Is Lightning Autofill safe?

Medium risk

Lightning Autofill is medium risk.

Lightning Autofill fetches encrypted JavaScript from its servers and injects it into every web page for paid license holders.

For users with a paid license (tier 2 or above), the extension periodically contacts api.lightningautofill.com, downloads AES-GCM-encrypted code blobs, decrypts them using the user's license key as key material, and registers the resulting scripts into the MAIN world on all web pages at document_start. The injected scripts run with eval enabled (unsafe-eval CSP) and can read and modify any page the user visits.

tohodo.comv14.24.3Extension ID nlmmgnhgdeffjkdckmikfpnddkbbfkkkChrome Web Store
51Risk
Who publishes it

tohodo.com - no other listings under this identity, 4 shared hostnames

Publisher
tohodo.com

Shared hosts - 4 hostnames

Hostnames hardcoded in this extension that few other listings call. That can mean one operator behind both, and it can equally mean a small shared vendor, so it is context rather than a conclusion. Hosts that many listings call are left out: they are services, not connections.

ai.lightningautofill.com
Also called by 2 other listings, including Lightning Autofill
docs.lightningautofill.com
Also called by 3 other listings, including Lightning Autofill, Rapid Autofill
lightningautofill.com
Also called by 4 other listings, including Lightning Autofill, Rapid Autofill, Password Slug
tohodo.com
Also called by 6 other listings
AI-assisted analysis.

Lightning Autofill findings

Lightning Autofill can run vendor-supplied encrypted code on every site

HighunwantedCWE-829Static analysis

Code analysis shows paid users' extension fetches encrypted code from api.lightningautofill.com, decrypts it and registers it to run inside every page.

What actually happens

You did this

You have a paid Lightning Autofill licence and browse any website.

The extension did this

The extension can download encrypted code from the vendor and run it inside the pages you visit.

Code analysis indicates the code runs in the page's own context on all sites.

The code that does this

Registration of decrypted remote code

Readable version

Readable equivalent

js/eventPage.js
// Decrypt each server-supplied blob, join them, and register the result as a user scriptasync function registerRemoteScript(blobs) {  const id = SCRIPT_IDS[2];  if ((await chrome.userScripts.getScripts({ ids: [id] })).length) return;  const code = (await decrypt(blobs[0], key)) + (await decrypt(blobs[4], key)) + (await decrypt(blobs[8], key));  await chrome.userScripts.configureWorld({ csp: "script-src 'self' 'unsafe-eval'", messaging: true });  await chrome.userScripts.register([{ id, allFrames: true, js: [{ code }], matches: ["<all_urls>"], runAt: "document_start", world: "MAIN" }]);}// decrypt(): base64 -> salt[0:16] | iv[16:28] | ciphertext[28:]; PBKDF2-SHA256 100000 iterations -> AES-GCM-256

Registration parameters

  • Match scope
    <all_urls>, all frames

    The code can run on every website you open.

  • Execution context
    MAIN world, document_start

    The code shares the page's own JavaScript environment.

  • Decryption key
    user@example.com:Autofill description (illustrative)

    Derived from your licence key and the extension description.

Code source

    • api.lightningautofill.com

    Vendor API that validates the licence and returns the encrypted code blobs.

What was and was not observed

During dynamic analysis the extension contacted the vendor API with a forged licence and received an HTTP 400 rejection, so the decrypt and register steps were not reached. Later runs lacked the userScripts API in the test browser.

Observation

Static analysis finding. This behaviour was identified by reading the shipped extension code and has not yet been reproduced in a live run. The trigger conditions and the exact data sent are read from the code, not from an observed capture.

What Lightning Autofill can do

Permissions this extension asks for, as declared in version 14.24.3. Asking for a permission is not a finding on its own - it is what the extension can do if it chooses to.

  • Read and change your data on every site you visit

    <all_urls>

  • Schedule its own background tasks

    alarms

  • Add items to the right-click menu

    contextMenus

  • Sign you in with your Google account

    identity

  • Run hidden pages in the background

    offscreen

  • Run its own code inside the pages you visit

    scripting

  • Show a panel beside the page

    sidePanel

  • Store data in your browser

    storage

  • Store an unlimited amount of data in your browser

    unlimitedStorage

userScripts

Where Lightning Autofill sends data

  • github-production-user-asset-6210df.s3.amazonaws.com/4110567/…9 calls

    From its own pages · only this extension

  • api.lightningautofill.com/o/…4 calls

    From its background script · also found in its code · only this extension

  • cdn.jsdelivr.net/gh/tohodo/…4 calls

    From a script it injects into websites · 25 other extensions

  • www.googleapis.com/oauth2/v2/…4 calls

    From its background script · 2 other extensions

Named inside its requests but not contacted (servers it tested or reported on): news-2025.md, news-2026.md, support-links.md.

Chrome Web Store listing

Versions
14.24.3 seen since March 4, 2026
Store rating
3.4 from 2,117 ratings
Last updated
November 13, 2025
Size
548 KiB
Privacy policy
www.tohodo.com
Updated November 20, 2026