Is WA Blaster safe?

Medium risk

WA Blaster embeds a reusable bearer token for its CRM lead-update API in the installed extension package.

The shipped main, content, and service-worker scripts include the same Authorization bearer token and use it when posting lead-update requests to an AWS API endpoint. The source also includes bypass code that forces Pro/broadcast-limit checks to pass while the extension operates on web.whatsapp.com.

The Digitalifyv10.0.60Chrome Web Store
46Risk
Who publishes it

The Digitalify - 1 other listing from the same operator, none carrying a finding

What this publisher told the store about itself, and the other listings that told it the same thing.

Publisher
The Digitalify

Same store account

1 other listing published from this account, 4 users between them, none of them carrying a finding.

Shared hosts - 1 hostname

Hostnames hardcoded in this extension that few other listings call. That can mean one operator behind both, and it can equally mean a small shared vendor, so it is context rather than a conclusion. Hosts that many listings call are left out: they are services, not connections.

dummy-s3-url-bypassed.com
Also called by 8 other listings, including WAPP Sender

AI-generated. Findings may contain errors. Those marked Verified have been manually reviewed.

Publishers can request a review.

Findings

WA Blaster disables paid-plan and broadcast safety controls.

Using WA Blaster on WhatsApp Web runs code that forces paid-plan and broadcast-limit checks to always pass, and reports broadcasts as completed regardless.

It reads page content and extension storage while sending via web.whatsapp.com.

Severity
Medium unwanted
Type
Unexpected
CWE
CWE-506
Source
Dynamic sandbox
What actually happens
You did this

The user starts a WA Blaster send action on WhatsApp Web.

The extension did this

The extension makes paid-plan and broadcast-limit checks pass, reports completion, and continues the send flow through web.whatsapp.com.

Captured request
POSTweb.whatsapp.com
Fields used by the extension behavior
  • WhatsApp page content
    WhatsApp Web chat and compose area (illustrative)

    DOM content can include the active WhatsApp Web interface that the extension reads or controls while sending messages.

  • Extension storage data
    Plan and broadcast state values (illustrative)

    Storage data can preserve extension state such as plan status, limits, or send-progress values used by the broadcast flow.

Observation

Observed during dynamic analysis, WA Blaster was confirmed to make its plan and broadcast-limit checks return as allowed while reporting broadcast progress as completed.

What it can do

Permissions this extension asks for, as declared in version 10.0.60. Asking for a permission is not a finding on its own - it is what the extension can do if it chooses to.

  • Read and change your data on soletstalkapp.com

    https://soletstalkapp.com/*

  • Read and change your data on www.soletstalkapp.com

    https://www.soletstalkapp.com/*

  • Read and change your data on wasender.ai

    https://wasender.ai/*

  • Read and change your data on www.wasender.ai

    https://www.wasender.ai/*

  • Store data in your browser

    storage

  • Read and change cookies, including the ones that keep you signed in

    cookies

Where it sends data

Destinations our analysis observed WA Blaster contacting. Sending data somewhere is not a finding on its own - an extension that syncs your settings has to talk to its own server - but it is where your data can go, and who else it goes to.

  • web.whatsapp.com

    WA Blaster sends data to web.whatsapp.com. 7 other extensions we have analysed send data here.

  • 022os10kr2.execute-api.ap-south-1.amazonaws.com

    WA Blaster sends data to 022os10kr2.execute-api.ap-south-1.amazonaws.com. No other extension we have analysed sends data here.

Updated 30 September 2026gnnbicblnglgjplblalhlhoieedcpkph