObject(eventName, storeId, opts.tabId, hostname);  const extra = getExtraData(eventName, opts);  return { ...defaults, extra };}async function getDefaultObject(eventName, storeId, tabId, hostname) {  const clientId = chrome.runtime.id;   // constant extension ID, same for every install  return {    client_id: clientId,    sid: storeId,    version: chrome.runtime.getManifest().version,    session_group: hashOf(`${clientId}--${storeId}-${tabId ?? 0}`),    release_type: getReleaseType(),    event: eventName,    url: hostname,          // <-- the visited hostname, in the clear  };}

Background: account-ID attach (annotated)

dist/background/bg.global.js
// Reads your DontPayFull account ID out of the auth cookie's JWT payload// and stamps it onto the event object about to be sent.async function attachUserIdToLog(eventObject) {  let userId = await getUserIdFromAuthCookie();  const cachedId = await getCachedUserId();  if (!userId && cachedId && cachedId !== "undefined") {    userId = cachedId;    await refreshCachedUserId();  }  if (userId) {    eventObject.extra.uid = userId;   // <-- ties this page view to your account  }}

Background: X-Session obfuscation (annotated)

dist/background/bg.global.js
// Copies the event object, drops any empty fields, stamps a fingerprint// timestamp, then encodes it into a header using base64 + a randomized// letter-shift cipher. This is obfuscation, not encryption -- there is no// key and no server-side lookup. The shift amount and stripped-padding// count are appended in the clear as the header's last two characters, so// anyone holding the header value can reverse it (see the artifact block).async function addSessionHeader(headers, eventOpts) {  const eventCopy = await createEventObject(eventOpts);  Object.keys(eventCopy).forEach((key) => {    if (!eventCopy[key] || key === "extra") delete eventCopy[key];  });  eventCopy.fingerprint = Date.now() / 1000;  headers["X-Session"] = obfuscate(JSON.stringify(eventCopy));}function obfuscate(jsonText) {  let base64 = btoa(encodeURIComponent(jsonText));  let paddingRemoved = 0;  if (base64.endsWith("==")) { base64 = base64.slice(0, -2); paddingRemoved = 2; }  else if (base64.endsWith("=")) { base64 = base64.slice(0, -1); paddingRemoved = 1; }  const shift = 3 + Math.floor(Math.random() * 6);         // random shift, 3-8  const padded = randomChars(4) + base64 + randomChars(4); // random padding, both ends  return caesarShift(padded, shift) + paddingRemoved + shift;}

Reproduce it yourself

Decodes the X-Session header value the extension attaches to every request to events.dpf.cloud, so you can see exactly what it's reporting about you without trusting our summary.

Requires
  • Node.js 16+ (for the global atob function)
dontpayfull-xsession-decode.js · js
#!/usr/bin/env node// dontpayfull-xsession-decode.js//// Decodes the X-Session request header the extension attaches to every// request to events.dpf.cloud / api.dontpayfull.com. The header is not// encrypted -- it's a base64-encoded copy of the same JSON event object// already sitting in the plaintext request body, obfuscated with a// randomized letter-shift (Caesar) cipher whose shift amount and stripped// base64 padding length are appended as the last two characters.//// Usage://   node dontpayfull-xsession-decode.js '<value of the captured X-Session header>'//// No dependencies -- plain Node.js.function unshift(str, shift) {  const c = ((shift % 26) + 26) % 26;  return str    .split("")    .map((ch) => {      if (/[a-z]/i.test(ch)) {        const code = ch.charCodeAt(0);        if (code >= 65 && code <= 90) {          return String.fromCharCode(((code - 65 - c + 26) % 26) + 65);        }        if (code >= 97 && code <= 122) {          return String.fromCharCode(((code - 97 - c + 26) % 26) + 97);        }      }      return ch;    })    .join("");}function decodeXSession(value) {  if (typeof value !== "string" || value.length < 6) {    throw new Error("Value too short to be a valid X-Session header.");  }  // Last char: the random shift amount (3-8) used by the extension's own  // encoder (function no() -> s() in bg.global.js). Second-to-last char:  // how many "=" base64 padding chars were stripped before shifting (0-2).  const shift = parseInt(value.slice(-1), 10);  const paddingRemoved = parseInt(value.slice(-2, -1), 10);  const shiftedBody = value.slice(0, -2);  const unshifted = unshift(shiftedBody, shift);  // The encoder wraps the base64 payload with 4 random alnum characters on  // each side before shifting (function n() in bg.global.js) -- strip them.  const base64NoPad = unshifted.slice(4, unshifted.length - 4);  const base64 = base64NoPad + "=".repeat(paddingRemoved);  const jsonText = decodeURIComponent(atob(base64));  return JSON.parse(jsonText);}const input = process.argv[2];if (!input) {  console.error("Usage: node dontpayfull-xsession-decode.js '<X-Session header value>'");  process.exit(1);}try {  const decoded = decodeXSession(input);  console.log(JSON.stringify(decoded, null, 2));} catch (err) {  console.error("Failed to decode: " + err.message);  process.exit(1);}
How to run it
  1. 1node dontpayfull-xsession-decode.js '<X-Session header value captured from your own browser's network tab>'

Hosts involved

    • events.dpf.cloud

    Receives the page-view event (hostname, extension ID, account ID if signed in) as plaintext JSON plus an obfuscated X-Session header. Operated by DontPayFull, the developer.

    • api.dontpayfull.com

    Serves the remote config (including the events_page_view_track = "supported"/"all" setting) and the store-recognition list that gates whether a given site's page views get tracked.

Coupon extension can read the names of your other installed extensions

LowunwantedCWE-359Static analysis

Code analysis shows the extension can read the names of all installed extensions.

What actually happens

You did this

A change is made to the extension's local storage.

The onChanged listener runs for every local storage change.

The extension did this

The extension reads the names of all your installed extensions.

The names are included in an error report only when its stored extension ID was removed.

The code that does this

Both management.getAll call sites in the background script

Readable version

Message handler returning the list

dist/background/bg.global.js
onMessage(GET_EXTENSIONS, async () => (await browser.management?.getAll()) ?? [])

Storage listener collecting names

dist/background/bg.global.js
storage.onChanged.addListener(async (changes, area) => {  if (area !== 'local') return;  const idChange = changes[EXTENSION_ID];  const removed = idChange?.oldValue && idChange?.newValue === undefined;  const extra = { extensionIdChange: idChange, changedKeys: Object.keys(changes),    userExtensions: ((await browser.management?.getAll()) ?? []).map(e => e.name) };  if (removed) captureMessage('storage.onChanged - Detected extensionID removed', { extra });})

Fields attached to the error report

  • Installed extension names
    ["uBlock Origin", "Grammarly", "Honey"] (illustrative)

    Lists the other extensions in your browser, which can reveal privacy or security tools.

  • Changed storage keys
    ["extensionId"] (illustrative)

    Names of the settings that changed when the report was made.

Observation

No management.getAll call and no extension list in outbound traffic were observed during a full dynamic-analysis session, so this is code analysis only and the path may be rare.

Observation

Static analysis finding. This behaviour was identified by reading the shipped extension code and has not yet been reproduced in a live run. The trigger conditions and the exact data sent are read from the code, not from an observed capture.

Account-linked coupon activity sent to events.dpf.cloud

LowunwantedCWE-200Dynamic sandbox

When the coupon flow runs, the extension reads the DontPayFull auth cookie, extracts the account id from that token, and adds it as a user id on coupon logs.

What actually happens

You did this

You use the automatic coupon feature on a checkout page.

The relevant code path starts from the Apply Coupons button in the content script.

The extension did this

The extension labels coupon activity with an account id from the DontPayFull authentication cookie.

It then prepares event and cycle logs for events.dpf.cloud.

Fields the code adds to coupon-event and coupon-cycle logs

  • Your account-linked id
    account id 123456 (illustrative)

    This ties coupon activity back to the same DontPayFull account identifier instead of leaving it as an anonymous browser event.

  • Shopping site context
    example-store.com (illustrative)

    This shows which store or page host was active when the coupon event was created.

  • Coupon session
    sid 8421, tab 2990810 (illustrative)

    This lets separate coupon attempts on the same browser be grouped into one application flow.

  • Coupon event name
    start_autoapply

    This records what you did in the coupon interface, such as starting automatic application or copying a code.

  • Coupon-cycle details
    index 2 of 6, session stopped by final screen (illustrative)

    This records coupon attempts, result steps, timing, version, and stop reason for the automatic coupon flow.

Captured request

POSThttps://events.dpf.cloud/automatic-coupons/events/

No request body was captured because dynamic testing did not reproduce the supported checkout coupon-application trigger.

Headers
Content-Type
application/json

Captured request

POSThttps://events.dpf.cloud/automatic-coupons/cycles

No request body was captured because dynamic testing did not reproduce the supported checkout coupon-application trigger.

Headers
Content-Type
application/json

The code that does this

The shipped code reads the auth cookie, adds uid, and posts coupon logs

Readable version

Auth cookie constant and uid attachment in the deobfuscated background bundle

dist/background/bg.global.js
AUTH_COOKIE: {  url: "https://www.dontpayfull.com/",  name: "AUTH_BEARER_DPF"}function h(g) {  var _;  if (!g) return !1;  const p = t(g.value);  return !(!p || !p.data || !((_ = e(p.data)) != null && _.id))}async function f() {  try {    return await C.cookies.get(Z.AUTH_COOKIE)  } catch (g) {    return ze.error("getAuthCookie", g), g.message && g.message.includes(Kr.NO_HOST_PERMISSIONS_COOKIE) && await i(P.EXTENSION.SET_PERMISSIONS_REMOVED_SCREEN, {      visibility: !0    }), null  }}async function A() {  var p;  const g = await f();  if (g != null && g.value) {    const _ = t(g == null ? void 0 : g.value);    return (p = e(_.data)) == null ? void 0 : p.id  }}async function T(g) {  let p = await A();  const _ = await r();  !p && _ && _ !== "undefined" && (p = _, await o()), p && (g.extra.uid = p)}return {  openAuthWindow: c,  closeAuthWindow: d,  handleRemovedAuthWindow: l,  logOut: u,  extractAuthInfoFromCookie: h,  attachUserIdToLog: T,  getAuthCookie: f}

Cycle log POST in the deobfuscated background bundle

dist/background/bg.global.js
class Li {  constructor(e) {    this.codeApplyInfo = {}, this.code = "", this.error = "", this.index = -1, this.maxIndex = -1, this.sid = -1, this.extensionID = "", this.stoppedBy = X.NO_STOPPED, this.version = "0.0.0", this.releaseType = "public", this.tabID = -1, this.codeApplyInfo = e.storage.currentCodeApplyInfo, this.code = e.storage.currentCode, this.index = e.storage.currentIndex, this.error = e.storage.lastError, this.maxIndex = e.storage.maxIndex, this.sid = e.storage.sid, this.extensionID = e.extensionID, this.stoppedBy = e.storage.stoppedBy, this.version = e.extVersion, this.releaseType = e.releaseType, this.tabID = e.tabID  }  getLog() {    var o, i, a;    var e, n, s;    const r = `${this.extensionID}--${this.sid}-${this.tabID}`;    return {      client: {        id: this.extensionID || ""      },      tid: Array.isArray(this.codeApplyInfo.trainings) && this.codeApplyInfo.trainings[0].id ? this.codeApplyInfo.trainings[0].id : -1,      tv: this.codeApplyInfo.trainingVersion || "",      session: this.codeApplyInfo.session || "",      index: this.index > -1 ? this.index : -1,      index_max: (o = this.maxIndex) != null ? o : -1,      sid: (i = this.sid) != null ? i : -1,      code: (a = (e = this.codeApplyInfo.codeInfo) == null ? void 0 : e.hash) != null ? a : this.code || "",      code_type: (n = this.codeApplyInfo.codeInfo) == null ? void 0 : n.type,      is_code_hash: !!((s = this.codeApplyInfo.codeInfo) != null && s.hash),      steps: this.codeApplyInfo.steps || {},      started_at: this.codeApplyInfo.startedAt || new Date("01/01/1970").toISOString(),      ended_at: this.codeApplyInfo.endedAt || new Date("01/01/1970").toISOString(),      last_error: this.error || "",      session_stopped_by: this.stoppedBy || "",      version: this.version || it.EXT_VERSION,      session_group: ee.hashStr(r),      release_type: this.releaseType || it.RELEASE_TYPE    }  }  sendLog() {    if (Di() || !this.codeApplyInfo.startedAt && !this.codeApplyInfo.endedAt) return Promise.resolve();    const e = this.getLog();    return fetch("https://events.dpf.cloud/automatic-coupons/cycles", {      method: "POST",      headers: {        "Content-Type": "application/json"      },      body: JSON.stringify(e)    })  }}

Event log POST and Apply Coupons trigger in the deobfuscated content script

dist/contentScripts/index.global.js
async function t(o) {  return await xm().attachUserIdToLog(o), Xc(ws.EVENTS_LOG).request({    method: "post",    postData: o  })}function n({  url: o,  body: r}) {  return Xc(o).request({    method: "post",    postData: r  })}return {  sendCouponReview: e,  sendEventLog: t,  sendGA4Log: n}if (!D.length) {  t(ve.START_AUTOAPPLY), n(vn.APPLY_COUPONS, {    location: !0  });  const T = await Q();  if (T && T.preventLoad) return Kt().setMainScreenVisibility(!0)}r(), D.length ? (x ? c(D, f.value) : A(D), v.value = !1) : s(), l(!0), _i().applyHopURL(), Bo().removeStandDownOnInteract(), mo().closeAutoApplyPopup(), p(!1), await fr().startApplyingSession()

Remote hosts receiving the coupon telemetry

    • events.dpf.cloud

    Receives automatic coupon event logs and coupon-cycle logs that include account-linked uid fields and coupon-flow context.

    • api.dontpayfull.com

    Receives extension API requests for coupon configuration, store resolution, active codes, expired codes, trainings, deals, and related stores.

If you have Shopilo installed

  1. Open chrome://extensions and turn on Developer mode to show IDs. Find the one with ID jfoanacamkbfibjbidbmeobmnndfgpca and choose Remove.
  2. Scan your browser to check the rest of your extensions.

What Shopilo can do

Permissions this extension asks for, as declared in version 2.2.6. Asking for a permission is not a finding on its own - it is what the extension can do if it chooses to.

  • Read and change your data on every site you visit

    <all_urls>

  • Schedule its own background tasks

    alarms

  • See the address and title of every tab you have open

    tabs

  • Store data in your browser

    storage

  • Run its own code inside the pages you visit

    scripting

  • See every page you navigate to, as you navigate to it

    webNavigation

  • Watch every request your browser makes

    webRequest

  • See, disable and uninstall your other extensions, including your security ones

    management

  • Read and change cookies, including the ones that keep you signed in

    cookies

Shopilo version history

  1. 2.1.27

    Mar 4, 2026

  2. 2.1.36

    Apr 11, 2026

  3. 2.1.43

    Jun 21, 2026

  4. 2.2.6

    Oct 28, 2026

Chrome Web Store listing

Versions
2.2.6 latest of 4 seen since March 4, 2026
Store rating
4.9 from 6,562 ratings
Last updated
June 19, 2026
Size
1.54 MiB
Privacy policy
www.dontpayfull.com
Updated November 20, 2026