Is ID Card reader extension safe?

Clean risk

ID Card reader extension relays commands from matched service pages to a local native ID-card reader host.

The extension runs on localhost pages and listed Serbian ID-card service pages, then accepts same-window messages addressed to its native service. It forwards the supplied command to the local rs.omnipay.idcardreader.service native host and posts the native host's reply back to the page.

OmniPayv1.1Chrome Web Store
1Risk
Who publishes it

OmniPay doo - no other listings under this identity

What this publisher told the store about itself, and the other listings that told it the same thing.

Publisher
OmniPay
Declared legal entity
OmniPay doo
Registered address
Esad Pašina 13, Belgrade 11000, RS
Website

AI-generated. Findings may contain errors. Those marked Verified have been manually reviewed.

Publishers can request a review.

What it can do

Permissions this extension asks for, as declared in version 1.1. Asking for a permission is not a finding on its own - it is what the extension can do if it chooses to.

  • Talk to a program installed on your computer, outside the browser's sandbox

    nativeMessaging

Where it sends data

Destinations our analysis observed ID Card reader extension contacting. Sending data somewhere is not a finding on its own - an extension that syncs your settings has to talk to its own server - but it is where your data can go, and who else it goes to.

  • rs.omnipay.idcardreader.service

    ID Card reader extension sends data to rs.omnipay.idcardreader.service. No other extension we have analysed sends data here.

Updated 30 September 2026ifdgimjbcclgbaheeeimoegnoohheofn