Is 购物党自动比价工具-AI看差评和商品对比 safe?

Critical risk

购物党 is critical risk. Code analysis shows that, when remote config enables it, the extension reads item IDs, prices and quantities on JD.com and VIP.com checkout pages and posts them to gwdang.com.…

购物党v5.17.4Extension ID jgphnjokjhjlcnnajmfjlacjnjkhleahChrome Web Store
96Risk
AI-assisted analysis.

购物党 findings

Gwdang extension can send JD.com and VIP.com checkout item details to gwdang.com

HighunwantedCWE-359Static analysis

Code analysis shows that, when remote config enables it, the extension reads item IDs, prices and quantities on JD.com and VIP.com checkout pages and posts them to gwdang.com.

What actually happens

You did this

You open a JD.com or VIP.com checkout page.

The extension did this

If the remote flag is on, the extension reads your order items and sends them to gwdang.com.

Dynamic analysis could not reach a logged-in checkout, so the send was not observed.

Fields read from each order item

  • Product ID
    100012043978

    Identifies which product is in your order.

  • Price
    2399.00

    The price you are paying for the item.

  • Quantity
    1

    How many units you are buying.

  • Host and time

    Which shop page it came from and when.

The code that does this

Gate, collection and upload

Readable version

jdCollect: DOM fields read

js/chrome.js
async function jdCollect() {  await (__webpack_require__(30888).waitForConditionFn)(() => {    return $('.goods-item').length;  });  let list = $('.goods-item').toArray().map(item => {    let priceText = $(item).find('.p-price .jd-price').text();    if (!priceText) {      priceText = $(item).find('.p-price .jd-final-price').text();    }    if (!priceText) {      priceText = $(item).find('.p-price .jd-final-plus-price').text();    }    if (!priceText) {      priceText = $(item).find('.p-price').html();    }    return {      id: $(item).attr('goods-id'),      // url: $(item).find('.p-img a').attr('href'),      // title: $(item).find('.p-name a').text().trim(),      price: priceText.replace(/[¥¥]+/g, '').replace(/,/g, ''),      price_html: $(item).find('.p-price').html(),      num: $(item).find('.p-num').text().replace(/[^\d]/g, '')

Hosts involved

    • cdn.gwdang.com

    Serves gwdang.json config containing the allowCartCollect flag.

    • browser.gwdang.com

    Receives the order data at /extension/PluginHelper?op=orderData.

Observation

Three dynamic analysis sessions confirmed the flag was live as true, but JD.com and VIP.com required a logged-in account, so no upload was observed. This finding rests on code analysis.

Observation

Static analysis finding. This behaviour was identified by reading the shipped extension code and has not yet been reproduced in a live run. The trigger conditions and the exact data sent are read from the code, not from an observed capture.

Extension posts Pinduoduo search page HTML to browser.gwdang.com

HighunwantedCWE-359Static analysis

Code analysis shows that on Pinduoduo the extension requests keywords from browser.gwdang.com, loads a search page for one, and posts the page HTML back.

What actually happens

You did this

You browse a page on yangkeduo.com.

The extension did this

The extension fetches a keyword from browser.gwdang.com, loads the matching search page and posts its HTML back.

Applies only when the server returns a keyword.

The code that does this

Keyword fetch, page load and upload in chrome.js

Readable version

Same code as shipped (module is already readable)

js/chrome.js
const ids = await request.get(G.server + '/extension/PluginHelper?op=pinWords&t=' + now);if (!ids.ids.length) { return; }let keyword = ids.ids[0].split('-')[1];let key = ids.ids[0];const urlPrefix = "https://mobile.yangkeduo.com/brand_activity_search_result.html";const url = joinUrlParams(urlPrefix, urlParams);fetch(url).then(r => r.text()).then(result => {  const toUpload = {};  toUpload[key] = result;  let payload = String.fromCharCode.apply(null, gzip.gZip(toUpload));  request.post(G.server + '/extension/PluginHelper?op=pinData&t=' + Date.now(), btoa(payload));});

What the pinData upload contains

  • Keyword ID
    1234-usb cable (illustrative)

    Identifier returned by the server for the searched keyword.

  • Search page HTML
    <!DOCTYPE html><html>... (page markup)

    Full HTML of the Pinduoduo search results page.

  • Encoding
    H4sIAAAAAAAA... (illustrative)

    Gzip compressed then base64 encoded before posting.

Hosts involved

    • browser.gwdang.com

    Supplies keywords (pinWords) and receives page HTML (pinData).

    • mobile.yangkeduo.com

    Pinduoduo host the search results page is loaded from.

When this fires

Every 4 hours · flushes at 5 queued events

At most one run per minute and 5 runs per 4 hours per browser profile, counted in localStorage.

Observation

Static analysis finding. This behaviour was identified by reading the shipped extension code and has not yet been reproduced in a live run. The trigger conditions and the exact data sent are read from the code, not from an observed capture.

Extension Fingerprints Your Device And Probes Your Local IP

MediumunwantedCWE-359Dynamic sandbox

This extension builds a device fingerprint (canvas, WebGL, fonts) on every page, refreshed every 2s for 5 minutes.

What actually happens

You did this

You visit any page that isn't on the extension's exclude list.

This covers the large majority of ordinary websites, not just gwdang.com or shopping sites.

The extension did this

The extension builds a hardware/behavioral fingerprint of your device and probes for your local network IP, then stores both as cookies on its own domain alongside the page URL.

We confirmed this live: fingerprint cookies were set on gwdang.com and WebRTC requests to the exact servers named in the code fired within seconds of the page loading.

What gets collected and sent on every non-excluded page

  • Device fingerprint hash
    5e910057d1375d77c4e67f2cef2aaef6

    A hash built from canvas, WebGL renderer, and fonts, stable across visits, letting the extension recognize your device after cookies clear.

  • Local network IP address
    192.168.1.42 (illustrative — the actual value depends on your network)

    Your device's real local/LAN IP, discovered via a WebRTC technique that can work even when you're browsing through a VPN.

  • Mouse, keyboard and scroll activity
    42 clicks, 118 key presses, 7 scrolls (illustrative)

    Counts of clicks, key presses, and scroll events on the page, folded into the tracking profile as a behavioral signal.

  • Battery level
    76% (illustrative)

    Your device's current battery percentage, one more device attribute added to the profile.

  • Page you were browsing
    https://www.amazon.com/

    The fingerprint is sent together with the exact URL of the page you're on, linking your device identity to specific browsing activity.

The code that does this

Fingerprint collection and the WebRTC IP probe

Readable version

Annotated: what the init routine does

// module.exports.init runs on every page the content script matches// (i.e. any page not on the ~40-domain exclude list).module.exports.init = function () {  let details = new DynamicDetails();            // behavioral tracker: mouse,                                                   // keys, scroll, WebRTC IP,                                                   // battery, orientation  // ... restores any previously saved profile from localStorage ...  collectMovement(details);                       // attaches the listeners                                                   // and starts getWebRTCIP()  Fingerprint2.get({ /* canvas, WebGL, fonts, ... */ }, components => {    const fp = Fingerprint2.x64hash128(      components.map(c => c.value).join(''), 31   // hash of hardware signals    );    communicate.trigger({ type: 'fp', value: fp }); // -> gwd_extension event                                                     //    -> 'fp' cookie on                                                     //       gwdang.com  });  // Every 2 seconds, for up to 5 minutes, re-encode and re-send the  // behavioral profile (mouse/key/scroll counts, WebRTC IP, battery, ...):  setInterval(() => {    communicate.trigger({ type: 'fingerprint', value: details.encode() });                                                     // -> 'dfp' cookie  }, 2000);};

Captured request

GEThttps://browser.gwdang.com/extension?ac=currency&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.amazon.com%2F&fp=5e910057d1375d77c4e67f2cef2aaef6

Request observed during dynamic analysis while browsing amazon.com with the extension active. The fp parameter carries the same 32-character fingerprint hash recorded moments earlier as the 'fp' cookie on gwdang.com in the same session.

Where the fingerprint and IP-discovery traffic goes

    • browser.gwdang.com

    Receives the device fingerprint, paired with the URL of the page you were browsing.

    • gwdang.com

    Cookie domain for the 'fp' (fingerprint hash) and 'dfp' (encoded behavioral data) values set by the extension's background worker.

    • stun.cloudflare.com:3478

    STUN server used to discover your local/LAN IP address via WebRTC ICE candidate gathering.

    • stun.qq.com:3478

    Second STUN server used for the same WebRTC IP-discovery probe.

If you have 购物党 installed

  1. Open chrome://extensions and turn on Developer mode to show IDs. Find the one with ID jgphnjokjhjlcnnajmfjlacjnjkhleah and choose Remove.
  2. Block the servers only it was seen contacting: cdn.gwdang.com, browser.gwdang.com, i.gwdang.com, www.gwdang.com.
  3. Scan your browser to check the rest of your extensions.

What 购物党 can do

Permissions this extension asks for, as declared in version 5.17.4. Asking for a permission is not a finding on its own - it is what the extension can do if it chooses to.

  • Read and change your data on gwdang.com

    https://*.gwdang.com/

  • Read and change your data on every site you visit

    <all_urls> and 1 more

  • Read and change your data on every secure site you visit

    https://*/*

  • Read and change cookies, including the ones that keep you signed in

    cookies

  • Store data in your browser

    storage

  • Schedule its own background tasks

    alarms

购物党 version history

  1. 5.16.35

    Mar 4, 2026

  2. 5.17.3

    Jun 26, 2026

  3. 5.17.4

    Oct 28, 2026

Where 购物党 sends data

  • cdn.gwdang.com/plt_web/template/…33 calls

    From its own pages · only this extension

  • browser.gwdang.com/extension8 calls

    From its background script · only this extension

  • browser.gwdang.com/api/haitao2 calls

    From its background script · only this extension

  • browser.gwdang.com/brwext/dp_query_latest2 calls

    From its background script · only this extension

  • browser.gwdang.com/brwext/history2 calls

    From its background script · only this extension

  • browser.gwdang.com/brwext/monitor2 calls

    From its background script · only this extension

  • browser.gwdang.com/brwext/permanent_id2 calls

    From its background script · only this extension

  • browser.gwdang.com/brwext/prepare2 calls

    From its background script · only this extension

  • browser.gwdang.com/brwext/promo_brand2 calls

    From its background script · only this extension

  • browser.gwdang.com/brwext/tbres2 calls

    From its background script · only this extension

  • browser.gwdang.com/extension/price_towards2 calls

    From its background script · only this extension

  • browser.gwdang.com/extension/review2 calls

    From its background script · only this extension

  • cdn.gwdang.com/images/extensions/…2 calls

    From its own pages · only this extension

  • cdn.gwdang.com/js/configs/…2 calls

    From its background script · only this extension

  • i.gwdang.com/User/Detail1 call

    From its own pages · only this extension

  • m.media-amazon.com/images/I/…1 call

    From a script it injects into websites · 35 other extensions

  • www.gwdang.com/window/banner1 call

    From its own pages · only this extension

Chrome Web Store listing

Versions
5.17.4 latest of 3 seen since March 4, 2026
Store rating
3.5 from 434 ratings
Last updated
June 24, 2026
Size
8.6 MiB
Privacy policy
www.gwdang.com
Updated July 21, 2026